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This dissertation asserts that critical historiography, a term first 
used by Stefan Berger and later by Mark Jarzombek, is worthy of 
extensive development as a discourse.  Furthermore, it calls for both 
intra- and interdisciplinary research regarding the meaning, relevance, 
and application of critical historiography and its methods. Though 
post-structural approaches to historiography have afforded attention 
to the literary construction of written historical narratives, they have 
all but ignored Derrida’s caution against the suppression of writing to 
rhetoric, which reduces writing to speech’s graphic representation.  My 
study restores the place of writing qua writing to historiography, a 
position, I insist, that is underscored—actually necessitated—by its 
etymology.  While interest in historical narrative during the 1970s, 80s 
and 90s began an important chapter in postmodern historiography, 
my dissertation indicates that this was only an initial foray; these 
approaches neglected its written or inscribed telos.  Rather than the 
study of tropes, which remains largely indifferent to writing’s 
supplemental status, I look to written operations within 
historiography, drawing on Greimassian semiotics.  I conduct an 
investigation of the effects of two operations on historical writing, one 
which centers on the inscription of charismatic authority, the other on 
the operation of ekphrasis within historical description.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS CRITICAL HISTORIOGRAPHY? 
 
In 1996, comparative European historian Stefan Berger 
introduced into print the term, ‘critical’ historiography; likely, it was 
the first instance of that term in English-language academic 
publications.1  Four years later, MIT architectural historian, Mark 
Jarzombek, devoted the prolegomenon to his book, The Psychologizing 
of Modernity: Art, Architecture, and History, to an investigation of 
critical historiography (which, this time, appeared without Berger’s 
quotation marks).2  Given the popularity in the academy of both 
critical theory and new approaches to historiography, the appearance 
of the term was propitious.  In both cases, these prominent 
contemporary historians of Modernity independently began a rich 
discursive dialogue on the meaning, value, and practice of that 
compound expression. 
But in each case, the term itself was introduced without 
background, explanation, or procedural description: indeed, critical 
historiography remains undefined in scholarly literature.  Yet, the 
seeming specificity suggests that the term might offer a more precise, 
potentially powerful type of analysis to the contemporary historian.  A 
cursory glance at the term indicates an endocentric compound.  Thus, 
the semantic head of the term lies within the latter word, and its 
                                       
1  Stefan Berger, "The Rise and Fall of `Critical' Historiography?" European Review of 
History 3.2 (1996). 
2  Mark Jarzombek, The Psychologizing of Modernity: Art, Architecture, and History 
(Cambridge, U.K.; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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critical descriptor indicates a type or kind within that larger category, 
“historiography.”  Before this can prove useful, however, we must pay 
some effort in sketching out a discursive territory for historiography, 
itself.  Even a fast perusal of contemporary historical criticism amply 
shows that there has yet to emerge a consensus on historiography’s 
provenance. 
This dissertation, accordingly, offers preliminary research into 
the meaning, method, and repercussions of a critical historiography.  I 
proceed under the assumption that critical historiography would 
potentially enrich current discussions within historiography, critical 
theory, and especially the interdisciplinary research across those 
fields. 
Pursuit of the term involves not only a history of the idea, but 
more formidable epistemological questions, as well.  My research 
argues that though a number of interdisciplinary approaches may 
provide similarly useful angles, critical historiography is in fundament 
visually anchored to writing.  As a visual matter, it is appropriate that 
a historian of art—still the discipline most suited to visual questions—
approach the interrogation of the term.  To begin, I turn first to the 
aforementioned accounts by Berger and Jarzombek.  Their respective 
essays engage with modern approaches to historical writing.  For 
Berger, ‘critical’ historiography finds its roots in post-Marxist politics 
of resistance, while for Jarzombek, critical historiography originates in 
the European avant-garde movement.  Neither Berger nor Jarzombek, 
however, looks immanently into the term, garnering some sense of 
scope from etymological clues. 
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I, therefore, turn to etymology, which in the case of critical 
historiography, sufficiently focuses requirements on any endeavor 
under that term.  Early usage of the word, “critical,” was medical in 
nature, invoked to describe discernment or judgment as with a 
disease.  A kind of visual prognostication, the word grew more 
generalized, later encompassing judgments of either fault or value in 
an object.  (We might even regard criticism itself as a kind of reading, a 
searching for flaw or virtue in a given text.)   
Historiography, however, in every respect indicates a narrative 
that has been written, or the study of historical writing, in both 
senses.  Thus, the pen distinguishes historiography from the 
nonspecific study of historical criticism, the latter of which makes no 
modal determination.  A consequent tenet of this dissertation holds 
that writing, in every instance herein, be given the broadest scope, 
following the pioneering work of the late philosopher, Jacques Derrida. 
In his pivotal work, Of Grammatology, Derrida cautions against 
the suppression of writing to rhetoric in which writing denotes merely 
a graphic representation of speech.  My dissertation responds to 
Derrida’s call by restoring the place of writing qua writing to 
historiography, a position, I insist, that is underscored—actually 
necessitated—by its etymology.  Though attention to historical 
narrative from the 1970s onward began an important chapter in 
postmodern historiography, my dissertation indicates that this was 
only an initial foray; these approaches neglected the written or 
inscribed telos of historiography.    Since I throughout the dissertation 
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refer to this telos as its “written-ness” or its “inscription,” I will pause 
here to give those two descriptors a fuller treatment. 
By “written-ness,” I refer to the state or condition of being 
written; consistent with a Derridean framework, this state or quality 
results more from a process of division or delineation than literal 
alphabetic transcription or encoding.  As a state or condition, written-
ness is modal, and might best be described as resulting from the 
operation, “writing.”  That operation itself, which I will explore later in 
chapter two, can be described as “inscription,” if it includes an object 
or substrate upon or within which that writing occurs.  Thus, while 
writing refers to an operation, inscription simultaneously enjoins the 
object to that writing act. 
Moreover, I continue in chapter two to insist that historiography, 
as a problem of writing, inherently relies on visual processes.  This 
may confound scholars accustomed to thinking of vision as a strictly 
ocular process.  Vision, rather, is a cognitive process which cannot be 
tied wholly to the eyes, but rather to varying degrees, informs any 
cognitive operation that relies on visuo-spatial effects, real or ideal.  As 
I cite in Derrida, mark making, whether by pen and paper, trails 
through a landscape, or ultimately, the rectilinear plotting of a logic 
operation (as in Greimas’s rectangle), all constitute writing, and gain at 
least part of their meaning effects through visualization. 
Vision, however, is subject to a variety of conditions that may 
warp or obfuscate an image; so, too, is historiography vulnerable to 
visual distortion.  My research critically examines the especially visual 
effects of charismatic authority on written history from a sociological 
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perspective.  Charismatic authority, I argue, causes direct 
misperceptions of the historical field, thereby providing opportunity for 
historiographic critique.  I begin with Max Weber's definition of 
charisma as a transaction between a leader and the followers that 
bestow upon the leader an authority and investment in his or her 
message.  Historians, I argue, in the construction of their own writing, 
may knowingly or unwittingly participate in a charismatic transaction 
diachronically with the subject of their history—the charismatic 
authority.  Cautioning against such a history, which often follows a 
seamless “Grand Narrative” form to mask its own complicity, I insist 
that the responsible contemporary historian can forgo charismatic 
participation by drawing critical attention to the contradictions 
inherent in historical inscription.  In doing so, attention to writing 
within historicism ensures that the historiographer no longer 
conspires in Grand Narrative, but instead highlights history’s 
immanence within writing. 
An approach that endeavors to avoid such seamless historical 
narrative might follow the Foucauldian model of archaeology, which 
takes special interest in historical “ruptures,” rather than continuous 
causality.  In this manner, I investigate the practice of ekphrasis, a 
writing style in which an author purports to represent faithfully in 
language a visual image, usually a work of art.  Showing that such a 
representation cannibalizes the visual, I contend that ekphrasis 
exemplifies a rupture between text and image. Rather than the study 
of tropes, which is largely indifferent to writing’s supplemental status, 
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I look to written operations, with an emphasis which foreshadows my 
interest in Greimassian semiotics.   
 I conclude this study with a close look at the relationship of 
image to text within a Greimassian semiotic perspective, in which 
figurative language affords a process for encoding the visual within 
discourse.  This process is, however, always operational and cannot 
promise any fidelity in the transposition of image into text.  Instead, 
the inscription of figuration constitutes writing in a Derridean sense, 
and therefore for the historian, any issue of inscription must be a 
historiographical question. 
 
Historiography is Fundamentally Visual 
The compound “critical historiography” rarely appears in 
scholarly documents, and when it does, it often lacks historical 
context and an explanation of theoretical affiliation.  The idiom likely 
derives from the conjunction of “critical theory” with the much older 
word, “historiography.”  Critical theory, in the contemporary sense, 
originated with the Frankfurt School around 1937.  That term is often 
interpreted as a tactical protocol with which its proponents may 
launch political and ideological opposition to oppressive regimes.3  
While the term has expanded in its scope,  the only scholarly accounts 
                                       
3  See, for example, Contested Knowledge, which espouses just such an 
interpretation.  This is only a partial understanding, though, since its creators—
especially Theodore Adorno—were concerned that a radical left could just as easily 
spout a totalitarian ideology as the right.  Instead, their project is more correctly 
interpreted as a dialectical reading, to offer question of any directive ideology; it was 
less concerned with the replacement of one regime with a more just, or democratic 
one, but only with providing the tools with which to critique any political force. 
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of “critical historiography” originate with writers evidently influenced 
by the Frankfurt School; thus, I maintain the narrower sense of 
“critical” given that limitation.  With its longer etymological history, 
historiography, has referred to many different facets of historical 
practice:  the writing of history, written history itself, the study of 
either, or even, as is most often the case with art history, an implied 
critical evaluation of the work of historians (written or otherwise). 
This dissertation opens by taking up two of the rare 
contemporary instances of “critical historiography,” one in the work of 
architectural historian Mark Jarzombek and a second in the work of 
European historian, Stefan Berger.  These two scholars stand out in 
contemporary historiography as the only active scholars today to 
employ the compound term “critical historiography” in their 
scholarship.  Jarzombek uses the term as a corrective to what he sees 
as Modernism’s influence on contemporary historical methods, while 
Berger claims the term refers to an under-critical, defensive posture 
assumed by historians in the 1980s as a response to neoconservative 
scholarship. 
Given the paucity of explicit references to “critical 
historiography,” I turn to several contemporary writers who investigate 
historiography from a “critical” perspective.  This group of authors 
works either from within the paradigm set by the Frankfurt School, or 
else from literary critical perspectives, especially those influenced by 
the post-structural “linguistic turn.”  In this group, I look at the works 
of Carl Becker, Allan Megill, Stephen Bann, Hayden White, Elizabeth 
Clark, and Madeline Caviness.  
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In all but the last of these contemporary writers, I locate a 
problematic treatment of the term “historiography.”  What their 
formulations lack is an acknowledgment of the written aspect of 
historiography, an aspect distinct from its rhetorical construction.  
This is especially surprising in the case of those working from a post-
structural linguistic approach, since they would likely be fluent in 
Derridean deconstruction, which enjoys semiotic play in etymological 
constructions of words. 
 
When Vision Deceives: Viewing the Field Under Charismatic Authority 
I establish in chapter two a working definition of critical 
historiography as a dialectical study of written history, I proceed in 
chapter three to critique the effects charismatic authority draws out in 
written history; to do this, I turn first to Max Weber.  Weber’s best 
known work on charismatic authority accompanies extended 
meditations on Second Temple prophets in his essay, “The Sociology of 
Charismatic Authority.”4  In that essay, Weber suggests that one social 
process in which followers vested leaders with authority involved 
charisma.  In such a situation, a given leader, one with a message 
counter to dominant religious leadership, believes himself to receive 
divine authority; if he offers sufficient “proof” to a followership, they 
will cede to him authority on account of his divine gift, i.e., his 
charisma.  While Weber holds that the charismatic looks only inward 
for divine or magical confirmation of that authority, Weber 
                                       
4  Max Weber and S. N. Eisenstadt, Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building; 
Selected Papers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968) 313. 
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nevertheless notices that the followership of the charismatic will only 
bestow their allegiance so long as they recognize the divinity of that 
message.  More precisely, Weber notes that this transfer of authority 
occurs through a “regard,” that is, a charismatic leader is constituted 
as such because he “is actually regarded” by his followers, and their 
regard is the mechanism of that conferral. 
When French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu revisits Weber’s 
account of charismatic authority, Bourdieu outlines several problems 
in the earlier sociologist’s formulation, mostly owing to a model of the 
subject that proves incompatible with contemporary sociology.  
Bourdieu's reformulation of Weber aims to move beyond Weber’s 
interest in typologies and taxonomic categorization to theorize the 
charismatic transactions in terms of “direct interactions” between 
agents.   
In Bourdieu's stylized approach to describing those interactions, 
characterized by post-Marxist economic analysis, agents vie in various 
struggles on a “field,” which might be seen as a spatial metaphor for 
the stage on which a sociological speech-act may be deployed.  That 
field hosts extended interactions between agents, and power is 
ultimately exercised and captured there.  In addition, agents act in 
accordance with what Bourdieu terms the habitus.  In Bourdieu’s 
update of the Aristotelian term, the habitus is a “self-structuring 
structure” that dissolves the subject-object distinction; in doing so, the 
habitus theory holds that agents at once learn and constitute (i.e. self-
structuring while structuring) the doxa that define their sociological 
positioning on the field.  In this way, the charismatic, his followers, 
 10 
and ultimately the religious powers against which the former two rebel 
can all be plotted on a sociological field, each constituting through 
their actions and self-defining each respective habitus. 
For Bourdieu, then, a charismatic leader is not chosen on the 
basis of the novelty of his divine message or mission.  Instead, the 
unarticulated conditions pre-exist any leader within a group of 
potential followers.  A transactional process on the field allows a 
charismatic leader and his followers to negotiate the message.  If a 
charismatic’s message proves amenable to a people, then he will be 
adopted by that group as their leader.  To balance the equation, the 
charismatic must continue to provide the leadership desired by that 
following to maintain authority. 
If we reconsider the field that Bourdieu offers, together with the 
charismatic “regard” that Weber insists constitutes that authority, we 
can ascribe to the field a more spatial and visual modeling of those 
objective relations than is currently available in Bourdieu.  In fact, 
construed to eliminate the aforementioned Weberian interest in the 
divine, Bourdieu’s field suffers ironically symbolic consequences.  
Given that Weber specifies that the conferral of authority of upon the 
charismatic occurs through the regard, and given that Bourdieu’s own 
description of the field posits an inherently visual—even sculptural—
model of sociological interaction, I assert that charisma relies heavily 
on its visualization; Bourdieu seems to corroborate this assertion in 
his discussion on the role of ambiguity and legitimation.  In fact, 
Bourdieu uses precisely visual terms to describe a mechanism similar 
to the divine message of Weber.  Bourdieu writes of magic that a 
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magician’s spectators produce and maintain a collective misrecognition, 
a projection and subsequent recognition of their own desires, which “is 
the source of power the magician appropriates.”5 
In attempting to expand on this collective misrecognition, I 
invoke the classic text by Walter Benjamin on “The Work of Art in the 
Age of Mechanical Representation,” in which the critic names the 
historical embeddedness of an object its aura.6  While the aura is not 
itself a visual object, its existence is confirmed—much like Weber’s 
charisma—by regard.  This aura, I argue, is itself the proof provided by 
the charismatic, concomitantly constituted by his followers’ regard.  
More importantly, the aura attests to that magic or divine inspiration 
Weber accounts for; this divinity does not depend on the occult, but 
rather obtains its power through a symbolic struggle for language, that 
is, for the symbolic itself. 
In this way, the struggle charismatics and their followers wage 
against dominant authorities is one of control over the symbolic.  A 
critical prerequisite for control over the symbolic lies in access to and 
knowledge of tears in the symbolic, that is, singularities through which 
evidence of the Real flashes.  While Bourdieu shuns psychologism in 
his own sociological study, my discussion of charisma and its 
linguistic battles on the field demonstrates that even Bourdieu’s 
formulation cannot be uncoupled from psychoanalytic accounts of 
                                       
5  Pierre Bourdieu and Randal Johnson, The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on 
Art and Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) 81.  (Emphasis 
original.) 
6  Walter Benjamin and Hannah Arendt, Illuminations, 1st Schocken pbk. ed. (New 
York: Schocken, 1969) 278, Section IV. 
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language.  The battles for language, moreover, extend both 
synchronically and diachronically.  The implication here is essential 
for critical historiography: in examining written history, we may 
discern within a historical text the diachronic continuation of a 
symbolic struggle.  Put another way, a sympathetic historian may 
actually constitute himself within his historical text as a follower of 
that history.  The historian must therefore be evaluated critically as 
belonging to the very field upon which her subject waged historical 
battle. 
To examine a case in which this diachronic participation 
emerges, I turn to the writings of historian François Dosse on the 
history of structuralism.  In 1991, Dosse published History of 
Structuralism Volume 1: The Rising Sign, the first volume of a 
monumental intellectual history which promised a reconstruction of 
the contours of structuralism. 7  He writes: “In order to understand the 
principle positions of the period, we have to reconstruct its many 
methods and personalities, while at the same time, and without being 
reductionist about it, seeking some coherent centers.”8  Dosse 
presciently anticipates the anti-relativist backlash by offering some 
“centers” around which coherent historically narrative might be 
organized.  As I will illustrate, though, his orthodox account relies 
entirely on the reductionism he eschews as a means to further the 
charismatic politics behind his writing. 
                                       
7  François Dosse, History of Structuralism (Minneapolis, Minn: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997) xxiii. 
8  Dosse, xxiii. 
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In The Rising Sign, and Volume 2: The Swan Song, published in 
French a year later, Dosse skips over the defining work his history 
ought first to have considered: that is, whether there, in fact, are 
“principle positions” to understand, and how he defines that “period.”  
Actually, Dosse makes several a priori assumptions whose 
unsubstantiated nature weakens his historical credibility.  First, 
through the entire 1,000-page history, is Dosse's undefended assertion 
of structuralism as a phenomenon of the 1950s and 1960s.  Though 
French structuralism assuredly occurred during those decades, much 
earlier scholars publicly identifying with structuralism, notably 
structural psychologist Edward Titchener, announced the arrival of 
“structuralism” some twenty-five years earlier.  Dosse was either 
completely unaware of earlier structuralisms (especially in the sciences 
and social sciences), or has deliberately suppressed the historical 
mention thereof.  In either case, we must consider this omission a 
critical factor in Dosse’s equation of structuralism with 1960s Paris. 
Far more devastating to the intellectual history of structuralism, 
however, is Dosse’s altogether uncritical positioning of structuralism’s 
etiology in the lineage of Claude Lévi-Strauss.  The predominance of 
Lévi-Strauss to several strands of French and subsequently American 
structuralism is indisputable, but Dosse writes Lévi-Strauss as the 
founding father of a (nonexistent) global structuralist movement.  More 
surprising, Dosse's fatuous language must be seen as evidence of Lévi-
Strauss ’s charismatic hold over him.  By tracing Dosse’s historical 
narrative regarding Lévi-Strauss, I critique his historical text on the 
grounds that it participates in the charismatic exaltation of the very 
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actors it attempts to historicize.  Most unfortunately, though, it 
conceals in its Hollywood-styled narrative the fact that Dosse, himself, 
is an agent on the structural field acting with impunity on behalf of 
establishing the unquestionably French reign over western intellectual 
life in the years surrounding and including the 1960s.  
Though merely a case study to demonstrate the operation of 
charismatic authority within historical writing, the case of Dosse’s 
structuralism, and structuralism more generally, presents a bridge 
between the early twentieth-century critical approaches to 
historiography and the grammatological direction I advocate.  
Structuralism provided historiographers the opportunity to interrogate 
history’s reliance on language.  More importantly, the transition from 
structuralism to post-structuralism—itself transient and far from 
clear-cut—brought to bear on the historical disciplines a sharp, lasting 
critique on any written narrative’s claim for semiotic stability, a 
critique most often associated with the late Jacques Derrida.  Though 
Derridean deconstruction has enjoyed enormous success in American 
academies, his approaches to grammatology and inscription remain 
even today undermined in historiography.  Deconstruction became a 
critical tool to challenge establishment, but within historiography, so-
called deconstructionists continue to neglect the process of writing to 
which Derrida so inscrutably attended.  Dosse, thus, provides the 
practical link by which I aim to return to post-structural 
historiography a Derridean interest in history’s grammatology. 
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Ekphrasis: History’s Mirage 
The Greek roots meaning, “out,” and “to speak” directly imbue 
the term ekphrasis with an emanating voice, but that term’s deeper 
significance lies in poetry.  Within the history of western poetry, from 
Homer through the Renaissance, and into today, ekphrasis has come 
to describe the genre of writing which seeks to describe an otherwise 
visual work of art like painting or sculpture.  The term is misleading; 
written language, too, takes a visual form, and so any attempt to 
distinguish between imagery and rhetoric will collapse.9  Since writing 
itself is “multimodal,” we must consider the practice of ekphrasis, or 
any linguistic description of visual phenomena, to be essentially 
hybrid.   
The difficulty of reaching an agreeable definition of ekphrasis 
indicates a fragile theme from which a historian might launch an 
archaeology or epistemic history.  Nevertheless, following the case of 
Dosse’s narrow Grand Narrative, I argue that just such a tenuous 
basis serves as a corrective for the outmoded intellectual biography, 
since critical approaches to historiography must proceed dialectically 
to challenge unchecked authority.  Instead, a Foucauldian 
epistemology of ekphrasis will unveil gaps, lexical instability, and 
valuable ruptures around which a different kind of history or histories 
might begin.  
                                       
9  WJT Mitchell meditates on the link between pictures and writing that has 
continued throughout human history in W. J. Thomas Mitchell, Picture Theory: 
Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1994) 445. 
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In moving from the critique of charisma to an examination of 
ekphrasis, after briefly introducing the operation of the latter, I then 
proceed to rectify what appear to be incongruent terms.  That is, 
having launched a largely sociological critique of the force of charisma 
using a Bourdienne matrix, I argue that the value of ekphrastic 
critique is more clearly realized in terms of a Foucauldian approach to 
history.  Thus, to bridge the two methodologies, I attempt first to 
propose a combined terminology merging Foucauldian epistemic 
history with Bourdienne sociology, thereby achieving compatibility 
between the two practices. 
Perhaps the most immediate infelicity lies in the radical 
divergences between the two in their respective treatments of the 
subject-object divide.  Of particular importance to an intellectual 
history are the repercussions such divergent positions hold over the 
placement of knowledges or discourses.  I review Bourdieu’s concept of 
the habitus, an ingenious invention he instituted to bypass any 
unnecessary subject-object division.  Though Bourdieu easily analyzes 
the complex sociological predispositions and hegemonies regarding the 
maintenance of knowledge, he does not often delve into classical 
questions on the nature of that knowledge.  Foucault, in contrast, 
offers a subtle distinction in kinds of knowledge, which complements 
his already complex schema of knowledge as it relates to power.  I 
proceed to explain Foucault’s distinction between savoir and 
connaissance, a distinction that seems to pose a problem for the 
historian by limiting the access one has to one’s own episteme.  
Arguing that, in fact, these two kinds of knowledge are synchronic and 
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diachronic conceptions of the same kind, I then argue forcefully that 
both kinds of knowledge fit within the struggle of the Bourdienne field, 
so long as that field is granted irregularities and singularities, 
synchronies and diachronies. 
If this amelioration between the two is granted, then issuing 
from a sociological critique of charisma, one can begin an epistemic 
history in its place as, for example, an archaeology around ekphrasis.  
Such an archaeology is not an exhaustive history as Dosse seeks in 
his two-volume set.  Instead, an archaeology of ekphrasis, as observed 
in structuralist literature, is more of a multi-directional inquiry into 
the conditions that make the writing of ekphrastic language possible. 
To do so, I begin with an examination of the essay, “The End of 
the Image Theory,” by Otto Pächt, in which the famed Viennese art 
historian denounces the practice of poetic writing about imagery, a 
practice that he even refuses to name.  Pächt cites the derivative 
practice as a degradation of an original work, which corrodes that 
work into a vulgar imitation intended for mass consumption.  Though 
Pächt is identified with the Vienna School of Art History rather than 
critical theory’s Frankfurt School, such a rebuke seems consistent 
with the school’s critiques, particularly in the assertion that the 
digestion of more difficult thought or creative process into kitsch 
representation disempowers the masses, ensnaring them in a cheap, 
ersatz shell of ideology.10 
                                       
10  Pächt worked concurrent to the Frankfurt School, though he launched his 
criticisms most often against iconologists rather than totalitarians.  Certainly there is 
overlap between the two approaches in their rebuke of aspects of scientism, but it 
would be hasty to equate the two, since ideologically, they approached criticism from 
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For Pächt, the main difficulty lies in the dangers for the reader.  
He faults the writer for creating a trap that in its crafty rhetorical 
construction permits the helpless reader to misread information.  As I 
will show, this formulation relies on an implicit, passive construction 
of the reader.  Unlike Algirdas Julius Greimas, whose approach I also 
examine, Pächt seems to locate a dishonesty in the middle man, who 
acts as a plunderer of the original force of the artwork.  He apparently 
sees no power in the reader to read it as a separate text, but rather 
sees it as a replacement for the original, a replacement that will prove 
detrimental in the disappearance of the proper force of the original.  
The problem in the mechanics of this process centers on a 
transposition of plastic units into a poorer, less replete version in 
language.  This transposition Pächt sees as always a reduction in kind.  
The only corrective he posits is a systematic approach which, through 
a method decided ahead of time, can in a mechanistic way transpose 
those visual elements into a scientific language.  We will see that 
Greimas attempts this very project, but, I argue, does not accomplish 
it. 
Following the discussion of Pächt is an examination of ekphrasis 
as developed especially by Leonard Barkan, professor of art history at 
Princeton.  Barkan posits the play of ekphrasis in a theatrical light, 
focusing on the age-old mimetic competition.  Barkan shows 
convincingly that ekphrasis has long been linked to theater—a 
performance of language and image together.  Both in form as writing 
                                                                                                              
divergent stances, Pächt by valuing artistic intention, Horkheimer and Adorno by 
battling the “dialectic of the Enlightenment.” 
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and in performance on the stage, ekphrasis has been engaged in irony 
and comic performance, rather than a desire to deceive.  
With Barkan as a guide, I theorize that ekphrasis never actually 
engages an original, but always takes a referent of its own 
construction, which it antepositions as its original.  This original, 
though, never truly existed.  To support this claim, with its roots in 
Barkan, I move then to my final examination of Greimas.  Greimas, 
perhaps similarly to Pächt, seeks a thoroughly scientific project of 
linguistics.  Following his article, “Figurative Semiotics and the 
Semiotics of the Plastic Arts,” I trace a very complex network of 
semiotic designations.  In this work, Greimas deals with the image 
directly, but its relevance to the discussion on ekphrasis, I surmise, 
rests in Greimas’s words themselves, which function as linguistic 
description of imagery.  Greimas begins his early investigation with the 
question, “Can we recognize a semiotics within plastic representation?”  
Believing that we can, Greimas goes on to examine painstakingly the 
paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes of such a semiotic system.  
Especially germane, Greimas posits the importance of a “reading grid,” 
that is, a culturally relative matrix of predispositions that allows a 
reader to recognize given features and bundles of features as 
representative of something in the natural world.  Two asides need be 
mentioned in this introduction, however.  As I explain, the reading grid 
does evolve within Greimassian semiotics into a much more 
performative model, in some ways similar to components of speech-act 
theory.  Secondly, in this article, what most interests Greimas is the 
recognition of representation, though, he repeatedly contends (as in 
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the work of Kandinsky, for example) that abstraction and iconicity are 
merely degrees within a way of reading figures. 
Believing that there is convincing evidence of a semiotics of 
plastic representation, Greimas executes a detailed investigation into 
various means by which signification emerges.  He examines 
topographical analyses into figures of imagery, and though he does not 
execute his famous “semiotic square” in the confines of the article, he 
nevertheless presents all initial steps required for its plotting.  Since 
this article provides the terms from which a semiotic square can be 
drawn—a visual representation of what Greimas has argued 
represents the most basic binary relationships within semantic 
paradigms of a given item—I continue in this fashion by completing a 
square based on the visual descriptors Greimas mentions. 
Though Greimas often talks of a transposition from visual 
features into another discourse, natural language, etc., he does so in a 
very different, more systematic way than that in which Pächt speaks of 
transposition.  For Greimas, transposition includes the construction of 
a meta-discourse, in essence, a functor, which can navigate the 
translations of items from one discourse to another.11  I argue that the 
plotting of the semiotic square is itself just such a meta-discourse, as 
it posits the invisible structural relationships between a term and its 
calculated relations. 
What does not interest me here is whether Greimas’s 
formulation of the relationship between paradigms is either stable or 
                                       
11 As in mathematics, a functor refers to a functional operation that interpolates 
items between comparable or related sets.  
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defensible; instead, what proves to be of utmost concern is what he is 
doing.  That is, in the act of plotting a grid or in the act of using a 
metadiscourse to describe a given set of objects, I argue that the 
operation thereof is one of inscription.  Such an inscription (which 
necessarily exceeds its own borders) is itself confluent with the 
writings of Derrida on an expanded concept of writing, a kind of 
writing that is not subservient or supplementary to the spoken 
rhetoric, but is itself constitutive and discursive.  This inscription, 
which I ultimately argue is a historical operation, is thus the primary 
object of the historiographer.  Under historiography, then, we must 
always include the evaluation of the means by which a historical 
writing inscribes its object, an operation, I insist, that is always deeply 
rooted in its own writing. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORIOGRAPHY IS FUNDAMENTALLY VISUAL 
 
Introduction: The Seeds of a Discourse 
The term “critical historiography” appears only twice in recent 
scholarly literature; and yet, the potential benefit of a historiographic 
practice cognizant of critical theory demands a more thorough 
exploration.  This chapter introduces two published accounts of the 
term, one by architectural historian Mark Jarzombek from his 2000 
book, The Psychologizing of Modernity, the other by European 
historian, Stefan Berger, from a 1996 article in the European Review of 
History.   
This chapter will establish a provisional definition of the term 
“critical historiography.”  I first discuss several twentieth-century texts 
on historiography to lay a foundation upon which to build my own 
definition.  Though the term “historiography” is used in multiple 
historical contexts, close inspection reveals divergent definitions and 
imprecise connotations; such varied treatment is unnecessary, 
though, since in its etymology, historiography provides specific 
direction regarding its scope.  After laying out some initial positions on 
critical historiography as presented within twentieth-century 
literature, I proceed to critique those texts, which neglect a 
fundamental aspect of historiography, that is, its inscription within 
writing.  From this critique, I develop my working definition as a 
critical project that interrogates the writing or “written-ness” of 
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history, a grammatological aspect that I contend has been absent from 
recent historical criticism. 
With too few examples to infer an established usage of the 
phrase, I begin by defining each half of the term.  For this project, I am 
satisfied with a historically specific definition of “critical” that 
originates with Horkheimer and the Frankfurt School.  In this context, 
a project is “critical” when it seeks to destabilize the advance of 
dominant, and often dominating, modes of thought.  Criticality in this 
sense is not merely the substitution of one end of the political 
spectrum for the other, but an equally deliberative method that 
provides a check to any hegemonic system of thought.12     
A “critical historiography,” then, can be seen as a historiography 
that seeks to destabilize the dominant ideology of the object of its 
critical gaze.  But what does it mean to do historiography?  Finding a 
similarly precise, historically situated definition of “historiography” is 
more challenging, in part because different historical disciplines 
maintain idiosyncratic formulations of historiography’s scope.  In 
history of art departments, for example, historiography, though 
customarily taught only as a component within a more general 
methods class, is universally understood to delineate the study of the 
manner in which art history is written.13  This usage seems consistent 
                                       
12  Adorno’s well-known negative dialectic answered his own call to dispel totalitarian 
currents in criticism.  By writing around rather than through any single issue, 
Adorno offered poignant critiques without ever providing a graspable weapon against 
them. 
13  The term is also used to designate the study of art historians themselves, in 
addition to their works, a role often served by intellectual history within other 
historical disciplines. 
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with the Greek origins of the word, but is by no means standard 
across historical disciplines. While, likely, a given university’s 
infrastructure correlates to the way it partitions historical practices, 
substantial dialog between historical disciplines remains 
underdeveloped.  The pragmatics of academic funding and disciplinary 
competition certainly contributes to cross-departmental reticence.  My 
interest in critical historiography and associated analyses does not 
entail so much an “interdisciplinary” approach, but rather an “intra-
disciplinary” one—an approach that recognizes several powerful, 
parallel historical approaches and tries to facilitate more fully this 
discussion for the collective audience of historical disciplines. 
If taken as an intra-disciplinary problematic rather than an 
interdisciplinary one, the historical disciplines have two immediate 
needs: first, a terminological remapping of discursive borders, and 
second, a concerted effort to build a common critical language.  I have 
addressed the first question for the purposes of my study by 
designating an umbrella term under which the different configuration 
of practices (separated, somewhat arbitrarily by the given host 
institution, but not necessarily by correlation) be reunited by epistemic 
interest.  I use the term “historical disciplines” to accomplish just that.    
On the second matter of generating a common idiom within 
which the historical disciplines can support critical practice, my 
dissertation more broadly serves to foster such dialog.  As outlined 
previously, various historiographers have enforced a more 
ambassadorial—less isolationist and jargon-riddled—critical program.  
This directive shapes the remainder of the chapter—indeed, the 
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structure of the overall dissertation.  I henceforth aim to establish 
working historiographic definitions relevant to a variety of practitioners 
of the historical fields, no matter the disciplinary perspective or 
academic department. 
Following the discussion of critical historiography, then, I seek 
to articulate the more widespread formulations of historiography.  I do 
so by means of a nontraditional review of literature, nontraditional in 
that my review makes no claims to comprehensiveness.  I organize this 
data in pairs by staging hypothetical conversations between scholars.  
Beginning with the early twentieth-century, I recount the work of 
American historian, Carl Becker, focusing on his 1931 article, “What is 
Historiography?”   In this article, Becker describes the then orthodox 
practice of historiography as the exhaustive listing—and to a limited 
extent evaluating—of published historical texts on a given topic.  To 
illuminate the changes in historiographic practice over the past 60-70 
years, I compare Becker's work to a more current criticism of 
historiography by contemporary historian Allan Megill.  Megill’s article, 
like Becker’s, criticizes the dominant methods of historiography, 
methods that he sees as a victim of the professionalization of history.  
Since Becker promoted an early historical relativism—a relativism that 
paved the way for later historians to critique the Grand Narrative 
tradition—comparison with Megill seems apt in presenting both past 
and contemporary critiques of dominant modes of historical practice. 
Two staged dialogs complete this section, both discussants 
practicing within the Anglo-American tradition.  The first involves a 
conscious dialogue in which British art historian, Stephen Bann, takes 
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up critical aspects of the seminal work by American historian of 
consciousness, Hayden White.  White’s work on literary tropes in 
history provides a pivotal study on historical criticism, but as this 
dialog will demonstrate, he falls short of discussing the written aspect 
of historical narratives. 
Finally, I compare the calls from two medievalists, Duke 
Professor, Elizabeth Clark, and Tufts Professor Emerita, Madeline 
Caviness.  While each scholar makes the case for a historiography 
more attuned to the linguistic turn (and, consequently, the means by 
which medieval studies may further such a historical sensitivity), they 
do so from fundamentally different discursive positions.  Clark, as a 
scholar of early Christian religious texts, primarily finds interest in 
narrative, while Caviness, as an art historian, centers on visuality.  
This foundational difference between the two, I show, exemplifies the 
widespread disparity in treating the written interests of historiography, 
interests that historians of visual culture hold at the fore of their 
methodologies. 
In the case of her book, History, Theory, Text: Historians and the 
Linguistic Turn, Clark shows remarkable sensitivity to both linguistic 
and critical approaches within European and American traditions of 
history.  Though astutely aware of deconstruction and Derridean 
criticism, what I describe as the grammatological study of history, 
nevertheless, eludes her chronicle: Clark’s account of the linguistic 
turn reiterates writing’s supplemental status within Western thought.  
On the other hand, Caviness describes a means of incorporating 
theoretical and critical perspectives in terms that are wholly 
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congruous with a study of history as writing.  I, therefore, conclude 
this chapter with Caviness’s invocation of triangulation as a means of 
consciously inscribing the historical object within adjacent discourses.  
In a later chapter, I will return to Caviness’s method, noting the 
propitious juxtaposition of her triangulation to Greimas’s rectangle. 
Though scholars like Clark make laudable appeals for an 
“epistemic” historiography, only a few historians (Dominick La Capra 
and Hayden White, for example) have developed the distinction 
between historical criticism and what we might think of as a self-
aware historiography.  I argue that this distinction is vital to an 
etymologically faithful understanding of historiography, since more 
sweeping epistemological inquiries need only deal with the restricted 
scope implicit within “historio-” and “-graphy,” or history writing.   
From this, a question ensues: why has historiography so frequently 
been synonymized with epistemology in the philosophy of history?  
Surely, historiography as the study of written history is not the most 
appropriate mode in which to conduct philosophical epistemology, 
except insofar as the writing itself engenders a limited kind of 
epistemological questioning.   The term, “critical historiography,” as I 
develop it here, thus restores to written history the urgency that 
Derrida carries throughout his grammatology.   Any epistemological 
question for the historiographer, I charge, is one of writing per se, not 
one of language, so to speak, and therefore, only suitably referred to as 
a grammatological question. 
The first area I will draw up surrounds the topic of the avant-
garde, a popular term describing modern art, but initially derived from 
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the militaristic “front line.”  Thus, the avant-garde seems an 
appropriate commonality between two scholars, Mark Jarzombek and 
Stefan  Berger; both Jarzombek and Berger posit Modernity as a chief 
concern of recent historiography.  Jarzombek deems Modernity an 
obstacle which has cast all contemporary historical writing into 
suspicion, since it promotes an aesthetics of anti-intellectualism and 
opposition.  Berger, on the other hand, sees the “Rise and Fall of 
Critical Historiography” related to the “old ‘critical’ paradigm from the 
late 1970s onwards [which] had much to do with political disillusion 
and methodological weaknesses.”14  He locates “‘critical’ 
historiography” as a late twentieth-century defensive response by the 
academic left to conservative trends in historiography.  This section 
will outline their arguments. 
 In an ambitious “Prolegomenon to Critical Historiography,” 
Jarzombek attempts an explanation of the compound term, critical 
historiography.15  The “Prolegomenon” occupies a slim entry in a book 
otherwise concerned with the degradation of scholarly reception of art 
and architecture in interwar Germany.  More pointedly, The 
Psychologizing of Modernity problematizes “the intermixed disciplinary 
and quasi-disciplinary substructures” that influenced the course of 
scholarly inquiry into modern art and architecture.16  The 
miscegenation between the scholar and the philosopher produced the 
                                       
14  Stefan Berger, "The rise and fall of `critical' historiography?" European Review of 
History 3.2 (1996): 213. 
15  Mark Jarzombek, The Psychologizing of Modernity: Art, Architecture, and History 
(Cambridge, U.K.; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 327. 
16  Jarzombek, 1. 
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twentieth century art/architectural historian, who, in Jarzombek’s 
words, could not dispense with “an increasingly problematical 
philosophical foundation for the avant-gardist, anti-intellectualist 
aesthetics of intellectualism.”17  The real challenge for Jarzombek 
proves to be historicizing an era with the very historical methods so 
visibly touched by modernity. 
Jarzombek’s point proves salient if one subscribes to his 
convincing charge that the artificial split between art history and art 
production—a split he links to the birth of the College Art Association 
and the professionalization of the discipline, ostensibly but not 
explicitly, in the United States—is a false, unnecessary, even 
detrimental bifurcation that the assiduous historian of modernity 
ultimately need overcome.  To do so, he advocates adopting a critical 
outlook to historical writing.  Jarzombek substantiates my assessment 
regarding the colloquial use of the term, “historiography,” as popularly 
circulated by both art and architectural historians: 
‘Historiography’ is thus more than just what historians 
have to say about each other’s work; it is the dialectical 
equivalent in history of the modernist notion of self-
consciousness.  It is the site where history constructs 
itself to its own advantage.18 
In the remainder of this passage, Jarzombek launches a 
headstrong attack on scholars who lack “a critique of their disciplinary 
                                       
17  Jarzombek, 5. 
18  Jarzombek, 8. 
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aesthetic of objectivity.”19  Tacitly, though, he confirms the definition 
widely held by art and architectural historians that historiography at 
least constitutes “what historians have to say about each other’s 
work.”  The corrective that Jarzombek posits is a “project that is 
neither the handmaiden of a discipline,” nor a seemingly modern drive 
towards objectivity. 20  Instead, he suggests beginning with “a critique 
of a historian’s practice,” followed by “larger disciplinary ideological 
critiques.”21  He continues: 
Beyond that, it could develop into a more far-reaching, 
galloping interdisciplinary diegesis dealing with the 
fundamentals of epistemological construction […] In all 
cases, (and, I should add, it is possible to envision an art 
or architectural practice as historiography!) functions on 
the principle that history and the production of art and 
architecture are only as strong as the historiography that 
simultaneously critiques them.22 
But throughout the work, Jarzombek fails to distinguish this 
critical project from a project many other scholars have more 
convincingly called “historical criticism,”23 from the provocative term 
he uses instead, “critical historiography.”  Indeed, Jarzombek neglects 
to make any worthwhile clarification about what makes his criticism 
                                       
19  Jarzombek, 9. 
20  Jarzombek, 11.  Jarzombek’s language here is rather unclear, but I interpret his 
charge that Modernism seeks a loss of “Self” to refer to the Modern quest for a 
universalized objectivity. 
21  Jarzombek, 11. 
22  Jarzombek, 11. 
23  For instance, Dominick LaCapra, Hayden White, Paul Ricoeur, Roland Barthes,  
Elizabeth Clark, and others. 
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relevant to historiography as such, rather than a kind of historical 
connoisseurship. 
Juxtaposed with the article by Stefan Berger entitled, The Rise 
and Fall of ‘Critical’ Historiography?, Jarzombek’s undefined use of the 
term shows not a personal oversight, for though Berger, too, deploys 
the term, he also does so in a nonspecific manner.  Rather, alongside 
Berger’s article, it becomes evident that the vagueness of the term is 
more appropriately attributed to an uneven treatment by the historical 
disciplines as a whole.  In his article, Berger declares “critical” to mean 
“oppositional and emancipatory,” and he further identifies this 
historiography in Britain, France, and Germany to the period since 
1945.24  Given that Berger limits the scope of critical historiography to 
that time following World War II, a time especially pivotal to the 
intellectual production and critical inventions of the Frankfurt School, 
it seems reasonable to assume Berger refers to that German and 
transplanted American tradition rooted in social theory.  His article, 
however, presents several implicated origins of the ‘critical’ with 
virtually no reference to Frankfurt social theory.  Instead, Berger 
suggests three areas around which varieties of critical historiography 
revolved: British Marxist analysis, the French Annalistes, and a post-
war German revival of “modernization theory,” largely uninterested in 
Marxist concerns.25 
It is unclear why Berger would neglect the Frankfurt group’s 
relevance to criticism, especially given that Berger opens his article 
                                       
24  Berger, 213. 
25  Berger, 218. 
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with a quote from Walter Benjamin, a close friend of Theodor Adorno.  
We might attribute this suspicious lacuna to an incompatibility 
between the reductivist model that Berger renders for “the critical” and 
the more complex approaches offered by the Frankfurt school.  
Though, indeed, the Frankfurt thinkers appropriated from Marxism a 
certain interest in emancipation, they nevertheless rejected Marx’s 
faith in the revolutionary direction of materialist thought.  More 
importantly, their methods were most often formed as dialectical, not 
oppositional, critiques.   
Berger maintains the oppositional definition of “the critical” 
throughout his article, most observable in a curiously persistent 
idiosyncrasy.  At each mention of ‘critical’ historiography, Berger uses 
(as I have just done here) single quotation marks, imbuing the term 
with an ironic status.  In essence, this mark itself underscores his 
thesis, which asserts that the earlier, oppositional critical 
historiography following World War II has been undermined during the 
neo-conservativism of the 1980s and 1990s.  Berger writes, “‘Critical’ 
historiography cannot be about legitimating what is already powerful; 
on the contrary, it has to be oppositional history.”26  Presumably, the 
relegation of the critical to apostrophes denotes any of the following: 
that the term is used outside of common usage, that it ironically does 
not signify a true criticality but is falsely misleading, or even that 
‘critical’ references speech or dialog.  While all these may be true, the 
more appropriate emphasis in Berger’s article ought to be placed on 
                                       
26  Berger, 213. 
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critical ‘historiography.’   That is, while in a very narrow sense, Berger 
does discuss a kind of critical history, even while mentioning the 
‘linguistic turn’ and other contemporary thinkers, Berger himself never 
examines the ‘writing of history.’  While he ultimately calls for a 
reinstatement of critical historiography updated with postmodern 
terminology to return to the emancipation movement with a greater 
technological acumen, he does not himself seem willing to apply that 
criticality on his own gloss of names of European historians.  Never, in 
his refashioning of a 1960s political activist tone, does Berger rethink 
either the role of criticism—decidedly dialectical and not a replacement 
of liberal values for conservative ones—or the absolutely constitutive 
role of writing to history. 
Jarzombek comes closer to a genuinely critical attitude.  He 
posits the development of critical historiography in successive steps; 
moreover, he holds the presumably elementary task of the critical 
historiographer to be a “critique of the historian’s practice.”  We will 
have to assume that Jarzombek advocates a categorical appraisal, 
rather than critiques of individual practitioners, given the impersonal 
singular of his statement.  I take issue with this charge, though, since 
it bears little distinction from the work of a historical critic.  In fact, 
since Jarzombek nowhere makes explicit the connection between 
writing and historical practice, this occupation is more appropriately 
given to the critic—not the critical historiographer.  Any such usage 
renders the “historiographer” a deceptively excessive term. 
Jarzombek insists that to evaluate such practices, the critical 
historiographer may indeed resort to ideological critique; Jarzombek, 
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however, fails to defend ideology’s constitutive basis of historiography.  
Critical analysis of ideology offers potentially rich recourse to the 
historiographer; my own chapter three uses a similar analysis of 
charisma, not from a strictly Marxist or Althusserian tradition, but 
rather from the sociological critique of agents controlling access to 
information.  Ideology and the mechanics thereof can explicate a 
number of influences on the writing of history, but cannot be allowed 
totalitarian control over critical historiography.  Though some critical 
practices do entail rigorous attention to ideology, Jarzombek’s neglect 
in developing his terms forces us to admit to historiography too wide a 
range of critical approaches, many of which do not directly engage 
with ideological critique.  Recall an earlier excerpt from Jarzombek’s 
“Prolegomenon,” in which he imagined a critical historiography that 
might become a “galloping interdisciplinary diegesis.”27 
In addition to never fleshing out the terminology of that 
interdisciplinary diegesis, I charge that Jarzombek glosses over a more 
troubling aspect of historiography—its “written-ness.”  This is 
especially suspect given Jarzombek’s expected predisposition to art 
and architectural criticism—a criticism that among other modalities, 
thoroughly regards the visual.  The diegesis Jarzombek speaks of in 
the aforementioned quotation, with its voice echoed in the retelling—
not the writing—of history, utterly obfuscates the grammatology of 
written history by suppressing its writing to the voice of the narrator.  
Surely, diegesis finds closer affinity in the logos, and therefore, any 
                                       
27  Jarzombek, 11. 
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diegetic analysis must be released from the graphically-minded 
historiographer. 
Jarzombek’s most illuminating charge from that passage, 
though, is sublimated within parentheses—a sublimation that 
indubitably demonstrates the unconscious role of writing in critical 
historiography, and even supports the very statement he relegates to a 
tangential status.  He writes: “(and, I should add, it is possible to 
envision an art or architectural practice as historiography!)”28  It is 
fitting that Jarzombek erects parenthetical walls around this 
statement.  Architecture is a process of division and restriction,29 and 
thus delineates if not as writing itself, then at least as an early form of 
writing (as Derrida terms, arche-writing).  Jarzombek recognizes this 
when he contains his statement, somehow to soften or restrict a 
potentially instigative poke at the division between art historians and 
artist-architects themselves.  But, the process by which those 
disciplines split is the very process that allows history to be written at 
all; a critical historiography capable of managing this contradiction 
must itself “envision” the problem as one of inscription. 
For Jarzombek to gloss over this essentially visual aspect is 
especially troubling since, as an art and architectural historian, he is 
particularly equipped to consider poetic and formal meaning in written 
history.  (Troubling, too, since his parenthesis temporarily breaches 
the diegetic discourse, but sadly sequesters that grammatological 
                                       
28  Jarzombek, 11. 
29 Though countless architectural theorists treat this process of division with far 
greater depth than I do here, one that deals with the idea memorably is Rem 
Koolhaas, especially on pondering the Berlin Wall. 
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question within the very object he ought to regard!)   In fact, 
Jarzombek’s own writing plays in the mimetic costume of the 
modernist (the “Prolegomenon” itself a promise quite inflated—like a 
Botero—implying simultaneously a thesis of phenomenal size but 
vulnerable to deflation by anyone willing to prick the surface.)  Indeed, 
his subsection headed, “Critical Historiography,” pronounces with so 
vehement a tone that one wonders (given the glut of Modern 
manifestos) whether Jarzombek ironically assumes the voice of a 
modern decree to call critical attention to the performance thereof.  
Whether a conscious deployment of style or a magnificent emergence 
of a split unconscious, the performance itself is the prolegomenon’s 
most laudable virtue. 
Indeed, Jarzombek’s theatricality is what enables its own 
criticality.  By calling the artifice of its written style into suspicion, he 
encourages the reader to search for the conditions that make its very 
formulation possible.  This theatricality, therefore, provides 
Jarzombek’s most effective—though unintentional—thesis: that critical 
historiography, to establish its own self-criticism, must invoke its own 
written vulnerabilities, whether stylistically or otherwise.   
Though Jarzombek and Berger both aim to launch a critical 
project, they nevertheless do not interrogate the fundamental meaning 
of such a critical historiography.  We are left, then, to look to more 
rigorous examinations of historical criticism, and ultimately to impute 
upon the more successful currents of historiography a 
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grammatological direction.30  An early pioneer of historiographic 
questioning in the United States, Carl Becker, a professor of European 
history at Cornell University, asked the question, “What is 
Historiography?” in a 1938 review of the book, A History of Historical 
Writing, by Harry Elmer Barnes, a historian often credited (alongside 
Becker) with pioneering the modern academic field of history in the 
United States  Becker's question has a twofold purpose: as a review, 
his question seeks to evaluate Barnes’s claim for a comprehensive 
history of historical writing, but more pressingly, Becker lays down 
one of the first published accounts in the United States to grapple with 
a reevaluation of the meaning of historiography itself.  To this latter 
end, Becker begins with three kinds of historical fascinations which, 
incidentally, correspond to his own early-, mid-, and late-career 
interests.  Becker postulates first his historical interest in the 
                                       
30  The history of art has interrogated these policies of disciplinary isolationism since 
the 1980’s—here, Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson are notable critics of the de facto 
policy.  In history departments, Paul Ricouer, Dominick LaCapra, Hayden White, 
E.H. Carr, Elizabeth Clark and Quentin Skinner have been vocal proponents for 
attention to literary criticism as valuable tools for historical narratives.  A 
commonality to most academic traditions of the historical disciplines remains a 
schooling in historical “methods.”  History departments often school aspiring 
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“mechanics of research,” followed by the ostensibly more abstract 
pursuit of “history itself,” which he describes as the “suggestive 
meanings” the historian might ascribe to given periods.  But by the age 
of sixty-five, Becker writes, his earlier historical interests give way to 
what he calls the “most intriguing aspect of history,” that is, “the 
study of the history of historical study.”31  Becker identifies this last 
pursuit as that of “historiography.”  
  
Carl Becker: An Early Champion of Modern Historiography 
In this article, Becker indicates the possibility of a 
historiography that draws from the dynamic, even literary 
interpretative function of history.  Becker, for instance, admits The 
Iliad into the category of historical literature, a work that offers 
“history, story, and scripture all in one.”32  Becker elaborates that the 
invention of written records marks the shift in history when humans 
could distinguish that the historical memory of an event differs from 
its written account.33  Only at this moment, Becker writes, “could they 
properly distinguish between story and history […] then only could 
histories be thought of as a “branch of literature.”34  This remarkable 
assertion proves to be the most valuable kernel in Becker’s essay, but 
the conclusions he draws from it remain deeply unsatisfying.  For 
Becker, histories as a “branch of literature,” offer us narratives that 
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convey the evolving conception of time and space.  Ancient histories 
retain the gods, whose interventions in the world of men explain 
historical causality.  As these narratives evolve, the gods as historical 
agents find replacement with new catalysts, whether called “the Law of 
Nature, the Transcendent Idea, the dynamic principle of Dialectic, or 
whatever it may be.”35  In each of these models for historical causality, 
the historiographer can glean something about that era’s 
understanding of its own relation to time and space. 
Becker’s vision of historiography as a sort of historical criticism 
must be contrasted with the more orthodox historiographic practice in 
place within most American academic centers of the time.  Though 
Becker’s critical perspective predated the Frankfurt School, it certainly 
was informed by the New Criticism movement underway in the United 
States.  The practice of such analysis within a historical context, 
though, was quite novel, and Becker notes as much in his review of 
Barnes’s more traditional historiography.   Barnes’s work, Becker 
shows, conforms to the drolly conventional collection of secondary 
sources grouped thematically.  Becker credits Barnes with producing 
“more than an annotated catalogue of historical works,”36 but faults 
him for not thinking through the intellectual potential of 
historiography.  For Becker, the consideration of the elements of time 
and space on historicism ought to form the backbone of a 
conscientious historiography.  He writes, “The development of 
intelligence, in the individual and the race, is in some sense a matter 
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of pushing back the limits of the time and space world and filling it 
with things that really exist and events that actually happened.”37  
This is to be contrasted with the grand but nevertheless predictable 
mission Barnes sets forth in his book: 
[To] characterize the intellectual background of each major 
period of human advance in western civilization, show 
how the historical literature of each period has been 
related to its parent culture, point out the dominant traits 
of the historical writing in each era, indicate the advance, 
if any, in historical science, and then make clear the 
individual contributions of the major historical writers of 
the age.38 
But for Becker, that relationship between historical literature 
and its “parent culture” reflects the history of that culture’s 
consciousness, a history which he equates with the consciousness of 
frames of reference for space and time. 39  The history of consciousness 
as an intellectual history of time-space consciousness, “far more than 
sheer brain power,” shapes the content of historical literature, and 
more urgently, informs any culture’s intellectual history.  To relocate 
historiography to Becker’s field of intellectual history, he contends, 
would thus allow historiography to “have as its main theme the 
gradual expansion of this time and space world…”40   Becker 
provocatively declares that such a historiography would chart history 
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as history “subjectively understood’ instead of Barnes’s more limited 
purview of the development of historical truth from an objective 
viewpoint.41 
Becker’s reception by more doctrinal historians was markedly 
strained, and he was very often criticized for introducing a relativism 
into history that, for many of his contemporaries, threatened the 
scientific expectation within the field.42  This may seem deceptive, 
since at first glance, Becker’s historical relativism reveals an interest 
in the terminology of the theory of relativity, at least as a metaphor 
through which historiography could chart a history of space-time 
consciousness.  But this interest in scientific language resisted the 
kind of scientificity that contemporaneous historians had proposed, 
namely in its interdisciplinarity rather than in its dedication to a 
native historical science.  We may even theorize the widespread 
criticisms toward Becker as an unarticulated repudiation of his 
interdisciplinary assaults on the dominant professional borders in 
American history departments.  Historian Allan Megill offers useful 
critical attention to the professionalization of (especially United States 
and Canadian) history and historiography, criticisms very much 
germane to Becker’s review.  Megill traces four distinct phases of 
professionalization, with particular emphasis on the previously 
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prevailing Grand Narrative tradition, a tradition still very much in 
force during Becker’s tenure. 
Far more sufficiently, and sixty years earlier, Becker offered a 
compelling call for revision to the provenance of historiography—a 
provenance that seems presciently suited to critical application.  The 
dense paragraph below outlines several of Becker’s editorials that will 
find subsequent elaboration:  the designation of historiography as a 
phase of intellectual history, the subsequent subjectivism of the 
conceptualizing of time-space expansion, the separation from the 
motive of objective, historical truth, and finally the regarding of history 
as a literary modality.  Becker, as we also observed in Megill, describes 
temporally the provenance of historiography: 
Regarded strictly as a phase of intellectual history and not 
as a balance sheet of verifiable historical knowledge, 
historiography would have as its main theme the gradual 
expansion of this time and space world (particularly the 
time world perhaps, although the two are inseparably 
connected), the items, whether true or false, which 
acquired knowledge and accepted beliefs enabled men 
(and not historians only) to find within it, and the 
influence of this pattern of true or imagined events upon 
the development of human thought and conduct.  So 
regarded, historiography would become a history of 
history rather than a history of historians, a history of 
history subjectively understood (the ‘fable agreed upon’, 
the ‘pack of tricks played on the dead’) rather than a 
history of the gradual emergence of historical truth 
objectively considered.  The historiographer would of 
course be interested in histories—they would be a main 
source of information; but he would not confine his 
researches to them—would not, indeed, be interested in 
histories as such but only as one of the literary forms in 
which current ideas about the past find expression.43 
                                       
43  Becker, 26. 
 43 
Let us consider Becker’s designation that historiography should 
be “a phase of intellectual history.”  While indeed, the desire to list and 
evaluate historical work holds relevance to the intellectual historian, 
Becker advocates its use only in the service of the larger intellectual 
project of a culture’s understanding of and historical placement within 
time-space.  Such an investigation may draw from intellectual 
biography, it may focus more on that thinker’s ideas, or an admixture 
of the two.  But Becker, exhibiting a touch of the relativism for which 
he was famous, importantly calls for “a capacity for imaginative 
understanding” from the historiographer.  That is, Becker sees such 
intellectual biography or intellectual histories only at the service of the 
larger question of a given culture’s conditions for understanding 
history—i.e., its image of time-space.    
In Becker’s text, use of the word, “phase,” remains idiosyncratic; 
nevertheless, we may examine some possible interpretations here.  
“Phase” in its nominal form occupies two primary entries.44  The first 
is a historical term for the Jewish holiday, Passover, which holds some 
interest in its reiteration of Megill’s “first phase” of (pre-professional) 
historiography, in which story and truth were conjoined in the 
authoritative hermeneutic history as inscribed in the Bible.   
In its second entry, “phase” presents four subordinate entries.  
The word’s primary meaning in this entry refers to the “aspect 
presented,” either lunar or planetary, to an observer’s eye.  The key 
here, much like the interest in my earlier discussion, is the 
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embeddedness of appearance, even considerable as causing to appear 
(these four possible meanings are referred to as “senses”).  In this 
sense, phase resolutely affirms Becker’s quest for reconstructing a 
given society’s perspective (especially that perspective of time and 
space).  It also simultaneously does not disprove Megill’s sense of 
fragmentation, though admittedly, fragmentation holds more relevance 
to a synchronic process whereas phase suggests more diachronic 
processes. 
While the astronomical sense of the word phase appears in the 
English language by the late seventeenth century, its appearance in 
the middle French with identical spelling evidences an earlier meaning.  
This sense, referring to a clear state within a varying life or timeline, 
seems to suggest a pre-Enlightenment (or, perhaps, pre-Hegelian) 
model of history.  Such a comparison to a life cycle, for example, is 
doubtless clear to art historians.  Winckelmann, the “father” of the 
modern discipline of art history, saw all societies as describable in 
historical phases, especially as in Greek art and society, to which he 
attributed a primitive phase, the simple-phase of Phidias, a “graceful 
and charming” phase, and finally a late phase of decline and impostor 
works. 
Now, to regard historiography as just such a mortal phase of 
history seems fraught, depending entirely on which of the several 
senses of the word we are to equate with Becker’s original sentiment.  
The third and fourth most recent senses of the word offer a more 
generous place for historiography—the third referring to a repeatable 
cycle, which may or may not be in synchronicity with another, the 
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fourth referring to the chemical descriptor, which indicates a 
particular state or form of matter (like ice, water, or vapor).  The 
second sense, however, very often used casually as something to 
outgrow, leaves a most uncertain prognosis for the discipline.  As 
either a physical or chemical phase, historiography in relation to 
history seems congruent with Becker’s relative historical perspective 
and Megill’s sense of parallel, fragmented disciplinary practices.  But, 
can we imagine the invocation of that more temporary sense?  Indeed, 
if we can impute a critical tone onto each, then we can imagine an 
apocryphal end to historiography. 
Becker seems content with the subsumption of history into 
literary studies, furthering his progressive suggestion that  
historiography acknowledge its position as a “branch of literature.”  In 
that written history offers the historiographer a corpus for 
contemplation as rich as that for the literary scholar, taken 
discursively, historical literature forms a conjoined twin to fiction, one 
equally deserving of critical attention.  Viewed in this way, 
historiography constitutes not merely a “phase” of historical 
disciplines, but one of the historical disciplines itself in which 
historical criticism—any number of critical methods focused 
immanently on the writing of history—usurps the mundane task of 
literature review. 
 
Contemporary Historians and Historical Criticism 
Megill presents a now-familiar repudiation of the—until very 
recently—dominant historical style of the “Grand Narrative,” which he 
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defines (pace Lyotard) as “the story that the world would tell if the 
world could tell its story.”45  Megill’s pithy essay identifies the vestiges 
of a Grand Narrative style still functioning in contemporary trends to 
“synthesize” otherwise fragmentary episodes into some historical 
account that aims at presenting “the full story.”  Megill targets 
professional historians, deliberately using a term freighted with 
connotations of membership and exclusivity, the consciousness with 
which he uses it emphasizing the unconscious, often-unnoticed 
repercussions of the professional club.46   
Megill sketches a development of western historical writing, 
which leads to this professionalized, but nevertheless 
counterproductive historian’s bias.  European historical narrative in 
its first phase (a phase before professional historiography) was 
exclusively the provenance of a single hermeneutic narrative, that is, 
the Judeo-Christian Scripture.47  Since the narrative therein held 
unquestioned authority, Megill contends that the need for a 
professional historian to find the narrative was wholly absent.  With 
the gradual weakening in “faith” of this one text to satisfy all historical 
needs, Megill writes, “professional historians began to walk the 
earth.”48  Megill sarcastically remarks that in the early phase, 
historiographers assented to the existence of a Grand Narrative, but 
deferred the telling of it until the future, “after further research has 
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been done.”49  To the canon of such minded historians, Megill admits 
Ranke, Lord Acton and J.B. Berry.50  Included also in this early phase 
is “that vast majority of historians who never reflected on universal 
history, but nonetheless wrote out of a fundamental faith in the 
validity of Western culture as they understood it.”51 
Megill posits the third phase to have followed World War I.  This 
“later phase of professional historiography” witnesses a waning 
devotion to the Grand Narrative, but also a simultaneous emergence of 
“a purely ideal narrative, a narrative that could never actually be 
told.”52  Megill notes that ideas like “autonomy” and “synthesis” 
retained their favorable appeal amongst professional historians, but 
any particular formulation could only garner contingent, factional 
support.53 
In the fourth phase, which he flirtatiously deems a “post-
professional” phase, Megill sees a complete dismissal of the Grand 
Narrative, but a dismissal offered (as one might suspect, from the 
inclusion of the “post”) with irony.  On the habits of such fourth-phase 
historians, Megill spends some time imagining the disaffected ignoring 
of terms as “synthesis” and “autonomy,” the lack of confidence in ever 
telling “the full story,” and even a shape-shifting ability (even 
propensity) to move between disciplinary occupations—from historian 
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to economist, to philosopher, to literary critic, even to historiographer 
and back again.54 
To recapitulate, Megill’s article seeks to problematize the 
professional tradition of synthetic, whole-story history and 
historiography.  Importantly, Megill never really defines this latter 
term, so we can only assume it refers to writing about historical 
writing.  Megill largely prognosticates on the condition of unnecessary 
synthesis, arguing that this is a symptom of a kind of institutional 
professionalism, which remains reluctant to forfeit its claim to a single 
professional “competence.”  Though Megill himself offers no particular 
evidence of such collegiate nepotism of ideas, it nevertheless seems 
highly plausible that such an atmosphere would persist in Anglo-
American universities, and likely, too, within continental traditions. 
Citing That Noble Dream, Megill recounts Peter Novick’s evidence 
that this professional cronyism was largely responsible for the 
institutional “repudiation” of Carl Becker (along with and in the 
company of Charles Beard).55  Primarily at issue with Becker and 
Beard’s methodology was relativism’s inherent threat to what Novick 
calls “an autonomous profession.”56  Novick argues that the 
development of history into that autonomous profession relied part 
and parcel on the exclusion of relativism, so that history—with 
relativism sufficiently expunged—appeared to be a self-sufficient 
discipline.  Both Becker and Megill offer instantiation of academic 
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reluctance to question historiography’s provenance and constitution.  
Though conservative members within the ranks of history departments 
disassociated from any hint of interdisciplinarity, proof abounds that 
historiographic questions have been and continue to be progressively 
refashioned both from within and without. 
Becker and Megill maintain interest in the phasic division of 
historiography, and both of these points share a connection to the 
professional bias to which Megill importantly pays critical attention.  
For two historians as prolific as Becker and Megill both to use the 
term historiography without qualification (and Megill doing so with the 
gift of hindsight and “post-professional” irony), we can and must 
assume the broadest implications of the term.  In both cases, we may 
discover that extending polysemic value to the term actually 
corroborates both of their projects. 
Becker, certainly, eagerly desired a more reputable position in 
the early twentieth-century academy for intellectual history.  Still, 
within his article, there is evidence that suggests even this model 
ought to be supplanted.  Becker writes:  “It would be worthwhile […] to 
forget entirely about the contributions of historians to present 
knowledge and to concentrate wholly upon their role in the cultural 
pattern of their own time.”57  Modern historiography—and history, for 
that matter—by this account will inevitably lead towards an 
anthropological model.   
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I cannot help but compare Becker’s resourcefulness to the 
anthropological sentiment in bricolage.  Lévi-Strauss developed this 
idea to describe what has anachronistically been deemed the pathway 
to postmodern thought: a resourceful approach to using whatever 
means are needed, without any concern for methodological 
consistency.58  Certainly, Megill echoes this sentiment.  He writes on a 
“disciplinary blindness” which impedes the modern academy: 
This is the blindness of historians who argue only with 
historians, philosophers only with philosophers, 
economists only with other economists, and so on.  When 
one’s universe of argument is restricted in this way—and 
the disciplinary structure of the modernist university 
certainly encourages such restriction—it is easy to 
imagine that one knows what competence is.59 
While wholly sympathetic to Becker and Megill, I also have some 
reservations about the means by which they launch their disciplinary 
critiques.  Both rely on launching a counter-vision of a “bricolage” 
history, and can only posit such an alternative by first collapsing the 
state of history.  Both rely on a popular appeal to common knowledge 
in which a contemporary, cynical audience is invoked to assume 
disciplinary-wide incompetence regarding the epidemic use of Grand 
Narrative.  While many historians have knowledge of or have even 
practiced less noble, more didactic forms of history, this by no means 
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sufficiently characterizes the historical disciplines as a whole.  More 
likely is that, while the more nepotistic faculty-hiring practices tend to 
propagate a narrow discipline, most academics could agree with 
Becker's admission that the orthodox historian does not really exist.60  
We, the readers, are then thrust into a precarious position: in each 
article, we are asked to cast doubt on any coherent discipline, but no 
sooner is this request made than we are told that either a bricolage 
approach or a fragmented approach are the dialectical options to 
choose. 
One case in point is the work by art historian Stephen Bann.  As 
early as 1981, Bann wrote an enviable article not for art historians per 
se, but for philosophers of history.61  Appearing in the Cambridge 
University Press journal, Philosophy, Bann expands the purview of 
historiography from its restriction to lists and critiques of historical 
writing, a taxonomic style, Bann explains, that predominates in his 
native Britain.  In contrast, Bann uses the platform of the 
philosophical journal to instigate a cross-disciplinary dialog in which 
to discuss—from both a historical and philosophical vantage—
fundamental concerns on the writing of history. 
Bann offers a concerted effort to converse between disciplines, in 
particular, joining in conversation historians and philosophers of 
history.  He chastises esteemed conservative historian G.R. Elton’s call 
for disciplinary isolationism.  Bann instead suggests the pressing 
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relevance of historical thinkers like Hayden White to elucidate tropes 
employed in historical writing.  In fact, citing White, 62 Bann explains 
that the then contemporary historiography showed limitation because 
it “lost sight of its origins in the literary imagination.”63  Bann, with an 
eye out for just such lost sights, trumps White's remark, for Bann 
notices White’s indifference to discursive provenance.  Bann keenly 
faults White:  
[…] White holds that there is no essential difference, for 
the purposes of his analysis, between a narrative history 
and a philosophy of history, any more than there is reason 
to discriminate in the accepted way between ‘History’ and 
‘Historicism.’”64  
Bann then includes a passage from White’s groundbreaking 
1978 book on historical criticism, Tropics of Discourse, a passage I, 
too, will reproduce here in expanded form: 
Even in the simplest prose discourse, and even in one in 
which the object of representation is intended to be 
nothing but fact, the use of language itself projects a level 
of secondary meaning below or behind the phenomena 
being “described.”  This secondary meaning exists quite 
apart from both the “facts” themselves and any explicit 
argument that might be offered in the extra-descriptive, 
more purely analytical or interpretative, level of the text.  
This figurative level is produced by a constructive process, 
poetic in nature, which prepares the reader of the text 
more or less subconsciously to receive both the 
description of the facts and their explanation as plausible 
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on the one side, and as adequate to one another, on the 
other.  
As thus envisaged, the historical discourse can be broken 
down into two levels of meaning.  The facts and their 
formal explanation or interpretation appears (sic) as the 
manifest or literal “surface” of the discourse, while the 
figurative language used to characterize the facts points to 
a deep-structural meaning.  This latent meaning of an 
historical discourse consists of the generic story-type of 
which the facts themselves arranged in a specific order 
and endowed with different weights, are the manifest 
form.  We understand the specific story being told about 
the facts when we identify the generic story-type of which 
the particular story is an instantiation.65 
The preceding disciplinary examination of historiographic 
provenance only generated geographic and temporal metaphors; if we 
are to regard disciplinary provenance as a set of admitted activities or 
practices rather than academic territory, then we will require a 
different kind of description altogether.  One such description has 
been underway for some time in the literature: that set of discussions 
dealing with the philosophical sense of historiography’s epistemology.  
As just mentioned, Hayden White’s work pioneered this discourse, and 
continues to influence scholars.  Bann, for instance, interprets the 
significance of White’s thesis to be nothing less than an “inversion” 
which “is literally without precedent.”66  The essential windfall in 
White’s work for the field of historiography, Bann contends, is the 
liberation of the widespread “disavowal of the discursive structure of 
historical writing.”67  But to heed Bann’s suggestion for critical care 
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even when attending to White’s text, largely owing to his distaste for 
textual analysis, White chooses to end his collection of essays in a 
outburst against writing conceived as such.  Early in that collection, 
White establishes the etymology of the word tropic in the following 
passage: 
It comes into modern Indo-European languages by way of 
tropus, which in Classical Latin meant “metaphor” or 
“figure of speech” and in Late Latin, especially as applied 
to music theory, “mood” or “measure.”  All of these 
meanings, sedimented in the early English word trope, 
capture the force of the concept that modern English 
intends by the word style, a concept that is especially apt 
for the consideration of that form of verbal composition 
which, in order to distinguish it from logical 
demonstration on the one side and from pure fiction on 
the other, we call by the name discourse.68 
Open and polysemic, White retains an unbothered posture to 
the “swerves in locution” he achieves with his use of the word 
“discourse,” and while each sense he conjures involves metaphoric 
directionality, White never lays a clear or unobstructed course for that 
word.  To demonstrate his thesis that discourse is entirely explainable 
as tropes, this strategy proves accommodating.  In suppressing all 
other critical examination to tropology, however, White unnecessarily 
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dulls the complex means by which writing can be distinguished from 
style.  He replicates this blunt stance later in a discussion of “text.”   
In the most circular—certainly most obdurate—essay in Tropics, 
White attempts to dismiss on several grounds what he calls the 
“absurdist moment in contemporary literary theory.”69  The then 
“present state of literary criticism,” White insists, “does not constitute 
a coherent field of theory and practice.”70  As soon as this is 
pronounced, though, White immediately contradicts himself by 
asserting its unity: “As a form of intellectual practice, no field is more 
imperialistic.”71  White unsuccessfully attempts to persuade us that 
“Absurdist” critics have wrongfully displaced the more moderate 
“Normal” critics, leading to an “apotheosis of ‘silence’.”72  For the 
Absurdists, White exaggerates, “Literature is reduced to writing, 
writing to language, and language, in a final paroxysm of frustration, 
to chatter about silence.”73  White exuberantly explains his frustration: 
Instead of regarding the literary text as a product of 
cultural processes more basic than writing, writing is 
taken as the crucial analogue of all those acts of 
signification by which meaning is conferred upon an 
otherwise meaningless existence, whence the pervasive 
melancholy of the structuralists activity; all if its 
“tropiques” are “tristes,” because it perceives all cultural 
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systems as products of the imposition of a purely fictive 
meaning on an otherwise meaningless reality.  All 
meaning derives from language’s power to bewitch 
intelligence with the promise of a meaning that can always 
be shown on analysis to be arbitrary and, ultimately 
spurious.74 
At each level, White’s huff prevents him from any meaningful 
engagement of the similarities between his own tropic project and the 
varied structural and post-structural projects.  Here, White’s own 
eponymous pun is at odds with that which he seeks to criticize, or 
more correctly, is in consort.  In the book by Lévi-Strauss to which 
White refers, the role of irony is ever-present and often self-critical.  
Moreover, in Derrida’s subsequent criticism of that anthropological 
work, the post-structuralist never makes the reckless claim that, 
ultimately, all meaning is “spurious.”  Nor does it establish writing as 
an analog “by which meaning is conferred upon an otherwise 
meaningless existence.” (Would not such an analog be tropic?) Instead, 
the infinitesimally complex essay by Derrida, among other things, 
allows that the very possibility of erasure (as in White’s own repeated 
erasure of post-structuralism into “meaningless existence”) itself 
indicates the process of writing, a process not of the conferral of 
meaning, but of the constitution thereof. 
It remains beyond the scope of this project to debate White’s 
wholesale dismissal of writing as the designatory process in 
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historiography—a dismissal due, evidently, to a deep-seeded mistrust 
of poststructuralists.  What is of interest, however, is the 
unquestionable role of writing in historiography, a role that White’s 
hyperbolic repudiation, ironically, seems to confirm.  On this point, 
White is casual, but incontrovertible: though he often exchanges the 
word “writing” for literary rhetoric, he does not do so with Derridean 
discourse in mind.  White wrongly rejects—or more exactly, 
overlooks—Derrida’s profound assertion that writing and rhetoric 
share coincident processes, a misjudgment that strips from White’s 
topological theory a potentially mighty ally in both literary and 
historical criticism.  I compare White’s theatrical performance in that 
essay to a description by Derrida: 
This inflation of the sign “language” is the inflation of the 
sign itself, absolute inflation, inflation itself.  Yet, by one of 
its aspects or shadows, it is itself still a sign: this crisis is 
also a symptom.  It indicates, as if in spite of itself, that a 
historico-metaphysical epoch must finally determine as 
language the totality of its problematic horizon.  It must 
do so not only because all that desire had wished to wrest 
from the play of language finds itself recaptured within 
that play but also because, for the same reason, language 
itself is menaced in its very life […]75 
                                       
75  Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, Correct ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997) 6. 
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This inflation of language describes White’s own imperative to 
purge criticism of grammatology, but that very inflation serves only to 
flaunt the play between writing and rhetoric.  Derrida continues: 
By a slow movement whose necessity is hardly perceptible, 
everything that for at least some twenty centuries tended 
toward and finally succeeded in being gathered under the 
name of language is beginning to let itself be transferred 
to, or at least summarized under, the name of writing.76  
But, for all of the deconstructive power in White’s work, he 
falls short of transferring attribution of this shift to 
writing.  Preferring time and time again the name, 
“narrative,” White thus subtly resists the quiet re-
inscription into writing, its story-telling, in short, its voice.   
Though vastly useful for the historian, Bann, too, criticizes 
White’s stubborn insistence on narrative’s exclusivity.  Perhaps as a 
corrective, Bann himself offers an insightful juxtaposition between 
Mandelbaum and Olafson in an attempt to illustrate the results of 
different approaches to the intersection between history and the 
philosophy of history.  Maurice Mandelbaum was the Andrew W. 
Mellon Professor of Philosophy at John Hopkins from 1967-1974, 
though he taught there until 1978.77  Also the president of the 
American Philosophical Association, Mandelbaum brought attention 
particularly to the philosophy of history and its enantiomorph, the 
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history of philosophy.  Frederick A. Olafson, similarly, is the Professor 
Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego.  In 
juxtaposing those two philosophers of history, Bann aims to show a 
more fluid intersection, most specifically so that practicing historian-
philosophers have recourse to incorporate theory into their works 
while at the same time, philosophers of history pay heed to the 
pragmatics of history writing.  In the comparison between 
Mandelbaum and Olafson, Bann offers particular attention to what he 
describes as a shift from a speculative philosophy of history to an 
analytic one: 
In the case of Mandelbaum, there is indeed a crucial 
distinction drawn between what he terms ‘general’ and 
‘special’ histories; the latter being economic history, 
history of art, etc., and the former ‘the study of human 
activities in their societal context and with their societal 
implications.’  Only the ‘general’ history, in his view, can 
lay claim to a genuine objectivity, and this, presumably, 
gives it a distinctive importance.  Mandelbaum does not, 
at this point, examine the very considerable amount of 
debate on this topic [… but] he does raise a genuinely 
contemporary issue which is perhaps decently veiled by 
the increased professionalization of both ‘general’ and 
‘special’ historiography.78  
                                       
78  Bann, 377. 
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I will return to this distinction between “general” and “special” 
histories shortly, but it should be noted that Bann himself offers little 
discussion on his own status as, perhaps, a doubly special historian, 
of art and ideas.  It is ironic, though, that Bann never in this work 
makes his own role as art historian explicit, but rather assumes the 
clothes of a general historian.  His interest in interdisciplinarity is 
carried instead by implication in the invocation of Olafson’s work.  
Bann praises Olafson’s project to broaden the scope and interrelation 
of humanistic study.  For Olafson, Bann does this to further show the 
philosopher’s role in broadening the discussion of historiography to 
philosophers and historians. Bann writes: 
In other words, where our literary scholars are becoming 
skeptical about ‘unexamined teleologies,’ Olafson is 
advocating that the historian should attempt to reveal, as 
his highest purpose, the new and adequate teleology. [/] It 
is here that Olafson justifies his claim to be providing a 
‘philosophical interpretation’ of the Humanities in general, 
as well as the place of History within them.79 
While impressed with the radical nature of such a claim, Bann 
does express some reservation.  Worried that Olafson concedes too 
much in the joining of philosophy and practice without enough 
interest in the discursive particularity of historical writing, Bann 
moves to discuss a historian he considers to be thoroughly informed of 
the linguistic turn while equally entrenched in historical practice.  
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Bann concludes his essay with an examination of “the philosophic 
position which can be deduced” from the historiography of Emmanuel 
Le Roy Ladurie.80   
Le Roy Ladurie, whose work, Carnival in Romans among others 
is already classic, includes in his historiography a language so replete 
with contemporary (and, therefore, anachronistic) idioms as to garner 
frequent criticisms from others in the field.  For Bann, however, this 
anachronistic style is central to the complexity of Le Roy Ladurie.  
Bann argues that, in fact, the very inclusion of incongruous concepts 
and terms is the mechanism by which Le Roy Ladurie positions not 
only the historian, but also the contemporary reader, alongside the 
now lost historical object.  Bann, again: 
[Le Roy Ladurie] had shown that the past keeps coming 
back, given a good chance.  But he had also shown that 
this effect takes place not in spite of, but because of, its 
remoteness; not in spite of, but because of, the stylistic 
marks which identify the historical text as being produced 
by a writer of the present day; not because of its 
connections to the present, but as a result precisely of the 
effect of isolating it in itself, and circumscribing it as the 
minimal historical unit that could be an object of 
scrutiny.81 
Bann sees this style, evidence of a keen philosophy, as a 
corrective for the oppressive role irony is afforded in White’s purview.  
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Whereas White charges that ironic style is historiography’s only 
possible track,82 Bann sees Le Roy Ladurie’s as a liberating approach: 
“But where the ironic approach, in White’s terms, is characteristically 
detected as a negative effect—where the historian simply eschews the 
organization of his discourse by tropes like metaphor and 
synecdoche—it achieves in Le Roy Ladurie a more integral organizing 
role, indeed a positive effect.”83 
Bann, though, misses a crucial opportunity in his inspection of 
Le Roy Ladurie to distinguish between the tropological study of 
historical narrative and the writing of history.  Though the above 
quotation shows clearly that writing remained central to Bann’s 
interest in Le Roy Ladurie, Bann makes no distinction between the 
“marks which identify the historical text” as tropes rather than as 
signs of writing in the Derridean sense.  In effect, though Bann 
criticizes White’s pejorative sense of irony, Bann nevertheless 
preserves White’s initial equation of the deployment of tropes with 
writing.  What is essentially missed in Bann’s article is praise for Le 
Roy Ladurie’s attention to inscription, that is, his sticky cocooning of 
the historical object within that anachronistic, contemporary 
language.  It is this act of inscription—i.e. language within language, 
and not the crafting of ironic tropes—which makes Le Roy Ladurie so 
valuable to historiography. 
Elizabeth Clark, in her laudable study on continental, British, 
and American theoretical approaches to history over the last century 
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or so, bears some resemblance to Stephen Bann’s program.  Clark, a 
historian of early Christian studies, aims to bring theoretical advances 
to practicing historians, while simultaneously informing theoreticians 
of the value of historical studies, in her case, specifically of early 
Christian textuality.  Also like Bann, Clark works from what 
Mandelbaum would term a “special” history, since she works on the 
history of women, among others, from a non-hermeneutical 
perspective.   
In her book, History, Theory, Text: Historians and the Linguistic 
Turn, Clark effectively follows the development of French and German 
historical traditions, from historical positivism, which aimed to 
supplant an “older belletristic history,”84 to its most current 
formations in a linguistic, deconstructivist field.  Beginning with 
German history, Clark notes that “‘Method’ was now the order of the 
day, and Ranke’s influence—the Ranke of facts, archives, and 
documents—was to dominate.”85  From this early point, Clark develops 
a thorough narrative of the development of historiography, hitting 
major (and many minor) figures, including the Annalistes, literary and 
historical critics, and early and later structuralists. 
Writing somewhat interchangeably of intellectual history and 
historiography, Clark regardless makes the compelling case for 
updating more hermetic historical practices.  Steadfast throughout the 
book, Clark builds a strong progression which indicates that any 
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historical project that endeavors to make a truth claim must do so in 
full awareness of the epistemological demands any such claim entails.  
In this, Clark insists on what has been called, the “reconfiguration of 
intellectual history” rooted in contemporary critiques of discourse and 
language.86 
Clark ends with an important chapter on the practical 
application of criticism (especially criticism informed by 
deconstruction) onto her own specialty of early Christianity.  While not 
directly stating her work as indexical, Clark delivers an important case 
whereby the relevance of early Christian texts proves to be equally 
relevant to theoretical study.  In that early historical figures are in a 
great sense lost to history—and this is especially true of women in 
ancient Christianity—Clark shows that while such elusive figures may 
not be directly observable, their effects are indexically available in the 
documents of others.  More importantly, such an index points not only 
to the invisible figure, but also to socio-psychological relationships, 
since the historian of the artifact necessarily encodes in that work his 
own desire of the unseen other.87  By showing an earlier dedication to 
the more “literary” forms of history and, subsequently, the militaristic 
overthrow of “rhetorical” history by the “new scientific history,” Clark 
foreshadows her own plea for a linguistic return. 
Medieval Professor Emerita Madeline Caviness approaches the 
question from a different perspective, which she describes as ad 
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triangulum.  In her book, Reframing Medieval Art: Difference, Margins, 
Boundaries, Caviness, too, discusses the difficulties in writing history 
about those most often relegated to the margins.  Citing Flax’s “triune 
relationship” which posits the methodological value of a 
psychoanalytic-philosophical-feminist approach that unapologetically 
embraces any disunities thereby generated, Caviness follows: “The 
question I pose in this book is how are we to evaluate the tensions and 
discrepancies between pictorial constructions, viewed as cultural 
practice, and historical ‘reality?’”88  The contingent solution Caviness 
affords her study relies on a similar trinity in which the object is 
envisioned from both a theoretical perspective and historical trace 
data.  Caviness explains her method as a kind of triangulation: 
Triangulation has come to hold special meaning for my 
work. Throughout this book I bring various feminist 
strategies to focus on selected works of art, and at the 
same time establishing a medieval context for them; in 
other words, I have two quite different angles from which I 
approach the object of study, giving a kind of stereoscopic 
vision. I have come to think of this model as an 
asymmetric triangle, where the medieval representations 
form an apex, projected between two widely separated 
viewing positions—one of the postmodern feminist critic, 
the other of the "historian" whom I hold by definition to be 
modern. The historical viewpoint privileges commentaries 
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by the makers and audience of the object in its original 
temporal and spatial frames, and may encompass 
interpretations over time; this is the conventional art 
historical route, the shorter of the two, yet it can no longer 
be viewed as the only one, connecting the ancient object 
directly with its modern viewer, the way it was held to be 
before the New Historicism. I still think of it as the short 
lever with which to pry open the object, but contextual 
study has a tendency to confirm the unity of culture at a 
given moment, rather than to reveal its fissures…89 
 
Discussion 
Having outlined a sample of twentieth-century writings on 
historiography, I will continue in this section with a critique of those 
works; the final section of this chapter will suggest an alternative 
formulation of critical historiography to meet the deficiencies outlined 
herein.  My critiques center around two themes.  The first theme 
problematizes the assumed provenance of historiographic inquiry.  The 
second theme faults historiographers for neglecting what, I argue, 
remains historiography’s most essential aspect—its written-ness.  I 
address this later criticism primarily through a comparative reading of 
an excerpt from Becker’s text.  
What is the provenance of critical historiography?  This is by no 
means simple to address, since the compound term has not been 
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clearly defined in print, and the latter term alone—historiography—
sees a surprising variance in contemporary literature.  Moreover, 
provenance as applied to an academic field does not have a direct 
correlation to geographic borders, but rather references an abstract 
field of inquiry.  That field abuts many other fields, even hosting 
subfields; thus, accurate identification of a particular provenance for 
historiography might prove an impossible task.  Nevertheless, Becker, 
Megill, and Jarzombek all attempt to stake out a territory for 
historiography; all three summarily do so via a critique of disciplinary 
borders.  
Is historiography, then, the best tool with which to have intra-
disciplinary dialog?  That is, is historiography the best way to get 
historians to talk?  Strictly speaking, I argue that moving between 
various discursive historical practices requires more than talking, but 
requires instead multiple examinations of processes of inscription.  It 
is a critical project, to be sure, and Becker, similarly, sees 
historiography’s charge one akin to the critical study of literature.  
Becker seems to concur both that historiography is the tool for this job 
and that this respectable, under-appreciated activity deserves far more 
credit as a rigorous academic pursuit.  
This chapter began with a more general discussion of what 
constitutes (and what ought not) the practices of the historiographer.  I 
conclude here by explaining that by looking pragmatically, the 
historical disciplines have always hosted interdisciplinary historical 
endeavors, and likewise have other disciplines offered rich grounds for 
historical projects.  A historian of art, therefore, holds as much a claim 
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to the requisite competencies as does any other historical academic. 
Having plotted a methodological heading, in the remainder of this 
chapter, I will focus on the specifics of my historiographic study.90 
And this is the primary contention of my own chapter herein: 
that the somewhat careless (“hardly perceptible”) transference of 
historical concerns (story, narrative, etc.) to writing qua historiography 
has rarely emerged beyond a nearly identical vehicle in which history 
pulls the narrative while its graphic mark (its writing) remains in the 
sidecar.  Though White offers us magnificent technology with which to 
scrutinize writing, it nevertheless insists on that writing’s subservience 
to narrative.  Bann, for all his care in ferrying White’s methods to a 
wider scholastic audience, also leaves this transition indeterminate.  
Recall White’s contention, quoted earlier, that “historical discourse can 
be broken down” into the facts, which he terms the “manifest or literal 
‘surface’ of the discourse,” and an inner figurative level, which “points 
to a deep-structural meaning.”91  Derrida, however, problematizes any 
such discursive stratification, suggesting its reliance on dualism: 
The system of “hearing (understanding)-oneself-speak” 
through the phonic substance—which presents itself as 
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the nonexterior, nonmundane, therefore nonempirical or 
noncontingent signifier—has necessarily dominated the 
history of the world during an entire epoch, and has even 
produced the idea of the world, the idea of world-origin, 
that arises from the difference between worldly and non-
worldly, the outside and the inside, […] etc.92 
In maintaining two levels of signification already present in 
historical narrative, White performs what Derrida terms, “Technics in 
the service of language.”93  Thus, any advance in poetics that 
maintains writing on the periphery of that project reifies a prior 
position of language (discourse) in which its writing is a mere 
supplement.  Derrida expands: 
I believe […] that a certain sort of question about the 
meaning and origin of writing precedes, or at least merges 
with, a certain type of question about the meaning and 
origin of technics.  That is why the notion of technique can 
never simply clarify the notion of writing.94 
As mentioned earlier, Bann proceeds as if White already makes 
this explicit, that writing figures discourse: “[…] White’s work in the 
English-speaking world at any rate, offers a path for historiography 
that is no longer based on the disavowal of the discursive structure of 
writing.”95  But that “path” is itself writing, and the means by which 
historians structure and arrange their narratives must be considered a 
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function of writing.  To consider poetic technique alone or in advance 
of writing flagrantly posits “the notion of technique” simply to “clarify 
the notion of writing.”  In the previous chapter, I argued that all 
historiography has no choice but to consider paramount the 
inscription itself of recorded history.  Similarly, the widespread 
contemporary calls for epistemological treatments in historiographic 
writing are excessively sweeping: only those epistemological questions 
concerned with grammatology are appropriate for historiography.  Any 
questions on the nature of historical knowledge—that is, 
philosophically epistemological questions—are best redirected 
elsewhere.   
One means by which history’s writing might be entertain is 
through the budding discourse called “critical historiography.”  A term 
used intermittently during the twentieth century, critical 
historiography has languished in nonspecificity; while the term first 
referred to a politically progressive approach to history, more recent 
invocations of critical historiography have avoided carefully 
ascertaining its scope.  I suggest that critical historiography wrests 
from the multivalent word, “historiography,” the study of written 
history, or the study of the writing of history.  In addition, the “critical” 
modifier denotes a contemporary approach based on the history of 
critical theory.  Like its origins in the Frankfurt school, critical 
historiography, then, adds to the study of written history the critique 
of dominant discourses.  
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CHAPTER 3 
WHEN VISION DECEIVES: VIEWING THE FIELD UNDER 
CHARISMATIC AUTHORITY 
 
Introduction to the Conflict between Charismatic Authority 
and Critical Historiography 
Recognizing that a critical historiography must ask whether 
historians underwrite intellectual hegemony, I now turn to a 
formidable cohort of Grand Narrative historiography: charismatic 
authority.  Naturally, all historians to some extent identify with their 
subjects, often ideologically.  This identification inherently shapes 
narratives and sublimates inconsistencies.  The critical 
historiographer, however, scrutinizes historical writing to uncover 
disruptions sutured together by a written account that aims to 
produce a seamless historical narrative; this scrutiny is especially 
urgent in instances when such continuity never existed.  Of the many 
critical idioms that might render such a critique, I focus here on the 
particular effects charismatic authority forces upon narrative 
structure, effects I trace through a case study on Structuralism.  That 
factor—charismatic authority—derives originally from Weber and 
subsequently through French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s revision of 
that theory. 
My own study on charisma begins with a review of concepts by 
the paradigmatic sociologist, Max Weber.  I proceed by attempting to 
extricate use of the term from a religious studies application to 
ascertain whether a secular deployment will prove fruitful for other 
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studies.  I subsequently outline and develop sociological strategies 
Bourdieu uses to analyze charismatic relationships.  I compare 
Bourdieu’s work on charisma to Foucault’s discursive formations.   
In discussing Foucault alongside of Bourdieu, I bring a hybrid 
sociological analysis to the historiographic case of François Dosse’s 
History of Structuralism, Volume I.  Bourdieu’s formulation of charisma 
bears specific relevance on the study of the social networks in Dosse’s 
book.  Consequently, I extend a historiographical critique to Dosse’s 
work by adopting some Bourdienne terms which elucidate the dangers 
charismatic participation hold for written history.  Once enumerating 
this procedure, I apply this template to identify specific charismatic 
operations at play in the first volume of Dosse’s historical work, 
History of Structuralism.  As set forth in his introduction, 
structuralism, with the initiation of the “linguistic turn,” opened a 
channel in the history of ideas against and through which Derrida 
would later develop the discourse of grammatology.  That discourse 
pays notable attention to writing, erasure, inscription, and delineation 
as themselves constitutive linguistic operations of equal significance to 
rhetoric.  As such, the specific case study of Dosse’s extensive history 
will act as a bridge though which I will ultimately support the 
grammatological imperative for historiographers. 
My critique of Dosse contends that the historian uncritically 
enters the field not as a impartial recorder of facts, but as an agent of 
his charismatic historical subjects—the French structuralists.  While 
Dosse narratologically displaces himself from the distant history of 
structuralism, I demonstrate that he nevertheless actively follows in 
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the wake of their charismatic leadership.  My analysis does not 
dismiss the impassioned intellectual biography that Dosse presents.  
In fact, his extensive “family tree” offers a rich quilt of key centers in 
early postmodern French intellectual life.  I do, however, seek to 
deconstruct the Grand Narrative edifice inherent in Dosse’s method—
indeed any method—which  eliminates the historical narrator, 
substituting a scientific, invisible voice.  While the historical narrative 
in Dosse’s History of Structuralism provides a valuably dense network 
of post-war French intellectuals, it does so at the cost of criticality.  
Since the disaffected voice of the historian qua social-scientist forced a 
prescribed top-down narrative focalization, the authority of Dosse’s 
historical voice leaves the reader bereft of any active learning or 
personal evaluative capacity.  
Dosse's History of Structuralism Volume 1 serves as the definitive 
historical account of structuralism.96  Dosse originally published "The 
Rising Sign" as "Le champ du signe, 1945-1966," the first  volume of 
Histoire du strucuralisme,  in  1991. Volume two, "Le chant du cygne, 
1967 à nos jours," followed in 1992.97 Volume one has been translated 
into no fewer than eight languages to date.  Dosse has gone on to 
publish extensively and successfully, becoming one of the most 
celebrated contemporary intellectual historians.  In spite of its broad 
success, I know of no previous attempt to develop a critique of Dosse's 
History outside the space confines of a book review.   
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Both volumes one and two of Dosse's History found extensive 
praise in English and French language presses. The reviews most often 
range from devotion to reserved excitement.  In this chapter, I aim to 
show, first, charismatic authority plays a central role in the formation, 
approval, and ultimately admission to the canonical intellectual 
history on structuralism. Second, the history of structuralism is fitted 
into a program on the history of twentieth-century France, with 
French politics as the primary telos to which every historical fact 
returns.  These two premises, I conclude, are the result of a writing 
process deeply affected by charismatic leadership, which obscures the 
reader’s ability to discern alliances between historian and subject.   
 
Charisma as Set Forth by Weber 
In analyzing the period of the Second Temple, Weber set forth 
four types to describe social power structures within various social 
formations.  The fourth of these, the charismatic leader, is what 
concerns this study.  Weber sees the source of charismatic power, in 
the case of Hebrew prophets, in the “recognition” of super or even 
divine powers.98  In the essay, “The Sociology of Charismatic 
Authority,” Weber introduces “the general character of charisma” as 
one that effectively exceeds the demands of the “everyday routine,” i.e., 
those normally provided for by either bureaucratic or patriarchal 
structures.99  In times requiring different leadership, the charismatic 
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leader “seizes the task that is adequate for him and demands 
obedience and a following by virtue of his mission.”100  Weber adds 
that charisma “knows only inner determination and inner restraint,” 
though he immediately thereafter offers specific qualification.101   The 
charismatic, he writes repeatedly, looks only inward for divine 
inspiration.  Weber contradicts this stance with the following 
quotation, in which he confirms that the charismatic must also 
anticipate the needs of his followers when executing his “mission.”  
Regarding this exchange, Weber writes: 
His charismatic claim breaks down if his mission is not 
recognized by those to whom he feels he has been sent.  If 
they recognize him, he is their master—so long as he 
knows how to maintain recognition through ‘proving’ 
himself.  But he does not derive his ‘right’ from their will, 
in the manner of an election.  Rather, the reverse holds:  it 
is the duty of those to whom he addresses his mission to 
recognize him as their charismatically qualified leader.102 
It will benefit this discussion to plot points of recognition implicit 
in this formulation.  Firstly, the charismatic must recognize his divine 
mission.  Followers of the charismatic recognize him as their “master,” 
but this is a contingent recognition, given only upon sufficient proof.  
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neither Weber nor Bourdieu analyze the gender politics of charisma, I assume that 
these texts refer to male charismatics, and while potentially applicable to female 
charismatics, I will not presume so here. 
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The charismatic recognizes that proof is compulsory to maintain a 
following; if he can provide proof to the people, they will recognize him.  
Simultaneously, he recognizes the “duty” of his followers to honor his 
divine qualifications.  Each point of recognition indicates a sequence of 
payment in the form of recognition.   
Though Weber posits charisma as falling outside an orthodox 
economic system, as activity between agents, his text does admit a 
“transactional” element.  The recognition itself is a “duty” collected by 
the charismatic in exchange for a desirable mission.  While a 
charismatic may believe himself impervious to external motivation, his 
mission is nevertheless selected on the field and effectively brought by 
his followers. 
Within this essay, Weber does not sequester charisma’s force to 
a heavenly realm.  On the contrary, his description here plainly 
situates charisma in social action; charisma’s force—its claim—relies 
on its repeated performance (“‘proving’ himself”) and the repeated 
recognition of that symbolic.  While Weber develops a sufficient 
explanation for the transaction—i.e. the proving and recognition 
exchange—he does not directly wrestle with the networks of social 
relations that set the stage for the charismatic to beguile his audience.  
Instead, Weber employs mystical language to describe what are 
otherwise sociological relationships.  Weber writes:   
The term ‘charisma’ will be applied to a certain quality of 
an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart 
from ordinary men and treated as endowed with 
supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically 
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exceptional powers or qualities.  These are such as are not 
accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of 
divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them, 
the individual concerned is treated as a leader.  In 
primitive circumstances, this peculiar kind of deference is 
paid to prophets, to people with a reputation for 
therapeutic or legal wisdom, to leaders in the hunt, and 
heroes in war.  It is very often thought of as resting on 
magical powers.  How the quality in question would be 
ultimately judged from any ethical, aesthetic, or other 
such point of view is naturally entirely indifferent for 
purposes of definition.  What is alone important is how the 
individual is actually regarded by those subject to 
charismatic authority, by his ‘followers’ or ‘disciples’.”103 
It behooves us here to take stock of Weber’s definition, largely 
because, as we shall see in the next section, Weber is too often read 
indelicately, denying subtlety in his decisive ambiguity.  “Charisma” 
refers to that quality which designates the charismatic leader.  By the 
“virtue” of charisma, the leader is “treated as” supernatural, 
superhuman, “or at least specifically exceptional” in power.  This 
statement does not confirm whether the charismatic possesses such 
powers, but only that he is treated as being in possession of them.  
Again, an ethical, aesthetic, or other judgment regarding that quality 
is irrelevant to defining charisma as such; what matters is “how the 
                                       
103  Weber and Eisenstadt, 48.  (Emphasis added.) 
 78 
individual is actually regarded,” and, I will argue, this regard is, in 
fact, the source of the charismatic’s gift. 
While Weber elsewhere contends that the charismatic himself 
must not question the divinity of his own calling, the above quotation 
forgoes the more pseudo-psychological characterization to which 
Weber elsewhere resorts.  Instead, Weber frames the relationship of 
the charismatic to his gift in terms of access.  We know simply that 
ordinary men do not have access to these gifts, but do have the ability 
to regard them.  As for the charismatic, we know only that he is 
treated as described, but we have little information from Weber as to 
where the charismatic’s own relationship to his gift resides.  And, 
certainly, the only dynamic of this relationship that would be of 
interest to the sociologist is the network by which the charismatic 
acquires that gift. 
Weber’s work on charisma is most often met with approval, and 
its criticism tends toward problematizing the distance between the 
exceptionality of charismatic authority and more mundane exercises of 
authority.104  Hebrew University sociologist emeritus, S.N. Eisenstadt, 
argues that a closer reading of Weber, particularly alongside 
anthropological and modern communication studies, bridges this gap, 
thus heightening the pertinence of charismatic analysis in everyday 
social structures.105  Citing work by Rudolph (sic) Arnheim, Eliot 
Freidson, Joseph T. Klapper, Ernst Kris and Nathan Leites, and others 
in defense, Eisenstadt insists that charismatic authority holds direct 
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influence over mundane social structures.106  Further, Eisenstadt 
notes the “semi-conspiratorial” approach to charisma posits the 
pragmatic need of despots to maintain “legitimation or for keeping 
people quiet and obedient.”107  My own project aligns with Eisenstadt 
on this point, since charismatic authority, I argue, equally shapes both 
mundane and extraordinary contours of the academic landscape.  
Reconsidering Weber’s theory of charisma’s sociological transaction 
plotted through Pierre Bourdieu’s field, I will continue in this chapter 
by suggesting that the seemingly mundane practice of the historian 
can reveal the systematic exercise of charismatic authority over 
historiography. 
 
Bourdieu Refashions Weber 
Bourdieu provides the most significant reappraisal in recent 
scholarship of Weber’s work on charisma.  Though Bourdieu criticizes 
Weber for never bringing his analysis of charisma into a fully 
sociological discourse, Bourdieu nevertheless sees exceptional value in 
reworking Weber’s original formulations.  Bourdieu ultimately appends 
Weberian work by highlighting charisma’s reliance on large groups of 
people within fields of actorship rather than individuals.  Bourdieu 
draws attention to the “transaction” within the field as the event that 
bestows charismatic authority; he further posits the causes of social 
predispositions of charismatic authority and followership as a social—
and not divine—consequence.  What is most crucial about Bourdieu’s 
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intervention, then, is his insistence that charisma is not the 
provenance of one individual, but is a social set of situations between 
multiple agents.  Social predisposition, rather than individual 
psychology, forms the basis for Bourdieu’s resuscitation of charismatic 
analysis.108 
In preparation for this discussion, I will first outline a few 
sociological terms that Bourdieu originated which are vital to any 
discussion of the French sociologist.  In Distinction: A Social Critique of 
the Judgment of Taste, Bourdieu set forth the crucial question of 
learning why classes of people tend to remain socially immobile even 
when their economic abilities improve.  In short, the judgment of taste 
proved to be an essential clue as to the long-term habituation of class 
markers. 
Bourdieu developed valuable explanations of that immobility 
which inform all of his subsequent work on sociological exchange.  
Firstly, Bourdieu reasoned, there are different kinds of capital other 
than economic capital, specifically, cultural capital and symbolic 
capital.  Bourdieu explains: 
[A]longside the pursuit of ‘economic’ profit, which treats the 
cultural goods business as a business like any other […], there 
is also room for the accumulation of symbolic capital.  ‘Symbolic 
capital’ is to be understood as economic or political capital that 
is disavowed, misrecognized, and thereby recognized, hence a 
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legitimate ‘credit’ which, under certain conditions, and always in 
the long run, guarantees ‘economic profits.’109 
When classes of economically challenged individuals increase 
their economic capital, their non-economic capital (i.e. symbolic and 
cultural capital) often remains unchanged.  Since it is often possible to 
convert between capital modalities, their class often remains far below 
wealthier classes, the latter of which are often far richer than 
commonly perceived, owing to invisible stores of cultural and symbolic 
capital. 
Secondly, people often habituate ways to express their symbolic 
and cultural capitals (or lack thereof) through socialized behaviors 
known as doxa.  Over the course of one’s life, the assimilation of these 
doxa create an individual that is at once subject and object, 
constituent and constitutor of that system.  Bourdieu calls this 
socializing, self-constituting role the habitus, and often refers to it as 
“a structured and structuring structure.” 
Bourdieu's most explicit work on the structuring effect of 
charismatic authority emerges in a brief essay published in English as 
"Legitimation and Structured Interests." This essay provides one of the 
most useful sets of sociological tools with which to approach charisma 
and power, since it attempts a translation of Weber into an updated 
sociological stance.  To do so, it posits interrelationships of social 
agents, rather than divinely inspired individuals, as the basis for social 
analysis.  My motive in re-reading this essay, then, is twofold.  Firstly, 
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I aim to determine which methods of analysis are appropriate to a 
secular discussion of charismatic authority. Secondly, and more 
difficultly, I am to select from Bourdieu's work those figures of speech 
that most directly serve as a kind of ekphrasis, a type of spatio-visual 
metaphor that I will more fully examine in the following chapter. 
Bourdieu’s criticisms of Weber can generally be grouped around 
problems from Weber’s typological treatment of the subject and, 
subsequently, an ensuing symbolic interactionism that Bourdieu 
attributes to that treatment.  Bourdieu succinctly faults Weber: 
Weber consistently fails to establish a distinction between 
(1) direct interactions and (2) the objective structure of the 
relations that become established between religious 
agencies."110 
The failure to draw the above distinction leads Weber to explain 
direct interactions by typology rather than sociology.  Bourdieu finds 
this formulation deeply unsatisfying, complaining that Weber “never 
proposes anything other than a psycho-sociological theory of 
charisma.”111  In this criticism, Bourdieu indicates that Weber’s theory 
of charisma itself remains mired by typological curiosity; such an 
unnecessary concern merely reduces interpersonal interaction to 
psychologically inflected types, rather than to their underlying social 
structures.  Instead, he plans to resuscitate Weber’s study of 
charisma, imbuing it with an independent analytical force.  He does 
this by removing the individual from charisma’s power and refocusing 
                                       
110  Bourdieu and Johnson, 126. 
111  Hutt, 244. 
 83 
on the greater social conditions that make charismatic leadership 
possible.  Bourdieu cautions: 
Let us then dispose once and for all of the notion of charisma as 
a property attaching to the nature of a single individual and 
examine instead, in each particular case, sociologically pertinent 
characteristics of an individual biography.112   
Regarding charismatic agents themselves, however, Bourdieu 
tolerates Weber's formulation; Bourdieu writes:  
These agents are relatively autonomous in respect of 
external constraints (economic constraints in particular) 
and invested with the institutional — or other — power to 
respond to a particular category of needs proper to 
determinate social groups by a determinate type of 
practice or discourse.113 
The agents, or "protagonists" per Weber, ultimately prove 
problematic in their reliance on typologies, and Bourdieu seeks to 
remedy these "difficulties" with an examination of Weber's ideal types.  
Bourdieu overcomes the imprecision of Weber's typology by insisting 
that the "basic intention of Weber's programme of research" remains 
"the necessity of apprehending the different agencies in their 
interaction."114  For our purposes, this terminology fits nicely, as 
"interaction" between agents describes their play or intercourse within 
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a field. Transaction would then describe an interaction in which an 
exchange passes between agents. 
In place of a taxonomy of actor types, Bourdieu substitutes his 
own complex sociological formulation of the field.  In this purview, 
Bourdieu seeks to relieve the sociologist from the earlier obsession 
with psycho-social typology which inevitably plagues any study that 
insists on the independence of an actor.  Unless sociological study of 
charisma focuses on the interrelationships of agents and their actions 
on the field, Bourdieu emphasizes, that study will necessarily 
suppress the "question of legitimacy" to a question of the 
"representation of legitimacy."115 
In a discussion of religious legitimacy, Bourdieu becomes his 
most independent in the article.  Bourdieu follows Weber in asserting 
that the recruitment of a "retinue" or "community" to follow and carry 
out the message of the charismatic forms a mandatory step in 
establishing legitimacy.116  This community itself must meet certain 
"charismatic criteria."117  "Religious legitimacy," then, "is nothing other 
than the state of the specifically religious power, relations at that 
moment [...]"118  Various expressions of that power will depend on an 
agent's configuration within the field, but also on its access to various 
capitals (symbolic, material) that can be deployed as weapons.119  
Bourdieu writes: 
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Competition for religious power owes its specificity 
(particularly in relation to the competition that takes place 
in the political field, for example) to the fact that what is at 
stake is the monopoly of the legitimate exercise of the 
power to modify, in a deep and lasting fashion, the practice 
and world-view of a lay people, by imposing on and 
inculcating in them a particular religious habitus.120 
At this point, Bourdieu reviews his renowned definition of the habitus, 
which refers to a "lasting, generalized and transposable disposition" to 
behave according to that particular world-view.121 Weber is virtually 
indistinguishable from Bourdieu's restylization here, but the division 
between the two quickly resurfaces: 
Whilst the authority of the prophet — an {auctor} whose 
{auctoritas} has continually to be won and re-won — 
depends on the relationship that exists at any moment 
between the supply of religion and the public's demand for 
it, the priest enjoys an authority deriving from his very 
function, which relieves him of the burden of continually 
having to win and consolidate his authority [...]"122 
Thus, Bourdieu blames Weber for neglecting the social 
inculcation of the laity by the religious authority, in particular, the 
repercussions for the ensuing types of transactions it requires between 
laity and priests, charismatics and breakaway followers.  It is the 
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struggle over the power to inculcate a habitus of followership that 
separates religious legitimation from the ever frangible link between a 
charismatic and his proselytes.  Religious scholar Curtis Hutt provides 
one of the few accounts detailing Bourdieu’s restyling of Weber.  He 
posits Bourdieu’s refashioning as an elucidation of power positions on 
the field: 
Bourdieu goes on to wield Weber against Weber […], 
centering the mischaracterization of the charismas put 
forward by religious leaders which are reputedly the 
product of “pure conceptualization” or spontaneous 
inspiration.  Not only is this portrayal inaccurate, but also 
duplicitous.  Legitimating and consecrating speech takes 
the laity’s and other consumers’ eyes off services provided 
and interests served.  By rendering these forces invisible, 
the reproduction of material and ideological dominance is 
more efficiently effected.123 
But by this, Bourdieu specifies that such an account explains 
"why a particular individual finds himself socially predisposed “to act 
in a way consistent” with latent lay persons.124 Followers adopt a 
prophecy solely owing to its compatibility with a habitus already 
operating among followers.125 
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Weber’s take on charismatic authority relies on the faulty 
premise of individual subjectivities, a premise which, for Bourdieu, too 
heavily emphasizes power derived from symbolic force rather than the 
social transactions that imbue that force.  To remedy this, Bourdieu 
interpolates his own theory of agency, which entails the social field as 
site of transactions between agents acting in accordance with the self-
structuring habitus.  The remainder of this section more closely 
envisions Bourdieu’s introduction of the field as a corrective for 
Weber’s symbolic interactionism.   
Hutt notes that Bourdieu takes umbrage with Weber’s “naïve 
symbolic interactionism.”126  Hutt continues:  “This was on account of 
difficulties intrinsic to any investigation of ideal interests not grounded 
in an evaluation of observable social-historical practices.  What people 
think and say are worldly doings—not the product of any divine or 
private revelation […]”127  In Weber’s defense, both Bourdieu and Hutt 
prove to be overly dismissive and reductionist.  In several other texts 
on charisma, Weber fully situates the divine symbolic within a social 
matrix.  By paying attention to the charismatic as symbol, Weber does 
not necessarily exclude the wider network of social exchanges that 
transfers symbolic capital to the charismatic.  Thus, while Bourdieu is 
certainly right to term the charismatic’s relationship with the laity a 
“transaction,” it would be unfair to edit a more sociologically 
embedded possibility from Weber’s text.  
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A consequence of Bourdieu’s dismissal of symbolic 
interactionism is that move’s accompanying expulsion of critical 
textual analysis from sociological inquiry.  On this matter, my primary 
contention with Bourdieu is his indifference to the visual significance 
of his objects of study—an indifference he often gently acknowledges 
but defers to visual culture’s “limited autonomy.”  In fact, I argue, 
Weber’s original formulation lends something to Bourdieu, not only the 
observable, but unobservable doings—doings Weber admitted to the 
divine.  Those doings are also worldly, and as such, deserve the 
sociologist’s utmost attention.  Nevertheless, Bourdieu steadfast 
maintains the anachronistic claim that Weber's understanding of 
relationships between agents is "interactionist (in the sense in which 
we speak today of symbolic interactionism)."128 Bourdieu defends his 
critique: 
The fact that it would not be difficult to extract the 
explicitly stated principles of a theory of symbolic 
interaction from Weber's theoretical writings makes the 
reformulation of Weberian analysis in the language of 
symbolic interactionism all the easier—and, it would 
seem, all the more legitimate.129  
Bourdieu insists that Weber's "interactionist view" neglects the 
configurations of the field entirely, reductively focusing on 
interpersonal relationships, which he characterizes as "practices and 
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representations in the logic of symbolic interactions."130  Such an 
approach never allows the sociologist release from "the 
characteristically Aristotelian logic of typological thought;"131 rather, 
that thinking remains inadequate by privileging "elements over 
relations of the religious field—and therefore of the objective 
domain."132  The ordering of "elements," Bourdieu explains, initiates an 
indefinite "list of exceptions" produced by the linearity of that logic, a 
recursion averted by the method of scanning the field.  Bourdieu 
outlines the procedure for this sociological scan: 
Any analysis of the logic of the interactions that may 
develop between agents in direct confrontation with one 
another must be subordinated to the construction of the 
structure of the objective relations between the positions 
these agents occupy in the religious field, a structure that 
determines the form their interactions may assume and 
the representation they may have of these interactions.133 
Furthermore, he writes: "It is only by constructing the religious 
field as the set of all the objective relations between positions so that 
we can arrive at the principle which explains the direct interactions 
between social agents and the strategies they may employ against each 
other."134  Agents fight or play "within" the field and never on it. 
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We notice an implicit insistence, in the subordination of logic to 
positions, on the worldliness of interactionism. But the spatialization 
of structural tropes only adds distance between language and social 
formation. While we can conceptualize the field as an abstract 
geometry (though in real practice it constitutes a topography or an 
architecture rather than geometry).  I use Bourdieu’s word in this 
instance not as a timeless geometry, but as an area of potentiation for 
action or operation. In this sense, agents do not maintain "positions" 
as calibrated coordinates, but rather they "keep" or "maintain the 
field." By maintaining the field, their operation therein constitutes the 
area of potentiation. This usage enhances the latent sense of the "fold" 
within the field, since the agent, enveloped within the fold, at once 
displaces and shapes it by his/her own operation. The mechanism of 
this folding becomes clearer when looking at the unnecessary 
“construction of the structure.”135 
Since the field preexists, there is no need for its construction to 
begin with. Very much like the self-structuring structure of the 
habitus, the field self-structures at the moment that an agent makes a 
“pitch,” as the common idiom “pitch the field” suggests. Thus, the 
“pitch” simultaneously sets the field and defines the agent.  The 
"objective relations" thereby need no further structure or support, 
since the field itself forms those traceable relations. To be sure, we can 
analyze those forms, and also discuss inhibited potential of any agent 
to describe power-plays on the field.  The field itself, as a form, 
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necessarily restricts the parameters' forms within and thus also 
"determines both the form that agent interactions may assume and the 
representation they may have of these interactions."136  It is tempting 
to think through these “representations” solely in visual mode, but as I 
have come to describe, the field is in constant flux, shaped by tissues 
of multiple modalities.  Like enfolded membranes, access to—and 
therefore representation of—any swatch can only be a grope of the 
elephant: any one part is incapable of total representation, and the 
struggle over knowing the depth of its enfolding is the very struggle for 
legitimation. 
Reinterpreting the struggles on the field as I have just done 
shows strong affinity to Foucault’s examination of power and 
knowledge; the control of knowledge, he contends , is itself an exercise 
of power.  To describe the struggle for legitimation as one of 
knowledge/power, it necessary for me to rectify the vocabulary of 
Bourdieu to Foucault.  Changing between methodological matrices 
does introduce some difficulties, the most salient of which is the 
incompatible formulations of subject and object within respective 
Bourdienne and Foucauldian approaches.  Bourdieu sought to 
eliminate the subject-object dichotomy that has plagued western 
philosophy by incorporating his concept of the habitus.  Foucault, 
however, maintained the subject-object distinction to credit (and 
simultaneously to chastise) the historian. 
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Certainly, Foucault’s distinction between two kinds of 
knowledge, savoir and connaissance, needs mention here. 
Connaissance refers to those rules and agreements between human 
agents that allow them to reach accord.  Both connaissance and the 
“conditions of knowledge” to which Foucault often makes mention 
retain sociological compatibility with Bourdieu's plotting various 
interests within the field.  In contrast, savoir, following Kantian 
fashion, asks after the conditions that allowed connaissance to arise.  
How are we to retain sociological consistency with the introduction of 
savoir?  If we understand Foucault when he says, “By connaissance I 
mean the relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules that 
govern it,”137 we may achieve a particular compatibility with 
Bourdienne methodology by substituting Foucault’s subject-object 
divide with a reinvigorated status of the habitus as described earlier.138  
This substitution, however, does not solve the seemingly asocial 
significance of savoir.  In order to continue, we must first finally 
explore whether Foucault’s pairing of terms proves to be incompatible 
within a Bourdienne system.  The sociologist Devereaux Kennedy, an 
early American champion of Foucault, writes: 
But Foucault does not place himself within a tradition of 
sociology of knowledge position by reducing these 
conditions of possibility (savoir) to social and economic 
conditions.  He grants the possibility that position in the 
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social structure or economic interest may explain why a 
given individual or group takes one side of a controversy 
rather than another. But, he argues, the conditions which 
allow the given controversy to exist do not reside within 
the given individual or group.139 
If we are to reconcile Foucault’s dual levels of knowledge within 
a Bourdienne sociology, we will need to make terminological 
adjustments.  First, though Foucault writes of subject-positions, we 
will need to consider agents; admittedly, this may cause some 
consternation for classical Foucauldians, who regard the conditional, 
conditioned nature of subject-hood to be vital in explaining power 
dynamics.  We might understand the access to connaissance in a 
Bourdienne sense as an agent’s own estimation of that configuration of 
the field in which he or she is enfolded.  Sense of that field is always 
conditioned by it; a given agent’s perspective of that field (read: 
subject-position) depends on the agent’s conditioned means of 
understanding that field.  We might ascribe the means of that 
understanding to the habitus, combined with formal knowability as 
determined by the configuration of the field. 
Savoir, however, holds affinity to Bourdieu’s understanding of 
the symbolic.  Savoir remains unknowable to agents in their own time 
because, firstly, it is not an a priori structure to be discerned, and 
secondly, because this knowledge is not universal (i.e., a total history), 
but contingent to the historian’s framing.  While connaissance and 
                                       
139  Kennedy, 271. 
 94 
savoir have direct relation to each other, they are temporally displaced; 
we might posit them as existing on separate fields, but this would be a 
mistake.  Only if we adopt a restrictive Euclidean geometry need we 
conceive of two separate planes.140   
In a reticular topography, with singularities capable of temporal 
displacement, such separation is hardly necessary.  The historian, by 
looking into the past, nevertheless wraps him or herself within an 
already-passed field of struggle; this pulls the symbolic of that field, 
changing access to it.  We might, then, posit existence of the field 
synchronically (and knowable through connaissance), and 
diachronically (knowable as savoir). The field is constantly reticulating, 
and its knowability, thus, is ever-changing and can be described from 
several approaches.  (For Foucault, this would imply that one cannot 
know one’s own field diachronically, but only synchronically.)  
“Surfaces of emergence,” an important concept in Foucault, can 
be effortlessly superimposed on Bourdieu’s concept of the field.  
Foucault himself defines them as “fields of initial differentiation” that 
attempt to delimit, and therefore render describable, a discourse.  
Further, Foucault attributes to those fields evidence of struggles over 
knowledge, “within which a discourse finds a way of limiting its 
domain, of defining what it is talking about, of giving it the status of 
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an object and therefore of making it manifest, nameable, 
describable.”141  Foucault’s vision of such surfaces remains 
remarkably consistent with my interpretation of a reticular field, in 
which folds, tears, and constantly changing perspectives present at 
any one time a deformed view of the discourse, one entirely flavored by 
one’s own available perspective, of the roughness of the terrain, 
singularities and their distortive effects, etc.   
Kennedy describes further: “Authorities of delimitation are 
constituted by those who ceded the authority, power, and knowledge 
to delineate, name, and establish objects.”142  In that Foucault’s 
authorities gain their power by a transaction with their followers, this 
understanding of authority fits snugly within Bourdieu’s or even 
Weber’s framework.  Bourdieu, however, allows a far greater 
complexity than Foucault.  Since authority is merely one description of 
a relationship established between agents on the field, it remains not a 
transcendental force, but one of performed specificity.  Foucault’s 
formulation remains somewhat serially defined, whereas in my take on 
Bourdieu, the field (or surfaces) are not only defined by emergence, but 
by a continual process of reformulation.  Access to the knowledge of 
that surface (which authorities may have greater, but never total 
access to), constitutes the kind of authority and power invested in that 
authority by followers.  
But the “rules” (referred to somewhat problematically as grids) 
by which agents negotiate discursive borders (or cease-fire zones), 
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while hinting at Wittgensteinian interests, in fact serve more to allow 
epistemic differentiation.  That is, Foucault identifies in historical 
subjects “lateral continuities,” or epistemic connections between 
popularly conceived splits, and “longitudinal discontinuities,”143 or the 
ruptures in rule specificities that indicate the shift from one episteme 
to another, incompatible epistemes.  To apply these terminological 
adjustments to structural history, then, would trace overlaps in those 
shared discursive specificities: this is all that is required of the strict 
archaeology of ideas.  If one desired to add a sociological domain, 
though, one would include historical actions between agents which 
clarified, defined, obfuscated, and assumed interpretative authority 
over a given field. 
As a fold or reticulum, the form of the field is an inseparable 
figure-ground continuum. To divide this simultaneous process into the 
sequential "construction" seems to reify the subject-object that 
Bourdieu sought to overcome. As a pitch is made, the field conforms to 
it, and similarly enfolds its agent. Any analysis of conditions 
(orientations) of agents within the field or their actions (pitches) is an 
analysis of conformity — both to that reticulum and by it! 
Bourdieu asserts that Weber “locates the central principle of the 
systems of religious interest in the forms in which the privileged 
classes and the 'negatively privileged' classes represent their positions 
in the social structure to themselves."144  In referring to "positions" in a 
"social structure," Bourdieu elliptically allows the reader to substitute 
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for Weber's simplistic "classes" his own broader categories of agents in 
the religious field. But in doing so, Bourdieu forsakes the formalism in 
Weber that Bourdieu himself would profit from. Formal interests are 
modal, and like charisma, express related and relational forms.  The 
centrality of this form conceived as enwrapping through action on the 
field will persist throughout this study, since the formation of the 
cartouche, whether on the field or within the page, is the imperative 
concern of historiography. 
 
Symbolic Consequences 
In laying out the field as a means to overcome symbolic 
interactionism, Bourdieu enmeshes his own program in a visualized 
vocabulary to describe essentially rhetorical relationships between 
agents.  By outlining sociologically how a charismatic is afforded 
power by followers, Bourdieu attempts to remove the divine power that 
Weber ascribed to the charismatic’s message.  The methodological 
substitution of divine or magic power for a sophisticated set of 
relationships or plays on the field, however, is itself not without 
consequences.  Having outlined Bourdieu's field and further extended 
its visualization, I will in this section indicate that by using the field to 
describe the charismatic’s symbolic acquisition of power, Bourdieu 
loses an area of significance that Weber admitted: the symbolic 
rupture created by the magical consecration of charisma.  Hutt writes: 
Bourdieu […] maintained that the activities, values, and 
beliefs endorsed by a charismatic leader are socially 
generated—‘already present in a latent state amongst all 
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the members of the class or group of his addressees.’ […]  
This is what underlies charismatic popularity—not a well-
reasoned, remarkably unusual, or supernatural 
message.145   
In this way, as explained earlier, Bourdieu sidesteps any 
symbolic interactionism ascribed to the charismatic’s object, that is, to 
the charismatic’s divine message.  Instead, the field of objective 
relations strips the message of any magic or divinity, returning it 
promptly to the worldly network of human relationships.  But even 
Bourdieu concedes a more phenomenal element to this system at the 
point in which the prophet or charismatic’s message is formed. 
One manner in which a prophet's message feels out its 
agreeability with laity has to do with its ambiguity.  Bourdieu writes: 
"The allusions and ellipses found in such forms of discourse are 
designed to promote a grasp of the message in the form of a 
misunderstanding or as a deciphering of a concealed message; or, to 
put it another way, to promote those reinterpreted perceptions that 
invest the message with the expectations of the hearers."146 Thus, 
followers are primed to interpret an ambiguous message within the 
schema of their already formulated desires.  Bourdieu neglects to 
specify whether this is an unconscious procedure, but ostensibly, to 
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be perceived as a providential windfall, surprise or sudden relief must 
likely accompany the follower’s reception of the prophet. 
I have avoided to this point any discussion of the particularity of 
religion because by reducing the study to the field of objective 
relations, Bourdieu effectively secularizes the authority afforded to the 
charismatic.  Though that authority certainly derives from a religious 
community and is enacted on a religious field, the content of that 
message is largely irrelevant, since its value derives from successfully 
meeting the “expectations of the hearers.”  We can easily adapt this 
model of authority onto a secular field all the while maintaining 
Bourdieu’s sociological template, since—unlike Weber—sacred content 
never actually defines Bourdieu's process.  In fact, charismatic 
authority per Bourdieu bears remarkable resemblance to his decidedly 
secular discussion of the authority afforded to the work of art.  On the 
latter, Bourdieu writes: “In short, what ‘makes reputations […] is the 
field of production, understood as the system of objective relations 
between these agents or institutions and as the site of the struggles for 
the monopoly of the power to consecrate, in which the value of the 
works of art and belief in that value are continuously generated.”147   
The “reputation,” which is akin to the proselytism afforded to the 
prophet, is likewise steeped in symbolic economies:  it is, after all, a 
credit or account extended to someone on their behalf.  Reputation, 
figured as the above field, relates directly to charisma’s field of 
operation, but I would draw an essential difference.  While reputation 
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includes the struggle for “the power to consecrate,” this lateral struggle 
between agents is unnecessary in the charismatic transaction.  I argue 
that this indicates a qualitative difference in fields.  More specifically, 
reputation is never a “gift,” but always reflects credit extended.  
Moreover, this loan is an estimate, computation, or figure.  But for 
symbolic capital to hold currency, it must be subject to both a 
disavowal and a misrecognition.  The latter misrecognition 
simultaneously constitutes a kind of legitimating recognition, in that 
the field accepts the original disavowal, thus recognizing a mistake. 
Since in the course of discussing charisma we have several 
times seen arise comparisons to the misrecognition afforded to the 
magician, we must first more fully consider the resemblance.  On this 
matter, Bourdieu is especially insightful: 
[T]he problem with magic is not so much to know what are 
the specific properties of the magician, or even of the 
magical operations and representations, but rather to 
discover the bases of the collective belief or, more 
precisely, the collective misrecognition, collectively 
produced and maintained, which is the source of the 
power the magician appropriates … [this] source of 
‘creative’ power, the ineffable mana or charisma celebrated 
by the tradition, need not be sought anywhere other than 
in the field, i.e. in the system of objective relations which 
constitute it, in the struggles of which it is the site and in 
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the specific form of energy or capital which is generated 
there.148 
In the above quote, Bourdieu accounts for how the greater field 
of social interactions produces a kind of “collective belief.”  Here, 
though, Bourdieu stops far short of Weber’s initial question of the 
divine or supernatural.  Can we reconcile the two to produce a theory 
of the field that does not dismiss the “magic” therein?  I believe it is 
possible through a term monumentally developed by Benjamin:  the 
aura. 
Benjamin deployed the term, aura, to denote an artwork’s “being 
imbedded in the fabric of tradition.”149  While in his initial formulation, 
one can detect a nostalgia for mysticism, the term can nevertheless 
prove relevant even under secular sociological scrutiny.  Benjamin 
continues with a discussion quite germane to the one of magic: 
Originally, the contextual integration of art in tradition 
found its expression in the cult.  We know that the earliest 
art works originated in the service of a ritual—first the 
magical, then the religious kind.  It is significant that the 
existence of the work of art with reference to its aura is 
never entirely separated from its ritual function.150 
While Benjamin’s prose does not instantly offer itself to the 
sociologist, it can still be adapted to social study without much effort.  
In that the “cult” consists of agents acting within some ritualized field, 
                                       
148  Bourdieu and Johnson, 81.  (Emphasis original.) 
149  Benjamin and Arendt, 278 part IV. 
150  Benjamin and Arendt, 278 part IV. 
 102 
we can garner compatibility here with Bourdieu.  The aura then refers 
to a highly specialized kind of “collective misrecognition,” that is, the 
bestowing of magical, supernatural, or divine powers on some object.  
This does differ from Bourdieu’s plainer description of art’s power in 
his more clinical estimation of art’s economic value because the aura 
requires a change in the visualization of a particular field.  I will 
explain. 
Recall my earlier distinction between reputation and charisma, 
in which I held that an essential transactional difference is charisma’s 
“gift,” which differs from reputation’s “loan” or “credit.”  That gift 
constitutes far more than mere “consecration;” it is the production of 
the aura itself.  But the misregard has an unexpected effect, 
unexpected because it so precisely and restrictively renders the visual 
field.  It does this through what Benjamin calls ritual, but what we 
might consider—in Bourdienne terms—the production and 
maintenance of “the ineffable mana or charisma.” 
Thus, the aura is a highly social gift onto a charismatic, owing to 
a carefully executed misregard by one’s followers in the visual field 
surrounding the leader.  That aura’s magic or divine powers derive 
from a distortion of vision.151  We, therefore, have a definition of the 
aura and a description of its origin, but still lack clarity on how it 
functions, that is, the mechanism of that social interaction.  To 
understand the social mechanism, we must more closely consider the 
collective misregard. 
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The aura itself is pneumatic rather than purely optic; it differs 
from the halo in this respect.  It is, however, conferred through a 
visual field by the concentrated regard of charisma’s followers.  It is a 
contradictory struggle, then, as followers vouch for the presence of the 
aura (the spiritual emanation) while they deny themselves visual 
possession of it.  “Proof,” in the form of visual clues, is only offered 
periodically and as necessary to rehearse their mutual agreement, 
keeping it current.  That visual proof (the whisper of the divine aura) 
escapes into the visual through momentary apertures.  The 
charismatic tries to exert control over these apertures, but at times, 
his or her individual will is unable to stop the apertures from opening.  
These apertures must always be confirmed visually and can only be 
seen by followers (though the charismatic knows of their existence). 
The aura itself is invisible (though perceptible), and its 
manifestation emanates through apertures.  Without regard of the 
aura, a regard based upon misregard, charisma ceases to be such.  
This magical exchange is wholly constitutive, and any like conditions 
without it rapidly retreat to the field of ordinary reputation.  The gift of 
grace is immediately withdrawn (rescinded or revoked), and any (gift) 
offering or token converts instantly to a line of credit.  Such debt 
ultimately will require repayment—often with interest. 
But Bourdieu himself leaves underdeveloped a thorough account 
of the role of the symbolic.  The notorious Lacanian, Slovoj Žižek, 
provides a necessary corollary on this problem.  Žižek’s academic 
contributions span disparate topics, but in the sociological discussion 
of Bourdieu, Žižek’s groundbreaking application of Lacanian 
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psychoanalysis—an analytic discourse intended for the study of 
individual subjectivities—onto compound subjects, i.e., social fields, 
opens to discussion the Bourdienne silence regarding the symbolic.  
Both the allusions and ellipses are better understood as linguistic 
manifestations of the symptom. In this respect, they are tied to the 
divinity or magic of the charismatic, magic that Bourdieu too hastily 
dismisses. In a declaration germane to the Bourdienne field, Žižek 
writes that the symptom, for either the "Freudian field" or the Marxist 
one, "In both cases the point is to avoid the properly fetishistic 
fascination of the 'content' supposedly hidden behind the form…"152  
This finds similar expression in Bourdieu's purging of the content of 
the prophet's message.  Žižek continues: "the 'secret' to be unveiled 
through analysis is not the content hidden by the form (the form of 
commodities, the form of dreams) but, on the contrary, the ‘secret’ of 
this form itself."153 Thus, the questions, "why have the latent dream-
thoughts assumed such a form?"154  And, "why have values assumed 
the form of various commodities?"  Both inquiries find close parallel in 
Bourdieu's question (which I paraphrase), "why have the interests of 
the laity assumed the form of a charismatic message?" 
To ask these formal questions, however, indentures us to 
complete a certain line of inquiry where Bourdieu does not. That is, 
what of those magical interests that gave birth to the charismatic? If 
we consider the laity as subject to an imbalance of power from within 
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the established (legitimate) religious field, we see that the invocation of 
magic—and ultimately bestowing that gift onto a charismatic agent— 
cannot be reduced to a sociological scorecard of power. Rather, it 
indicates struggle for the symbolic itself.  
During the battle for legitimation, religious authorities do more 
than wrest symbolic capital—they gain control of access to the 
habitual ways of understanding the symbolic. In doing so, they 
cultivate in lay followers an understanding of the field with but one 
asymptote—God. Access to this God, which in Žižekian/Lacanian 
psychoanalysis is access to the Real, is of course administered 
through religious authority (read: the Law of the Father) by the 
religious institution.  From Bourdieu’s anti-interactionist perspective, 
my equation of God with the Real is justified on the grounds of its 
transactional verifiability: both the religious Father and Lacan’s Father 
hold equal and total control over the symbolic.  Furthermore, lay 
dissatisfaction is not simply a dissatisfaction of power imbalances in 
the field.  It is a symptom of the insistence that the field maintains any 
number of internal herniations, through which emerge evidence of the 
failure of that symbolic (the fallibility of the Father’s law), evidences of 
the Real.  Bourdieu’s discussion of sacramental grace proves relevant: 
Priestly practice and also the message the priesthood 
imposes and inculcates always owe most of their 
characteristics to the continual transactions between the 
church and laity. The church as permanent dispenser of 
grace (sacraments) enjoys the corresponding coercive 
power of being able to accord or refuse 'holy goods' to the 
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laity over whom it intends to exercise religious 
leadership.155 
But the charismatic, also, owes much to continual transactions 
with the laity. The difference between the two authorities, then, rests 
in their opposing treatments of the symbolic. In the regular, 
permanent, and complete sanctity of the church, a smooth conception 
of the symbolic is meted out to willing laity; any fear of the wrath of 
the Real is averted entirely or, at worst, rationalized within the 
hermeneutic of that explanatory religious system. The charismatic, 
however, fights not in equal terms, for how could he, without equal 
symbolic material or cultural capital to the religious authority. 
Instead, the charismatic—by magic or divine grace—tears into the 
fabric of the field, revealing the very Real symbolic dysfunction within. 
Though Bourdieu dismisses ambiguity and misrecognition as the 
mechanisms behind the prophet’s “mana,” he is wrong to suggest 
these revelations are not occult.  This is the ineffable magic of the 
charismatic, and while priests may dispense "grace,” it is a banal grace 
that lacks the Real divinity of the prophet. 
To regard a charismatic’s powers as divine owes to a “manner of 
looking.”156  That is, though Bourdieu ascribes charisma’s power to 
misrecognition, in order to address the “magic” involved, we must 
account for the visual within.  Since a charismatic’s followers actually 
perform that misrecognition (that is, they actuate a decision, rather 
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than default to a cognitive mistake), we would do better to call it a 
“misregard.”   
In sum, to Weber’s account of charismatic authority, Bourdieu 
introduces the variables of the objective relations of the field to explain 
the worldly transactions between agents that bestow charismatic 
authority and legitimacy onto a leader by his followers.  Bourdieu’s 
language, itself ekphrastic, is easily adjusted to illustrate its reliance 
on visuality and spatiality to explain interrelationships.  This secular 
account remains indifferent to the religious, symbolic content that 
Weber maintains, but in doing so, Bourdieu’s attempt to avoid 
symbolic interactionism brings him to the door of the linguistic and 
psychoanalytic symbolic.  It is through this portal that I attempt to 
reintroduce Weber’s interest in divine symbolism.  I do so not to affirm 
the hermeneutic power of that symbolism, but rather to suggest that 
charisma gains power precisely because it suggests—quite 
supernaturally–the porosity of the symbolic, through which the 
presence of the undifferentiated Real may be discerned. 
That charisma is sociologically structured, by this point, is 
sufficiently clear.  The remaining sections of this chapter will apply 
directly Bourdieu’s analytical method to show that the field of objective 
relations extends not only synchronically, but diachronically, also.  
Thus, a charismatic’s followers may still satisfy the transactional 
requirements even trans-temporally.  This is satisfied on three 
accounts.  Firstly, the followers must recognize the message of that 
leader; secondly, they must regard that message as enchanted—which 
we may interpret as a linguistic perforation of the symbolic revealing 
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the Real.  Finally, they must vest the charismatic with both legitimacy 
and authority over the dominant structures of that field.  In the 
particular case of the historian, I aim to show in the next section, that 
the case of François Dosse and the history of the structuralists meets 
all of those requirements.  I will subsequently argue that this kind of 
history is one formed though charismatic authority.  Finally, I will 
argue that such a charismatically inflected history merits 
historiographic criticism, since that kind of history seeks to obfuscate 
its own means of inscription to further the message of their 
charismatic leaders. 
  
Enter the Rising Sign 
The structuralists like the prophet, too, launched an ensorcelled 
assault on the symbolic. While institutionally the religious authority 
and the academic authority function with very different economies 
and, therefore, different bureaucracies, they share a regulatory role 
regarding the symbolic.   François Dosse thus posits a story of 
structuralist history that closely follows the contours of the renegade 
prophet.  Dosse himself must be seen as a follower of charismatics, 
one who himself might be a continuer of that line. The remainder of 
this chapter then, will scrutinize Dosse’s text to detect such evidence 
of a history under the sway of charismatic authority. Once this charge 
is adequately established I then proceed in chapter four to envision a 
critical historiography that takes as its structuring principle not 
charismatic authority, but rather, the episteme of ekphrasis. 
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The two volumes form a pendant, with "The Rising Sign" 
indicating a historical crescendo (with the faint hint of proletariat 
struggle); "the Swan Song" documents the wane of the former.  In the 
titles alone, thus, we have the promise of an exciting (even tragic) 
narrative. Of course, the French "champ" is even more loaded than the 
English. The division between waxing and waning sign—between 
1966-67—also makes a bold historical promise. And, anyone even 
mildly acquainted with French modern history will want to infer 
connection here to the 1968-69 uprisings.  
The outline of volume one is tripartite.157 "Part I: The Fifties: The 
Epic Epoch" makes clear from the first two chapters (7. The Eclipse of 
a Star: Jean Paul Sartre," and "2. The birth of a Hero: Claude Lévi-
Strauss") that this is a cinematic history.  In any cinematic history, the 
casting is of utmost importance. What is suspicious of the chapter 
titles, though, is their compatibility with Hollywood language. This 
does not merely constitute glib criticism on my part; I mean to show, 
over the course of this chapter, the means by which Dosse's book 
unwillingly participates in an extended dance whose field generates 
and replicates authority based on charisma.  Dosse's table of contents, 
both in its language and by its length, recalls the screen's titles or 
credits. With heavy use of the ubiquitously academic colon (:) this 
Table of Contents fittingly reads as a cast list.  The role (e.g., "The 
Birth of a Hero") in the drama precedes the colon, followed by the actor 
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(e.g., "Claude Lévi-Strauss"). With twenty-one of thirty-nine chapter 
titles taking this form, it is hard to see the resemblance as accidental. 
The titles of the Dosse’s two books show a methodological 
affinity with his dissertation adviser, Jean Chesneaux, both in their 
multiple-volume format and in their penchant for dramatic narration. 
History of Structuralism, already ambitious in its title, cannot be taken 
lightly. In a book whose foundation lies in the history of linguistics, 
the deliberate omission of an article to modify "history" holds 
opportunity for analysis. The absence of an article (such as the more 
modest "a" or the more definitive “the”) adds a monumental promise of 
cinematic proportions. 
In my critique, I am expressly interested in a careful 
examination of the "field" as set by Dosse, and several of the 
actor/agents. As the last section’s study of Bourdieu suggests, there 
already existed prior to Dosse’s book a group of followers eager to 
canonize the French structuralists.  Dosse invites criticism in the very 
first sentence of the introduction: "Structuralism's success in France 
during the 1950s and 1960s is without precedent in the history of the 
intellectual life in this country."158   With this statement, the 
fundamental premise of the book—and, surely, the intellectual history 
of structuralism universally—is clear.  Though not exhaustively 
French, Dosse here establishes the irrevocable bond between French 
history and structuralism. Dosse continues: 
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There was such widespread support for structuralism 
among most of the intelligentsia that the resistance and 
minor objections put forth during what we can call the 
structuralist movement were simply moot. We can better 
understand how so many intellectuals could be at home in 
the same program if we understand the context. These 
were two fundamental reasons for its spectacular success. 
First, structuralism promised a rigorous method and some 
hope for making decisive progress toward scientificity. But 
even more fundamentally, it was a particular moment in 
the history of thought, which we can characterize as a key 
movement of critical consciousness; for the structuralist 
program attracted a particularly broad range of 
enthusiasts" [...]159  
Dosse in that first introductory paragraph defines a specific 
field, the French intelligentsia of the 1950s and 1960s, and proceeds 
straight away to elide that field with the global totality of “the 
structuralist paradigm.’160 More importantly, without qualification, 
Dosse unifies structuralism as a single “program,” “a rigorous 
method,” “a particular moment,” and — suspiciously — a 
“paradigm.”161  As such, Dosse closely follows Bourdieu’s prediction of 
charismatic authority’s “collective misrecognition.”  Certainly, such an 
oversimplification relies on the mistaken recognition of pattern where, 
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in fact, there was ambiguity and complexity.  While Bourdieu gives us 
little instruction on handling the “context” of the message, we have to 
understand at least part of the context as a socio-historical—not 
simply a textual—question. As mentioned earlier, ambiguity in the 
charismatic message allows potential followers to interpret, of more 
accurately, interpolate a message whose interest pre-existed the 
specific form of that message.  This interpellation by a  potential 
follower must be understood as pitching the field. It is a perlocutionary 
act by a social agent who simultaneously declares a speech act, 
thereby entering and enfolding the structural field. Thus, to even 
approach such a scope within a historical project, Dosse is entangled 
in a complex field of academic interests. Dosse writes: 
The structuralist program was a veritable unconscious 
strategy to move beyond the academicism in power, and it 
served the twofold purposes of contestation and 
counterculture. In the academic realm, the structural 
paradigm successfully cleared the ground for proscribed 
knowledge that had long been kept at bay, in the margins 
of the canonical institutions.162 
Dosse’s thesis of unconscious, underground struggle resembles 
the methodology of his adviser, and for that matter, shows his 
allegiance to the Marxist proclivity to identify proletariat struggle. Like 
more reductivist interpretations of Marx, though, this approach may 
ultimately oversimplify matters into a plain economic model—a 
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criticism Bourdieu launches and tries to resolve with multiple forms of 
capital. 
But the de-pluralization of structuralism into a simple “strategy” 
dramatically curtails the kind of activity occurring on the field. It 
firstly posits a unified group of agents, acting in consort against the 
institutionalized academy. Secondly, it describes those procedural 
actions alternatively as a “strategy” and a “paradigm.” But use of that 
latter term, particularly for a historian of structuralism working as late 
as the early 1990s, beckons an inspection of Thomas Kuhn’s use of 
the word.  In his already classic work, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, Kuhn offers two requisite characteristics that must be 
present before he is willing to apply the term, “paradigm.” He writes: 
Aristotle’s Physics, Ptolemny’s Almagest, Newton’s 
Principles, and Opticks, Franklin’s Electricity, Lavoisier’s 
Chemistry and Lyell’s Geology—these and many other 
works served for a time to define the legitimate problems 
and methods of a research field for succeeding generations 
of practitioners. They were able to do so because they 
shared two essential characteristics. Their achievement 
was sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring 
group of adherents away from competing modes of 
scientific activity. Simultaneously, it was sufficiently open-
ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group 
of practitioners to resolve.163  
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Kuhn goes on to qualify, and I add emphasis to the part most 
relevant: 
By choosing it [i.e. the term ‘paradigm’], I mean to suggest 
that some accepted examples of the actual scientific 
practice—instrumentation together—produce models from 
which sprung particular coherent traditions of scientific 
research.164 
Though Kuhn does not work closely with charismatic authority, 
he does make clear that a given paradigm shift does not issue directly 
from the merit of a particular discovery.  More correctly, Kuhn speaks 
of the ability “to attract an enduring group of adherents” from 
dominant, competing paradigms.  The resemblance to Weber and 
Bourdieu’s descriptions of charismatic authority is remarkable.  Dosse 
follows Kuhn’s paradigm-shift pattern in the over-dramatization of the 
authoritative shift from Sartre to Lévi-Strauss.  He writes, “The law of 
tragedy requires a death before a new hero can come on stage.”165  The 
sacrifice to structuralism that Dosse offers up to the annals is none 
other than Jean-Paul Sartre. The chapter, dedicated to this figure and 
his forced change of guard, assumes third-person limited voice. The 
historian provides an empathetic “reconstruction” of Sartre’s inner 
pain, a pain that Dosse shares with us.  Dosse narrates a series of 
“breaks” (read: shifts of paradigmatic status) for Sartre, beginning with 
faltering involvement with the French Communist Party at the height 
of the Cold War. Personal “breaks” with Claude Lefort, Camus, and 
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Etiemble, and then Merleau-Ponty, Dosse insists, contributed to 
Sartre’s disharmony.166 
Dosse’s conception of this existential field from the first 
incorporates evidence of Sartre’s enchantment: 
Other adventures were to unfold with Sartre, but the 
younger generation continued to be fascinated with him. 
[Regis Debray] writes that “for many of us in my high 
school in the fifties, Being and Nothingness quickened our 
pulse.”167 
Dosse begins to set a cosmos of charisma which directly 
accounts for paradigmatic changes: "This unshakable image would 
cling to him and he would be its first victim. [/] The Sartrean star was 
eclipsed because of political issues, but it was also affected by what 
was beginning to take shape in the intellectual world."168 
Dosse, of this latter crisis, faults the rise of the social sciences, 
which precipitated a "middle ground between the traditional 
humanities" and "the hard sciences."169  Sartre, refusing to leave his 
own philosophical ground, "was left behind."170  Here, too, though, we 
must afford Dosse the estimable role of a prospector trying to lay out 
different academic fields. While Sartre's field certainly was 
reformulated, Sartre was not simply "left behind" as in a continental 
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drift. Rather, his waxing status, Dosse outlines, was the result of 
competing messages from younger charismatic intellectuals. 
Dosse goes on to explain existentialism's collapse in light of new 
structural challenges to the earlier, Sartrean subject. The "subject and 
conscience gave way to rules, codes, and structure."171  What does this 
describe? While it could indicate in part a changing academic habitus 
as intellectuals become used to using different concepts, it more 
readily evinces a change in a doxa, or the way these agents were led by 
the field to identify themselves.  At first, Dosse's series of biographical 
vignettes can be used to fashion an account of the French structural 
field. Such a sociological history cannot be considered his goal, 
though, and even as such, it never furthers any socio-historical 
analysis of French structuralism. 
Lévi-Strauss was a thinker of such colossal charisma that, 
indeed, an analysis of his authority would occupy its own book. 
Fortunately, it is not my prerogative to do so here. What I would like to 
call attention to is Dosse as a (temporally displaced) follower of that 
leader.  Dosse confirms this displacement by recounting the life of 
“Sartre’s intimate friend,” Jean Pouillon, an philosopher-turned-
ethnologist who, Dosse insists, “became the sole link” between the 
fading Sartre and the rising Lévi-Strauss.  Dosse writes: 
 What had at first seemed to be a gratuitous detour or 
exotic adventure in foreign climes became, for Pouillon 
and for an entire generation, a lifelong engagement in an 
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existence turned toward new and more anthropological 
questions, and an abandonment of classical philosophy.172   
Not only Pouillon, but by Dosse's script, we, too, follow the 
charisma of Lévi-Strauss, the man who—from the primitive forces of 
nature—emerged with a new knowledge of anthropology. 
The abrupt force with which Dosse throws us at the foot of this 
"Hero" is remarkable because the gravity of Lévi-Strauss captures us 
so fully and without warning (a mere seven pages) that we never have 
the opportunity to question this "Birth of a Star" as the big bang of 
structuralism. By himself romanticizing the star-status Lévi-Strauss, 
Dosse pulls us into the structural field—a field that he constitutes, 
and one he defines as beginning with the anthropologist. Thus, the 
originary charisma of the anthropologist finds institutional legitimation 
as a charismatic leader in Dosse's book. 
Dosse confirms the importance of "allegiance" in the formation of 
the structural field. He writes of Pouillon that Claude Lefort provided 
an opposition to Lévi-Strauss' "relegation of historicity to a secondary 
position."173  On this point, Dosse reports Pouillon to have "remained 
faithful" to synchronicity over diachronicity.174  "But," Dosse reassures 
us, Pouillon's "double allegiance to structuralism and to anthropology 
was absolute, and from this point on Jean Pouillon attended Claude 
Lévi-Strauss's seminars" at the Ecole Practique des Hautes Etudes.175  
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Dosse’s own limited omniscient voice does the opposite of 
including the valorized observer. It instead is meant to suture us, the 
reader, into the drama, therefore, to accept this drama as complete, 
and thereby to assert its accuracy and verity. But looking to Dosse's 
own words reveals contradictions.  How, for example, do we reconcile 
the implied conflict between anthropology and structuralism that 
Pouillon, ostensibly, straddled?  
With the "Crises of the Militant Intellectual," Dosse further 
characterizes the decline of Sartre as a more widespread intolerance 
for the modern practice of intellectuals inserting their authority into 
any field.176  We could liken this to a drastic reduction of symbolic 
capital afforded to intellectuals. For Dosse, though, the structuralists, 
in particular George Dumézil and Claude Lévi-Strauss, provided the 
corrective for the arrogance of the militaristic intellectual.  As Dosse 
continues with a quote from Lévi-Strauss, we see the charismatic's 
denial of exterior motives, just as Weber specified. "To the same 
question regarding commitment, Lévi-Strauss answered, 'No, I 
consider that my intellectual authority, insofar as I am considered to 
have any, rest on my work, or my scruples of rigor and precision' ."177 
In a sense, with "The Birth of a Hero," that is, the title of chapter 
two, Dosse offers us a sort of confession. By positing the origin of 
Structuralism as concomitant with the birth of Lévi-Strauss' "hero" 
status, Dosse admits that his conception of the ontology of 
structuralism has little to do with the content of structuralism, but 
                                       
176  Dosse, 8. 
177  Dosse, 9. 
 119 
instead with a biographical narrative in which Lévi-Strauss assumes 
the status of the prophet. In fact, Lévi-Strauss acquires in Dosse's 
estimation, the soul (we might say—God-given grace) of a poet: 
Torn between a desire to restore the internal logic of 
material reality and a poetic sensibility that strongly tied 
him to the natural world, Lévi-Strauss forged important 
intellectual syntheses in much the same way as one writes 
musical scores.178 
A chronological biography, encyclopedic in tone and approach, 
begins this chapter. Starting in childhood, Dosse locates the initial 
spark of Lévi-Strauss's enchantment to his artistic patrilineage and his 
"intense pleasure of exotic nature."179  Dosse even overtly admits the 
magic in Lévi-Strauss's nature: "Lévi-Strauss rejected the spell of his 
own sensibility and without renouncing it, sought to contain it by 
constructing broad logical systems," (emphasis added).180 A true 
wizard, aware of his powers, through the power of rationality Lévi-
Strauss could channel his magic for the broader good. Dosse’s written 
account thus confers unto Lévi-Strauss the charismatic gift of divinity. 
There remains an odd romantic flirtation in Dosse's work; odd 
because he never forfeits a decidedly heterosexual tone, while, 
nevertheless playing with a very close set of relationships. From 
"Sartre's intimate friend" in Pouillon,181 to Marx as one of Lévi-
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Strauss's " 'three mistresses' "182  and later to Barthes as a mother 
figure, the book constructs an early "rising" structuralism as 
homosocial and self-sufficient. This does change the nature of the 
charisma and it complicates the arrangement of the field. But it would 
be a mistake to read this as playfulness: it is, in fact, only possible 
because of an impenetrable assumption of French masculinity that 
Dosse uses the technique. In fact, this flirtatiousness—devoid of any 
queered risk—serves to further establish loyalties. Dosse uses this 
flirtation just before underscoring Lévi-Strauss' loyalty to Marx.183 This 
thread continues: 
Leaving Anglo-Saxon empiricism behind, Lévi-Strauss 
found his masters in anthropology among those 
descendants to the German historical school who had left 
history, proponents of cultural relativism: Lowie, Hroefer, 
and Boas, 'authors to whom I willingly proclaim my 
debt'.184  
The odd homosocial transfer occurs most auspiciously in the English 
translation discussing Lévi-Strauss's infatuation with Boas: 
Lévi-Strauss was even present at the death of the great 
master during a lunch given by Boas in honor of Rivet's 
visit to Columbia University. 'Boas was very gay. In the 
middle of the conversation, he violently pushed himself 
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away from the table and fell backwards. I was sitting next 
to him and rushed over to lift him up. Boas was dead.185 
Even at death, Dosse confirms a spirit between them. No sooner in 
Dosse's narrative does Boas's death become succeeded by a passing of 
the importance of “the laws of language” to Lévi-Strauss: “Here was the 
linguistic thrust coming from anthropology as of 1922, and it was 
auspicious for the fruitful meeting between Lévi-Strauss and 
Jacobson.”186  The death of Boas, in Dosse's configuration, becomes a 
sacrifice, but one whose “thrust” bears enormous fruits for the 
historical narrative.  Through Boas' transfer, Lévi-Strauss gains a 
thirst for language. 
One frustration a reader may encounter in Dosse's text is his 
frequent neglect of attribution of various voices in the main text. In 
many cases, these orphaned quotations assume the form of consulting 
expert, but the lack of any attribution of substance shows an instance 
where Dosse himself invokes an invisible authority. The transaction is 
laid out before the reader. A good instance follows, expectedly the 
"hero," Lévi-Strauss.  Dosse writes that the publication of Lévi-
Strauss's thesis, The Elementary Structures of Kinship, "was one of the 
major events of postwar intellectual history and a touchstone for the 
founding of structuralism."187  Offered evidence is an orphaned quote, 
contemporary expert testimony: 
                                       
185  Dosse, 16. 
186  Dosse, 16. 
187  Dosse, 18. 
 122 
What seems most important and most fundamental to me 
is The Elementary Structures of Kinship, by the will to 
scientificity it introduced in the analysis of social 
multiplicity, but its quest for the most encompassing 
model to account for phenomena that do not appear, 
initially, to be part of the same categories of analysis, and 
by the transition from the question of filiation to one of 
alliance.188 
To construct repeatedly expert—yet anonymous—testimony such as 
this is not only historically dubious; it has a direct effect on the power 
relations with which the author is involved on the historical field. 
These cameo appearances (i.e., the many figures who are largely 
unknown outside French academic circles) establish a transaction in 
which we, the readers, give Dosse, the historian, a certain grace. Until 
we read otherwise, we extend to Dosse a historical authority, but we 
do this because of the field he constructs, one of disembodied voices 
signifying expert scholars whose testimony needs no time/date stamp. 
Similarly, we have no recourse to verify, and therefore, must accept 
Dosse's account to proceed. 
And, again, with a brief account of Emmanuel Terray, we see 
this incontrovertible testimony described suggestively as a seduction:  
For me, [Terray] at the time, and I still hold this opinion, 
the progress this book [The Elementary Structures of 
Kinship] represented was comparable in its field, to Marx's 
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Capital or to Freud's Interpretation of Dreams! Once again, 
our young philosopher was seduced by giving some order 
to an area where apparently total incoherence and total 
empiricism reigned. His admiration confirmed his choice 
of career and a way of life in anthropology.189 
But where can we properly place the seduction? Is its source the 
realm of "total incoherence", or perhaps the realm of "total 
empiricism"? (Indeed, can these two realms really coexist?) Is that 
seduction in Marx, in incest, or in unseen structure? This is not 
merely a flirtations return; rather, I call attention here to a powerful 
action waged by Dosse.  Bourdieu reminds us that the field is a 
struggle between unequal agents.  Right within this text Dosse, by way 
of intellectual coquetry, takes full advantage of his own historical 
authority by concealing from his readers the very ability to 
discriminate on one's own the history of the structural field.  In linking 
a field prior to Lévi-Strauss's arrival as dominated simultaneously by 
incoherence and empiricism, Dosse sets the scene for the birth of that 
hero.  The status of The Elementary Structures serves as a historical 
confirmation—but it is an antepositioned history. 
This move serves Dosse in ways that exceed presenting a 
biographical narrative on Lévi-Strauss. It offers an origin for an 
unstoppable history of dialectics—an often discredited method, to be 
sure. By doing so, our ability to perceive the historical conditions of 
the structural field become cripplingly distorted. Through Dosse's 
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academic authority we are funneled into a narrowed field which, 
devoid of any historical irregularities, retains a smoothed path leading 
from charismatic to charismatic. Dosse’s history, though it ironically 
enlists Foucault as an unwilling structuralist, nevertheless takes little 
heed of Foucault’s interest in rupture. 
I will bring the tenor of this criticism to a close by summarizing 
more rapidly the narrative in Dosse's first volume. The impetus of my 
critique of charisma by now I trust is sufficiently argued, at least in 
Dosse's formulation of the origin of Structuralism, by which he means 
the arrival of Lévi-Strauss. While the aforementioned critique holds 
amply true as a general methodological fault for Dosse, continuing 
with such microanalysis will grow tedious quite rapidly. My objective 
here is not to posit a microhistory or an alternative to Dosse’s 
narrative itself—but rather to think how we might approach  an 
alternative history 
 
Discussion 
David Herman's review of History of Structuralism is the only one 
in the Anglophone world to ask questions about the lack of a critical 
engagement in the work. Herman notes, rightly, that "Here emerges a 
second assumption at the basis of Dosse's account: that the history of 
structuralist thought reduces, at one level of analysis, to a collocation 
of the biographies of its proponents, fellow-travellers and 
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detractors."190  He promptly continues: "Yet a catalogue of the 
experiences of (more or less renowned) structuralist thinkers does not 
suffice to explain what structuralism was or why it exerted such a 
tenacious hold on the French imagination [...]"191  While Herman 
cogently asks how Dosse's differs from an antiquarian project, he 
seems to lose quickly the import indicated by these critiques. 
Herman, paraphrasing Dosse, cedes any question of 
structuralism's contested meaning by resorting to the common topos, 
that "the provenance of the term structuralism is essentially 
linguistic."192  In the sense of creating, Herman concludes from 
Dosse's book that the word "apparently was Jakobson's coinage."193  
(This is, however, incorrect, as both Wilhelm Wundt and E.B. 
Titchener used the term on the continent before Jakobson.194) 
Herman also adeptly identifies the unresolved 
"systems/structures" dichotomy, but he fails to address its 
significance for a historical project.  Herman goes on to identify a 
formalism in Lacan: "In The Elementary Structures of Kinship (1949), 
Lévi-Strauss had already whetted the French appetite for 
scientificity."195  This would have been rich grounds for a social history 
of structuralism. Later: "Likewise, Lacan framed his 'return to Freud' 
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using linguistic and mathematical formalisms; both were part of an 
attempt to demedicalize the psychoanalytic project and rescientize it 
on other grounds."196 
Herman continues with identifying how "Althusser and his 
followers (including Pierre Macherey, Michel Pêcheu, and Etienne 
Balibar) tapped into the 'ambient climate of scientism' (I: 290).'197  But, 
can we be satisfied by simply equating any field that looks to science 
as structural? What are the conditions that allow us to accept such an 
equivocation? Is it distaste for empiricist alternatives? 
Again, Herman notes important gaps in Dosse's text, most 
especially the "intellectual biography" of Lyotard.198   But, he fails to 
account for why such an omission might be compatible with Dosse's 
project.  Herman also notices the status of "Julia":  women are on a 
first-name basis.199  Since Herman does not delve into the causes of 
these lacunae, Dosse’s homosocial, charismatic program goes 
unremarked. 
Dosse's book would have been vastly more precise in scope and 
promise if reconfigured as a social history of the academic 
environment of Paris between 1945 to 1966 and 1967 to the present. 
Much of his painstaking work would be directly applicable, though the 
stylistic change— which would prove to be decidedly less cinematic—
would accordingly be less modest. While an orthodox social history 
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would still not offer a deep look into the content of structuralism; it 
nevertheless would provide a rich understanding of the social 
conditions of intellectual Paris — a valuable undertaking that would 
not simultaneously subsume any complexity into the Grand Narrative. 
This, perhaps, would not be a French history, but one of 
American tastes. Dosse's dissertation advisor, the Marxist historian 
Jean Chesneaux, has himself been criticized for forcing his historical 
narratives to conform to a predetermined pattern in which the 
oppressed subject rises up and conquers its oppressor — an error 
Dosse replicates here. With some imagination, the measured reader of 
Dosse can squint past the (very American!) Hollywood docudrama 
style, and still make out the foundational facts for a social history of 
structuralism.  
To prepare for what will be described as a singular event in 
structural history, Dosse writes: "Lévi-Strauss therefore adopted [the 
'phonological method's'] founding paradigms, virtually on a term for 
term basis. Phonology sought to go beyond the stage of conscious 
linguistics phenomena. Considering the specificity of terms was not 
enough, the goal was to understand them in their interrelationships, 
and phonology therefore introduces the notion of system in an effort to 
construct general laws. The entire structuralist method is embodied in 
this project."200 
Dosse does little else to justify this stark conjoining of terms, 
but it is wholly insufficient to equate interrelationships transitively to 
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structuralism. The interrelationships of linguistic terms certainly 
characterizes the new mission of that field, which moved in the 
modern era (with Jakobson and Saussure) beyond the earlier 
taxonomic model. But, surely, the inductive reason of general laws — 
while the data, i.e. interrelationships, was a novel formulation — is at 
least as old as the Greeks! Dosse makes no distinction here of 
whether, in fact, Jakobson's inductive practice is in any way 
"structural," or, in the fetishism of scientific jargon, structure becomes 
a substitute for "general laws."  
One shortcoming of Dosse's narrative remains the inattention to 
site/geographic import outside of France. If, as he argues, the birth of 
a new method occurs from the intercourse between Jakobson and 
Lévi-Strauss, how does New York's exile community interact? How did 
this community set conditions and repercussions in Paris of the 
1960s?  If the "entire structuralist method is embodied in this project," 
then can we induce a discursive scheme from Dosse?  
Certainly, the psychoanalysts have shown us the value of what 
we leave out as, often, more valuable than what we directly say. This 
single paragraph of Dosse’s which until now offers the most significant 
evidence of alternative structural forefathers to this point in the book, 
is thus a rich text in its lacunae. Let us consider the narrative 
techniques one by one. 
Dosse writes of Dumezil: “He would not, for example, have 
accepted being included in a history of structuralism, which was 
foreign to him. ‘I am not, I do not have to be or not to be a 
structuralist.’ His position was unequivocal, and he went so far as to 
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refuse any reference to the word ‘structure’ in order to avoid any form 
of co-optation.”201 
But clearly, this safeguard proved insufficient. Dosse soon after 
writes of his dilemma: “Given this, can we go against his will and 
evoke some of the innovations of this adventurer in Indo-European 
mythology in the context of the development of the structuralist 
paradigm? Yes, and as he received him in the Academy, Levi Strauss 
was right in saying that the word ‘structure,’ or ‘structural,’ would 
have come immediately to mind had Dumezil not refused it in 1973. 
This stubbornness is important evidence within my Bourdienne 
analysis because it indicates an overt discursive struggle between 
three specific agents: George Dumezil, Levi Strauss, and the latter’s 
charismatic champion Dosse. While I cannot argue with Levi Strauss’s 
desire to relate Dumezil’s work to the anthropologist’s territorially 
limited definition, I do take particular umbrage with Dosse’s 
collaboration. Dosse’s discussion never emerges from the most 
superficial gloss of the similarities between Levi Straus and Dumezil’s 
respective curriculum vitae, naturally flourished with a fraternal 
interest in Mauss (and also Marcel Granet). This is critical in 
understanding Dosse’s modus operandi: the historian suppresses any 
epistemological comparison wholly underneath the gravitas of 
charismatic personalities. 
To avoid the pitfalls of nationalistic bias that Dosse encountered, 
I would instead defend directions based on formal or thematic 
                                       
201  Dosse, 32. 
 130 
similarities, rather than geographic or chronological continuities.  
Firstly, following Foucault, an epistemic history of the ideas of 
structuralism would dispense immediately with the dialectic narrative 
that Dosse so eagerly produces regarding the uprising of French 
intellectuals against the academy.  Dosse’s approach represents what 
Foucault would term a “total history,” a universal story that 
suppresses inconsistencies to the larger narrative.  This is particularly 
curious given the extraordinary breadth of Dosse’s project.  Since he 
avoids any deep account but rather assembles an unprecedented 
collection of briefs on various French intellectuals, his chosen form 
ought to have elucidated fissures and discontinuities by statistical 
likelihood; it, however, produced a virtually seamless, but fictive 
narrative with no such discontinuities.  As a case for critical 
historiography, furthermore, Dosse’s airbrushed history brings 
attention to the power of charismatic authority to camouflage the 
processes of historical inscription.  As in the fight for religious 
legitimation, Grand Narrative wrests from its reader any potential to 
discern actors and struggles on the field.  The affect is to sublimate 
further the means by which historical subjects are inscribed in 
discourse, making the project of a critical historiography even more 
elusive. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EKPHRASIS: HISTORY’S MIRAGE 
 
Introduction 
In contrast to Dosse’s history organized around charismatic 
affinity, I argue in this chapter that a viable epistemic history could be 
constructed around the operation of ekphrasis.  An epistemic history 
would neither present a narrative of pure continuity, nor one of radical 
discontinuity.  Taking an ekphrastic episteme, a number of accounts 
would simply connect visually informed theorists to one another.  It 
would explain their theoretical affinities, perhaps trace common 
homologues, and importantly offer attention to differences and 
epistemic infelicities.  Such a configuration of actors and theories 
would not have a discreet beginning or ending, but rather would offer 
a swatch from a larger network of relationships.  The possibility of a 
multitude of such histories becomes available, and their 
historiographic value must be evaluated not on comprehensiveness, 
but rigor in describing a specific set of relations within the field.   
Let me begin the case for such an episteme with an examination 
of terms: ekphrasis, from the Greek for "out" and "to speak," has been 
defined in the English language as "a plain declaration or 
interpretation of a thing" since the early 18th century.202  The term, 
though, is now widely used to describe that body of poetry which 
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portrays an existing painting or sculpture.  The practice finds its 
origins in Homer, but also shows notable development in several works 
by Vasari and his contemporaries.  For the initial section of this 
chapter, then, we will consider rhetorical works describing historical 
artworks, a definition I will append as the chapter progresses.  The 
term, "description," poses more obdurate challenge; both etymology 
and current usage indicate a more ambivalent mode of output—
description may occur in words, sketches, or even paintings.  For the 
time being, the only other appreciable difference between description 
and ekphrasis will be the source: description does not specify an 
original mode or object, but any object capable of description may 
serve.  As mentioned earlier, ekphrasis will refer to those works based 
on an artwork.203 
Finally, and perhaps most tenuous, the relationship between the 
visual and the rhetorical must be granted some sort of exemption, at 
least temporarily.  Numerous scholars offer the tools with which a 
compelling opposition between the two terms would be dissolved 
effortlessly.  I in no way, then, ought to be mistaken for promoting 
such an immutable difference; instead, I would plot the two terms as 
coexistent with overlapping spectra.  As WJT Mitchell writes:  
[Literature,] insofar as it is written or printed, has an 
unavoidable visual component which bears a specific 
relation to an auditory component, which is why it makes 
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a difference whether a novel is read aloud or silently.  We 
are also allowed to notice that literature, in techniques 
like ekphrasis and description, as well as in more subtle 
strategies of formal arrangement, involves virtual or 
imaginative experiences of space and vision that are no 
less real for being indirectly conveyed through 
language.204 
Mitchell, along with Leonard Barkan, identifies this multi-
modality as "hybridity," but this term holds little value, since it points 
not to a coexistent condition, but rather concurrent modalities, which 
are constitutive and defining rather than conditional and contingent.  
(In fairness, Barkan more patiently makes the case for hybridity based 
on the bastard conjunction of theater and picture.)205  So, as 
perceptual subjects, it is unlikely whether we could ever isolate or 
extract one perceptual mode from the others; this chapter, then, will 
employ frankly the "visual," to denote a real art object made of 
traditional materials, and the "rhetorical," to denote a form intended to 
be read as text.  I insist that the difference is not casual, and does not 
deny the aforementioned "hybridity," but recognizes that 
deconstruction of vision and rhetoric would yield a discursive nihility. 
This problematic relationship between vision and rhetoric, art 
and literature, and even the nihilist threat therein, is precisely 
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responsible for Otto Pächt’s denouncement of the practice.  By the 
early 1930’s, the leading art historian of the Viennese School chided 
translating imagery into "poetic description," which, Pächt insisted, 
was a dangerous, misleading practice that strips the artwork of its 
value and function.206  Pächt's rebuke, while dismissive of the literary 
tradition of ekphrasis (indeed, his essay so thoroughly dismisses the 
practice as not to name it once in the entirety of his paper), 
nevertheless offers such well-argued caveats as to warrant a closer 
appraisal.  This chapter, then, will look at theoretical approaches to 
ekphrasis, first, by reviewing some literature that indicates to this 
author that any ekphrastic work necessarily furthers an aesthetic 
theory.  As I argue such, I will then ask whether ekphrastic writing 
can be produced for subjects outside of the fine arts, or whether 
writing about an artwork is essential to the genre.  As I conclude 
affirmatively that any visual material may inform ekphrastic writing, I 
will devote the final part of the chapter to the question of whether an 
original image proves necessary for ekphrasis, or if a simulacral 
ekphrasis holds equal semiotic consequence. 
Leonard Barkan notes that ekphrasis "stands as the emblem of 
a kind of utopian poetics."207  Barkan locates this utopia not in the 
poets themselves, but in scholars, who attempt to promote a "unifying 
insight that transcends medium, form, and the contingencies of 
                                       
206  Christopher S. Wood, The Vienna School Reader: Politics and Art Historical 
Method in the 1930s (New York; Cambridge, Mass.: Zone Books; Distributed by the 
MIT Press, 2000) 182. 
207  Barkan, 327. 
 135 
historical moment."208  If we are skeptical of the possibility of that 
utopian promise being fulfilled through ekphrasis, we at least can 
hardly garner malicious intent from the tradition; before happily 
consenting, though, I will go through several of Pächt's most 
compelling criticisms, to see whether his revulsion provides a needed 
defense.  An initial criticism Pächt sees in ekphrasis (again, I am 
substituting the word more consistently, where Pächt would resort to 
one of a variety of derogative terms) lies in its making popular, even 
vulgar, art history for the masses.209  Pächt consents that there is an 
"active need" for such a measure, i.e., for a summary means for facile 
understanding of the arts, but Pächt's objection rests more with the 
teller than the reader.  His concern lies in the mistaken identity by the 
reader of the writer—a mistake that credits the writer with "scientific 
truth" or honest objectivity, a promise, Pächt is sure, that cannot be 
satisfied.   
Though the history of ekphrasis suggests that the term presents 
a transposition of image into writing, by following Leonard Barkan, I 
insist that any such tactic is, in fact, a subtly violent break with its 
image.  Showing that an original is wholly unnecessary for ekphrasis 
to operate, the written transposition can only be unfulfilled.  Instead, 
any written account of an image antepositions a restricted image in 
place of the natural image.  This arrangement poses an interesting 
antinomy:  how can writing posit an image if that writing is incapable 
of such a transposition?  The resolution of this contradiction will 
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occupy this remainder of the chapter, returning, finally, to the 
relevance of this question to the historiographer.  I aim to bridge this 
antinomy with a (perhaps unwelcomed) reading of Greimas inspired by 
my understanding of Derrida’s writing. 
Given that ekphrasis, at a superficial level, appears to transfer 
signification from the pictorial to the linguistic, investigation of 
Greimas’s “Figurative Semiotics and the Semiotics of the Plastic Arts” 
is an understandable choice for comparison; as I hope to show, both 
hold unforeseen relevance to critical historiography.  “Figurative 
Semiotics and the Semiotics of the Plastic Arts”210 offers an opportune 
entry into early Greimassian investigations of the figurative; once I 
recount the primary steps of the article, I will demonstrate that within 
Greimas’s understanding of the figurative—and especially 
figurativization—there rests the possibility of a delineation of the 
operation of writing, a theory for which, if Greimas had been more 
sensitive to Derrida’s grammatology, Greimassian semiotics might 
provide a basis.  It is this theory of the operation of writing, I argue, 
that must inform any historiographical project. 
 
The Impossible Functor 
The process of transposition, that is, converting visual content 
into words, angers Pächt deeply.  He very credibly argues that the 
visual content of an artwork lies outside language, and any attempt to 
move that content into words sufficiently destroys that initial aesthetic 
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system.  Pächt notes that this transposition is itself an "artistic" 
task,211 implying that the move, then, to represent the artwork is 
undone, and all we can hope to find is another artwork.   The 
corrective, since Pächt is not against all forms of "pictorial 
expressions,"212 might be a rigorously scientific approach to 
description.  Pächt even outlines what such an approach might look 
like:  
A good description […] must emerge from the center of an 
imminent aesthetic frame of reference and articulate the 
essential structural characteristics of the object.  The 
description is formed not from an external point of view, 
not on a mere similarity, but on an inner grasp of the 
coherence of the whole.  Only then will the description be 
not an arbitrarily attached label but a true conceptual 
symbol that serves as a base of operations for any further 
research.213 
Literary description not only stands outside of the inner 
structure of the artwork (i.e., from a "non-immanent" position), but 
more insidiously, the describer assumes the "standpoint of a 
naturalistic observer,"214 thereby feigning truth.  For Pächt, this 
observer's voice is nothing more than "pure convention," and can offer 
only a "mnemonic aid," that is, a verbal surrogate for a visual 
phenomenon. 
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Poets are not Pächt's only target, though, and the Viennese art 
historian challenges even the descriptive capabilities of colleagues, 
whose work, though perhaps an "expression of correct partial 
insights," nevertheless may prove similarly "symptomatic."215  Pächt 
outlines a division in the way historians describe imagery: either 
historians obtain ideas from independent works, or they use deduction 
to acquire conceptual frames for several works.216  The latter, Pächt 
notes, "guarantees its own scientific format from the start."217  
The issue of scientific truth, or more generally, scientific 
treatment of an art object, is a more complicated principle within the 
essay.  A science in this sense must be understood more 
systematically or syllogistically.  It reflects not a move towards 
mechanistic measurement, but rather immanently defined systematic 
study, through which both the proposed form of examination and the 
exam itself are presented under overt criteria.  "Poeticizing 
description," on the other hand, conceals its mutating perspective in 
its own artifice, but fails to cede the scientific voice of authority.  For 
Pächt, this authority sufficiently convinces the masses that they 
possess adequate understanding of the original, and that through the 
ekphrastic description, retrieve all significance that had been present 
in the original. Pächt writes: 
A separate scientific language however—for this is what 
terminological questions require—can only be the aim of 
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research that fundamentally refuses to achieve effects 
through language outside the domain of scholarship, 
therefore deliberately renouncing any illegitimately gained 
popularity.218 
Relegated safely to the domain of scholarship, such jargon-
specific description will not disrupt the original work from its 
audience, but merely, within a sharply delineated net of academism, 
will only offer unharmful scientific description. 
At this point, I would like to pause and add some shape to the 
barrage of protests in Pächt's article.  First, there are several 
conflations that, in the heat of the argument, Pächt seems to admit 
out of carelessness.  To bestow maximum credibility to Pächt, I must 
first address these contradictions to proceed to the more valuable 
parts of his remonstration.  Pächt often chides "systemless 
description," but surely a poetic ekphrasis may exhibit, indeed may 
have been created, within a fastidious system.  Such a system would 
doubtless still trouble Pächt.  System, then, cannot be taken to mean 
schematic procedure or construction, but instead, like syllogism, must 
offer an imminent means for verification.  "System" under this more 
generous read poses no immediate threat to Pächt's logic. 
Another related conflation is the arguably exchangeable use of 
"description" and "poesis."  With this alternation, Pächt obscures 
whom he criticizes, whether it be anyone who describes the visual 
object or whether culpability rests with the poet alone.  Since Pächt 
                                       
218  Wood, 187. 
 140 
presciently notes that "words have exceptionally blurred and 
indeterminate content"219  (another charge, consequently, he levels at 
ekphrasis), we can assume that any sharp delineation between the two 
would have been dubious, perhaps the only admissible difference 
being that one obfuscates more artfully than the other.  Therefore, I 
assert that for Pächt, it matters not whether the description takes 
place in prose or verse, but that either form may seek to supplant the 
original object. 
More serious conflations, however, include the almost reckless 
fusion of words used to designate that appositive image.  Pächt calls 
the objects of ekphrastic writing artworks, perceptions, and 
phenomena.  This leads the reader to wonder whether Pächt's 
complaint lies solely in ekphrasis of the artwork, or if it applies equally 
to all description of visual culture.  We might be able to ameliorate this 
problem given that Pächt repeatedly locates the danger in the abuse of 
appealing to the populace, that is, any description that masquerades 
as synonymous with some other modality while at its core, seeking 
only to deceive.  It is this deception, the intentional trickery of those 
who desire simpler description, upon which Pächt focuses his tirade.   
Very similarly, Pächt almost interchangeably uses the words 
reception and perception, further complicating the aforementioned 
haziness by broadening the possible arena for misrepresentation from 
visual culture to encompass errors in perception itself.  Thus, we no 
longer know if the obscurity lies in the visual object, in the perceptual 
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operation that delivers the phenomenon to the subject (or a faulty 
percept), or within the subject him- or herself.  This particular 
obscurity needs some sort of resolution, because with it we have not 
just a flippant terminological carelessness, but substantial 
implications for the nature of the artwork or literary product to the 
subject. 
In fact, this is Pächt's very point: there is something 
fundamentally at risk in the instance of ekphrasis—it is not merely a 
question of taste.  Pächt writes: "The danger of offering a completely 
misleading and irrelevant interpretation, under the suggestive power of 
[the] linguistic image" perseveres.220  This danger threatens because 
underneath the rebuke, Pächt clings to a formidable aesthetic theory, 
one that he fails here to articulate, but nonetheless a theory that relies 
upon the autonomy of the artwork.  We see glimpses of the Viennese 
school's aesthetic theory in this passage: 
Only as long as one was convinced that the phenomenon 
to be described stood firm and unchanging, as well as 
independent from each beholder, could one believe that 
the argument was actually about whether to use more 
concretely vivid or more abstract expressions… The 
subject of description…seemed nothing more than a 
question of terminology…221 
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In a succinct but no less powerful parenthetical retort, Pächt 
insists, however, that this is not a terminological problem.222  Instead, 
Pächt continues: 
The quality of the description is dependent on the quality 
of the phenomenon.  If I have a thoroughly formed 
phenomenon (far removed from the chaotic or 
fragmented), it is very easy to describe.  For then 
perception itself is no longer blurred (diffuse or complex), 
blind and dumb, but articulated, and thus intelligent and 
knowing, in the truest sense of the word "meaning-full" 
(sinn-voll).  One has to evoke then only this meaning, the 
internal order of the aesthetic phenomenon, and the image 
itself begins to "speak."223 
This remarkable passage testifies to an underlying supposition 
on the nature of the artwork.  Pächt holds the artwork to possess 
immanent structure, and it is that immanent, "intelligent" structure 
from which the aesthetic phenomenon emerges.  This can only happen 
in an artwork which maintains "internal order" autonomously; any 
dependence on external order, and the phenomenon cannot maintain 
full meaning, but must always defer to an external semantic system.  
We glean from Pächt that it is ekphrastic description, far worse than 
fragmentation, that mutes the original work.  By giving literal voice, it 
ruptures the autonomy of the artwork, making it a slave to the written 
work for its meaning.  The artwork, then, has no need to speak, nor 
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could it, since the visual phenomenon always remains silent, drowned 
in the ekphrastic expression. 
The unfolding of the autonomous artwork enjoys an almost 
mystical treatment in twentieth-century German aesthetic theory; 
Pächt's essay fits within this tradition, showing some affinities with 
Sedlmayr and even Adorno and Horkheimer.  But even from the 
vantage point of another, seemingly removed school of thought—
Italian semiotics—the castrating power of ekphrasis can be 
corroborated.  In a slim essay from his now classic Travels in 
Hyperreality, Umberto Eco describes the power of the image.  Realizing 
that in order to make a radio broadcast more "real," the announcer of 
Radio Alice referenced a movie scene.224  Somehow, Eco realized, that 
this tactic marked a "singular" event, for as police struggled to break 
down the door, the narration could only resort to cinematic tropes.  
Eco concludes that either "life is lived as a work of art," or, more 
interestingly for Eco, images constitute memory.225 
In case readers pronounce this epidemic to be the inevitable 
symptom of being raised within a media generation, Eco quickly 
dismisses this from being a byproduct of the modern condition.  He 
writes: 
To tell the truth, it isn't even necessary to talk about new 
generations: If you are barely middle-aged, you will have 
learned personally the extent to which experience (love, 
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fear, or hope) is filtered through "already seen" images […] 
We  must only bear in mind that mankind [sic] has never 
done anything else, and before Nadar and the Lumières, it 
used other images, drawn from pagan carvings or the 
illuminated manuscripts of the Apocalypse.226 
Eco's careful prose repeats Pächt's view that the image holds its 
own voice; since experience is "filtered" through images, rather than 
narrated, Eco preserves the image's ability to communicate 
autonomously.  And, importantly, Eco insists, images throughout the 
"history of political and social relations" have held this constitutive 
position.   
To further illustrate, Eco turns to a photograph of a young 
Milanese gunman posed with his arms aiming his weapon, a photo 
that had recently circulated widely throughout the Italian press.  The 
image, writes Eco, immediately joins the ranks of powerful, historical 
photographs taken throughout modern history, because like 
monumental photographs, this image "has become a myth and has 
condensed numerous speeches."227  Eco continues: 
It [the photograph in mention] has surpassed the 
individual circumstance that produced it; it no longer 
speaks of that single character or of those characters, but 
expresses concepts.  It is unique, but at the same time it 
refers to other images that preceded it or that, in 
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imitation, have followed it…Sometimes it isn't a 
photograph but a painting, or a poster.228 
Barthes writes similarly of the mythic power of photographs, and 
like Eco, attributes the constantly circulating chain of signifiers to its 
mythic status.229  This photograph did not describe a "single event," 
but rather posed "an argument."230  Like Pächt, then, the image for 
Eco, too, derives aesthetic force through its autonomy: though it refers 
constantly behind and ahead of itself, it nonetheless does so from 
within its own internal structure.  A caption, an ekphrastic gesture, 
could only cleave the image's ongoing chain of signification, seeking to 
anchor through unchanging text the multivalent image to journalistic 
specificity. 
Pächt's admonition, then, fits appropriately for any aesthetic 
theory that confirms upon the image the possibility of autonomous 
signification.  Within looser traditions, though, Pächt's worst visions 
come to fruition. In a well-written and researched, but nonetheless 
conventional book entitled, How Poets See the World, Willard 
Spiegelman, lacking a developed aesthetic approach to the visual 
object, deracinates autonomy from the ekphrastic artwork. 
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Spiegelman begins his chapter by recounting a definition of the 
literary genre of ekphrasis.  He begins by citing Weiss's postulate that 
ekphrasis "is generally taken as a 'verbal representation of visual 
representation',"231 but amends this claim by recognizing the poet's 
additional ventriloquism by sometimes assigning voice to a character 
within the frame.  Unfortunately, the rhetorical device in Weiss's 
original positions the artwork within a mimetic, and, consequently, 
dependent relationship.  Before the chapter even approaches an 
artwork, it is already, in Pächt's terms, non-autonomous, pointing 
externally to an object it will always approximate, but never embody.   
This de-corporealizing process persists in the first discussion of 
Weiss's ekphrasis of a fictional fresco.  Spiegelman cites John 
Hollander's term, "notional," to describe a made-up picture within 
literature.232  The term, though, reifies a rhetorical bias: a notional 
image exists in concept alone.  Weiss's fresco was created through 
text, and therefore, for both Hollander and Spiegelman, is "notional" or 
conceptual, and therefore, does not exist as an image, but only as a 
linguistic construct.  If we are to presume the innocuous relationship 
of ekphrastic text on the image, then we must allow the possibility that 
a textually described object refers to a real image, regardless of 
historical verifiability.   Since a notional work does not grant even the 
possibility of a real image, we can deduce that ekphrasis, even in the 
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presence of a real image, similarly reduces that relationship to a 
notional one.  
This reductive corollary, which inevitably binds an image (real or 
not) to a notion, seems increasingly well-founded as Spiegelman's 
chapter develops.  Spiegelman spends some time conjuring a purpose 
for the ekphrastic form, but each speculation reifies the subservient 
position of the image.  Spiegelman, with revisionary boldness, writes: 
Weiss and his speaker [in the poem] have added a fifth 
cause to Aristotle's four: a relational one.  Esse est percipi, 
nothing exists but as (or until) it is perceived.  Hence the 
importance of description in the long poem, as neither 
filler nor ornament: it links sensibilities on both sides of 
the frame.  Ekphrasis itself occupies the rich middle 
ground between narrative on one side and meditation on 
the other.  Not only does Weiss present the fresco's self-
description, he also allows it to turn its voice toward its 
maker […]233 
This telling passage offers several confirmatory signs.  Between 
the second and third quoted sentences, Spiegelman implicitly equates 
perception with description, leveling an artwork to "nothingness" until 
substantiated by text. The subsequent two sentences ensure the 
disappearance of the "aesthetic" from the "sensible."  Ekphrasis, here 
serving as the descriptive chain between narrative on one side of the 
frame, ostensibly ought to link the subject to an image.  In that 
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image's place, though, Spiegelman situates not the image but 
meditation, the fresco's own narrative converses with its beholder. 
Spiegelman writes: "Unveiled to its audience, the fresco enters 
time, acquires its own historical and spiritual identity from the glares 
and glimpses of its viewers."234  But again, the unveiling for this 
notional work can only be accomplished through word.  The claim to 
truth in this work remains the utter domination of the image by its 
linguistic unveiling. 
The "occasion" (as Spiegelman calls it) of an actual, historical 
artwork proves no better ground for the likes of the image.  Moving to 
an ekphrastic poem by Irving Feldman written on George Segal's 
plaster casts, Spiegelman writes: 
Does art imitate nature, or the other way around? It 
hardly matters, for Feldman slyly reminds his readers of 
the implicit metaphor-making in representation and 
consequently in all knowledge: "About these figures we 
don't ask, 'Who are they?' / We ask, 'Who, who is it they 
remind us of?'"  In other words, because they lack genuine 
identity or integrity they must be merely like something 
else.  But if they are better than we are, then it is we, not 
the statues who are the pale imitations.  We are returned 
firmly to the realm of the simulacrum.235 
The identity crises introduced by the poet, and certainly absent 
in the silent original, brings about an odd twist for Spiegelman.  The 
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original sculpture, in its nondescript mimesis, though an original 
artwork, loses its status and falls into simulacral flux.  But, 
Spiegelman contends, we are imitations, and so the critic thrusts both 
object and spectator into tautological peril.  Though viewer loses origin 
and falls into the realm of the copy, the sculpture never regains its 
independence: it is always mimetic, always referring to the viewer 
referring back.   
The final section of Spiegelman's chapter offers his most 
potentially original contribution on ekphrasis.  Realizing the paucity of 
critical analyses ekphrasis based on non-representational art, 
Spiegelman speculates that for the ekphrasis of an artwork "in the 
absence of all mimesis," the poet "has really only two paths to 
follow."236  He or she might present a "scientifically accurate 
'description'" of the forms, or else "the poet may use the painting as a 
springboard for reverie, reflection, or," Spiegelman continues, the poet 
may seek to translate "its effects on and intentions for us, into 
appropriate linguistic structures."237  Pächt, naturally, would likely 
take issue with each of these options, and particularly the needless 
dichotomizing.  Scientifically accurate description, as mentioned 
earlier, could not simultaneously claim itself as art; rather, such a 
work would need to relinquish its dual status, seeking instead to 
understand the original work immanently.  The latter path more 
overtly exposes the rapacious relationship of the ekphrasis, which 
quite literally, springboards off the plane of the picture into its own 
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reflection.  His chapter ends with the consummation of Pächt's 
opening forecast, that ekphrasis might fool the reader into "the 
impression that they [the artworks] have been reproduced with poetic 
means, illustrated in words."238  Pächt promptly dismisses this 
possibility: 
In contrast to the high prestige that poetic description 
enjoys, the theoretical foundation of the approach is 
rather slight, for it necessarily presupposes a concept of 
scientific truth—truth as faithful reflection, as imitation of 
reality—that has become untenable since the advent of 
modern epistemology.239 
The path to popularity via literary or poetic description spells an 
unhealthy competition between the original and is diluted "extended 
caption."240  In a cogent essay on ekphrasis in Sidney and 
Shakespeare, Leonard Barkan confirms this anxiety.  Barkan recounts 
that, since the time of the Greeks, poetry, theater, and visual arts have 
vied for highest prestige.241  Barkan writes: "Mimesis is by its very 
nature a discourse of competition—or, at the very least, of 
comparison."242  In the case of ekphrasis, this competition often 
becomes a set of "contests," not only to determine the closest 
representation, but also to vet media themselves.243  But mimetic 
dexterity only partially describes the games.  Again, Barkan: "And, as I 
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have already suggested, the bid for prestige is one of the primary 
modalities of theoretical thinking about any cultural enterprise from 
Plato onwards."244   
Early on, however, Barkan establishes that modalities are not 
the only competitors; artistic creators vie for dominance, too.  In a 
passage selected from An Apology for Poetry, Barkan demonstrates 
that Sidney most significantly contends that poets "exist in a unique 
relation to both nature and truth," and that, unlike historians and 
philosophers, poets have creative faculties that trump even nature.245  
What strikes Barkan as most astonishing is that in this example of 
mimetic prowess, the visual artist makes no entrance.  Barkan rightly 
insists that this stands in contrast to the traditional topoi, which 
credits painters to be the most "literally appropriate" creative 
competitors to nature.246   
Given the impoverished backdrop of painting in Elizabethan 
culture, Barkan surmises that Sidney devoted his poetics to creating 
"something out of nothing."247  Barkan speculates that Sidney 
"appropriates and then suppresses the visual artist because he wants 
his poetry to make pictures but does not want the pictures to be 
real."248  Instead, Barkan argues, the only speaking image for Sidney 
was the theater.249 
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In this adroit move, Barkan suggests that for England, the 
theater served in parallel to Italy's rich image culture.  The suggestion 
seems well founded, and Barkan supports his claim with additional 
evidence, such as the prevalence of theatrical metaphors in London 
culture where its Italian correlate would display visual ones.  More 
pregnantly, Barkan writes: 
A middle course between the theater as a mechanism of 
visual composition and the theater as a signifier of loftier 
geometries would involve a recognition that both the 
theater and the visual arts are in this period coming to 
understand their own discourses and practices; the two 
media become interrelated as they attempt to define and 
promote themselves.250 
Drawing borders, then, becomes the central catalyst for the two 
discourses to become intertwined.  While Barkan continues to mount 
proof for theater's interconnections to visual media, I, too, would like 
to bring attention to Barkan's own methodologies, which echo an 
interdisciplinary approach.  Though I will postpone a discussion of 
method for the time being, I intend to return to performance studies to 
conclude the discussion on ekphrasis. 
Returning to the article, Barkan devotes the second half of his 
essay to the works of Shakespeare, for if the theater provided Sidney 
the English corollary of Italy's visual arts culture, then, Barkan rightly 
suspects, the searchlight shined back upon the stage would likely 
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reveal inversely valuable insights into the ekphrastic moment come 
alive.  Barkan begins by asking how the theater "stages" the "conflicts" 
between image and word for the title of best mimetic mode.251  He 
finds in Shakespeare a straightforward answer: "He celebrates the 
drama as speaking picture by selectively withholding speech from 
picture and picture from speech."252   
As evidence, Barkan recalls The Winter's Tale, in which the 
likeness of Hermione, likely a statue of the dead mother, comes to 
life.253  Barkan suggests that so long as the statue cannot speak, she 
remains a statue, even on the stage.254  Shakespeare, in Barkan's 
delightful reading, notes that the sculpture took many a year to be 
"performed," that is, "perfected."255  When the sculpture gains the 
ability to speak, though, Shakespeare delivers the chiasmus: the 
sculpture becomes perfected though its performance: 
It is at that moment that the central dream of all 
ekphrasis can finally be realized, that is, that the work of 
art is so real it could almost come to life.  Theater removes 
the almost.256 
Barkan admits Cymbeline to the essay in proof of another 
formulation of ekphrasis on the stage.  In the drawn-out narrative, 
Iachimo, spying on sleeping (and faithful) Imogen, contents himself to 
write down the "'contents of the story'" illustrated in the room's 
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pictures and tapestries.257  The audience must take him at his word, 
for we never witness directly that ekphrasis.258  Barkan relays 
Iachimo's report, revealed two scenes later, followed by commentary: 
"Never saw I figures / So likely to report themselves."  But 
they do not report themselves.  Shakespeare's theater 
teases us with their absence.  His audience sits in London 
watching a bare stage and hears a verbal description of 
classical pictures in words while, as a perfect complement, 
Posthumous sits in Rome and is treated to an ekphrastic 
rendering of the art work decorating Imogen's bedroom 
back in Britain.259 
Barkan asserts that Shakespeare thus stages "the drama of 
cultural absence and poetic recuperation" experienced in the 
geographic dislocations between Italy and England.260 With Hamlet, 
Barkan places the ekphrastic keystone in the written staging of the 
scene en scene of the King's death and betrayal.  To this scene, 
Barkan attributes the height of "visual narrative ekphrastically 
rendered."261  Barkan likens the "tableau" to the "painted panes of a 
saint's life,"262 but unlike those tableau, which seek credence based on 
their mimetic claims, with the substitution of Lucianus's name for 
                                       
257  Barkan, 343. 
258  Barkan, 343. 
259  Barkan, 344. 
260  Barkan, 344. 
261  Barkan, 345. 
262  Barkan, 345. 
 155 
Claudius's, Shakespeare proves "that the relation between images and 
words may be radically unstable."263 
Strictly speaking, though, Barkan, while providing three 
splendid meditations on the stage, never actually answers his own 
question when he asks how the theater stages the conflicts between 
modalities,264 but rather, only addresses the conflicts between image 
and work, abandoning the conflict of performance.  In his original 
question, Barkan remarks that theater "enters into the history of 
pictorial discourse because it enacts the millennial contests concerting 
the relative power of picture and word in capturing mimesis."265  While 
the first two references strike me as plausible within a more 
conservative reading of ekphrasis, Barkan's closing instance in Hamlet 
reveals a différance of another kind.   
In the case of Hamlet, and, I would argue, in earlier cases of 
ekphrasis of simulacra, the written ekphrasis occurs in the book.  As 
the play describes the silent images, it does so with the knowledge that 
those images are not yet existent.  The means to reach ekphrasis in 
the play, though, becomes salient while in Weiss's poem, the 
ekphrastic mechanism remained hidden behind the "notional" fresco.  
Shakespeare's ekphrasis knows that it will be "perfected," in the sense 
of "performed."  As such, it is quite sure that an "original" image will 
exist, but this original exists antepositionally.  Barkan's example 
makes this clear. 
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Ekphrasis always, then, anticipates an antepositional original, 
but like a demon, it holds a secret.  With its immanent birth through 
performance, it must vampirically feed off death.  In Hamlet, that 
death was Gonzago's, for the king's death enabled the antepositive 
original's performance.  In occurrences where a true original image 
exists, ekphrasis nevertheless requires a victim.  In this case, 
Ekphrasis does not require the stage, though, since its etymology 
promises its own ability to rise on its own, and speak as it will.  That 
voice necessarily and at all times draws its own existence from the 
death of the real artwork, supplanted by its ensuing copy made real 
through ekphrasis. 
 
Greimas and the Operation of Inscription 
Algirdas Julien Greimas began his career in Lithuania with a 
short study of Don Quixote, though he himself recognizes the 1956 
publication of his article, "L'actualité du saussurisme,” as a 
milestone.266  In the latter article, Greimas investigated works by 
Saussure, Merleu-Ponty, and Lévi-Strauss.267  He attributes to this 
work an understanding of paradigmatic analysis which would come to 
form half of his influential discourse analysis.  The second half would 
come from his discovery of the progenitor of Russian formalism, 
Vladimir Propp.  Greimas recounts that Lévi-Strauss recommended 
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Propp’s work on Russian fairy tales to Greimas’s friend, Roland 
Barthes: 
[…] that there existed an American translation of a certain 
Vladimir Propp.  Barthes gave me the reference and I sent 
to Indiana University Press for the book. Although this is 
anecdotal, I would like to say that Propp furnished the 
syntagmatic or syntactic component for my work. My 
theoretical genius, if I can so call it, was a form of 
“bricolage." I took a little Lévi-Strauss and added some 
Propp. This is what I call the first stage of semiotics.268 
The second stage, according to Greimas, came shortly thereafter, 
whereupon close study of the work by Danish linguist Louis Hjelmslev 
imparted onto Greimassian linguistics led, by 1970, to an attempt “to 
formulate better the elements of narrativity.”269  Greimas writes that 
beginning in the 1970’s: 
What became obvious is that if you want to construct a 
narrative grammar, then it has to be a modal grammar. 
This is where the revolutionary concept of the whole 
project took place since, if doing or causing are broken 
down, then, for example, to communicate can be analyzed 
as to cause to know. It is not a knowing-how but a 
causing to know, that is to say, the causing can be in 
either a realizing or a virtualizing position. Thus, doing or 
causing and being are modalities.  From this point of view 
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the whole grammar is composed of modalities; the rest is 
simply content, semantics.270 
Instigated by a 1985 conference at the University of Toronto, 
Greimas posited that he and his colleagues were already within a 
fourth stage of semiotics.  In this stage, Greimas and his colleagues 
were considering the problem of a discursive grammar.  It is just 
before this fourth stage, in 1984, that “Figurative Semiotics and the 
Semiotics of the Plastic Arts” was published, though it was written for 
an earlier project that went unpublished.  Even by 1984, Greimas 
confessed that the text was “a bit out of date.”271  For the purposes of 
my own study, however, it provides a much clearer entry into the work 
of Greimas, and offers an accessible case with which I will relate this 
problem of ekphrasis to the work of critical historiography.  And while 
the paper, “Figurative Semiotics,” avoids the jargonic trappings that 
accompany the fourth stage of Greimassian semiotics, it nevertheless 
is of sufficient density to require first a cursory primer on Greimassian 
terms. 
Greimas, in fact, published in 1979 an extensive dictionary of 
semiotics, released in 1982 under the English title, Semiotics and 
Language: An Analytical Dictionary.  Its status as a dictionary is, 
actually, under debate,272 and accordingly, I will instead draw from the 
                                       
270  Greimas, Perron, and Collins, 542. 
271  First published as “Sémiotique figurative et sémiotique plastique,” in Actes 
sémiotiques-Documents, 60, and translated in Algirdas Julien Greimas, Frank 
Collins, and Paul Perron, "Figurative Semiotics and the Semiotics of the Plastic Arts," 
New Literary History 20.3, Greimassian Semiotics (1989): 627-49. 
272 See Umberto Eco, Patrizia Magli, and Alice Otis, "Greimassian Semantics and the 
Encyclopedia," New Literary History 20.3, Greimassian Semiotics (1989): 707-21. 
 159 
excellent introduction Paul Perron wrote for New Literary History’s 
1989 volume dedicated to Greimas.  In that introduction, Perron cites 
Hjelmslev’s concept of the “semantic universe” as prominent within 
Greimassian semiotics.273  That universe, which is “coextensive with 
the concept of culture,” essentially refers to “the totality of 
significations prior to its articulation.” 274  Perron notes a practical 
difficulty with the concept, though, and presents Greimas’s solution: 
[Since] the semantic universe (the set of the systems of 
values) cannot be conceived of in its totality, Greimas 
introduced the concepts of semantic microuniverses and 
universe of discourses. The semantic microuniverse, 
which is apprehensible as meaningful only if 
particularized and articulated, is paradigmatically and 
syntagmatically manifested by means of discourses.275  
The microuniverse encompasses the paradigmatic axis but does 
not refer on its own; for a proper semiosis to occur, the syntagmatic 
must be introduced, thereby forming that particular discourse.  These 
two axes, the paradigmatic and syntagmatic, are often described by 
Greimas (and, as Greimas notes, similarly described by the likes of 
Chomsky, Freud, and Hjelmslev) as surface structures—the latter—
and deep structure—the former.  Paradigms are deep in that they 
derive meaning from their unarticulated relationship to other (absent, 
but connoted) paradigms.  The investigation and reduction of the 
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simplest set of such relationships ultimately defines the primary role 
of the semiotic square, a concept to which I will return. 
“Figurative Semiotics” contains three parts, entitled, 
“Figurativity,” “The Plastic Signifier,” and finally, “Toward a Plastic 
Semiotics,” the latter of which only indicates a direction in which a 
semiotic investigation of plastic representation might occur, but it does 
not offer anything of a how-to guide.276  The article immediately poses 
a problem for a “visual semiotics,” given that such a semiotics cannot 
be readily identified as either of the two macrosemiotics resulting from 
the human condition, that is, as a “natural” language or world.277  
Greimas questions, “Where do we place this phenomenon of the visual 
which is both ‘natural’—because it is manifested, ‘transcoded,’ within 
our verbal discourses—and ‘artificial’—because it constitutes, in the 
form of ‘images,’ an essential component of constructed poetic 
language?”278  He provisionally offers that visual semiotics must be 
defined by its “planar structures,” and that those structures work 
within “tridimensional space.”279  Greimas consents that such a 
formulation, already of “scarcely articulated specificity,” quickly 
vanishes when considered alongside of systems of writing or other 
modes of graphic representation.280  Without a more precise scope, 
Greimas proceeds to problematize the use of the word “semiotic” in 
that formulation; the word, semiotic, “implies that the markings 
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covering the surfaces chosen to receive those markings constitute 
signifying wholes, whose limits are yet to be defined, in turn constitute 
signifying systems.”281  This implication “justifies” for Greimas the 
semiotic postulation regarding the materiality of the plastic arts. 
But, in order to offer semiotic analysis, Greimas must ask a 
preliminary question.  He writes, “Are visual configurations, which are 
constructed upon planar surfaces, representations?”282  If so, Greimas 
continues, what kind of systems might they entail, and, can we 
recognize those systems as languages?  “In other words,” Greimas 
writes, “can they speak of something other than themselves?”283  In 
the case of the letter “o,” Greimas argues that there is no iconic 
relationship between the visual depiction of the letter and its 
corresponding sound.  Thus, the link between the two is “a 
correspondence between two systems—graphic and phonic—such that 
the figure-units produced by one of the systems can be globally 
homologated with the figure-units of another system,” never requiring 
any “natural” link between the two.284  This relationship never exceeds 
one of analogy. 
On the other hand, in the creation of formal languages, while 
such languages may use equal visual signifiers—as an alphabet—“the 
internal organization of the visual figures is a matter of indifference to 
them.”285  That is, in the case of “writing as a system,” Greimas posits 
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“oppositions” between possible features (or the absence thereof) as 
constitutive, while formal languages use those signifiers in an 
independent and “discriminatory” way.286  Greimas articulates the 
importance of this distinction: 
If we now set aside the rapprochement between graphic 
and phonic systems […] we see that in the case of our two 
extreme examples, we can speak of two “representation 
systems” and mean two different things by that.  Writing 
is an articulated visual mechanism which can represent 
anything (the semantic universe in its totality).  Formal 
language on the contrary appears to be a “corpus of 
concepts” that can be represented in any way (using 
various symbol systems).  What seemed especially 
interesting to us was to show that one and the same 
alphabet could be used to two different ends, that one and 
the same signifier could be articulated in two different 
ways and thus be used to constitute two different 
languages.287 
This passage exhibits my primary criticism of Greimas and an 
internal inconsistency I will attempt to ameliorate with the 
introduction of a grammatological perspective.288   Greimas make clear 
in the alphabetic example the difference between the functioning of 
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writing as a representation of the semantic universe versus the 
disinterested use of writing in a formal language.  The formal 
language, by definition, is unable to immanently comment upon its 
own formation; therefore, any system of writing can never function 
intertextually.  For this, Greimas posits the need for a metalanguage or 
the transposition between discourse universes.   
I charge, however, that the difference Greimas draws between 
the two kinds of writing are surface differences.  The great power in 
Greimas’s semiotics is its ability to think through operation; it is at its 
most advanced levels an operationalist endeavor.  Writing at its 
current development within that project remains very much under-
examined.  In the above passage, writing in both cases represents 
simply a functional system which either refers to a semantic universe, 
capable when combined with a syntagmatic axis of dynamic, 
immanent discourse, or to the more arbitrary system of representation 
within a closed, artificial language.  The explanation proves to be an 
incompatibility of approaches: the earliest stages of Greimas’s 
semiotics belie a more unsatisfactory functionalist explanation; with 
the introduction of modalities in the “third stage” of semiotics, 
Greimas relocates the project to one of operationalism.  In this 
process, however, he neglected to update his functional approach to 
writing; it is my prerogative here to do so.  I will continue to trace this 
latent functionalism in “Figurative Semiotics,” concluding the chapter 
with a suggestion for an operationalist account of writing. 
Following the two types of representation, Greimas further 
complicates the scenario with the introduction of the age-old problem 
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of iconicity.  Frustrated that “despite all the refinements that centuries 
of thought have brought to the concepts of ‘imitation’ and ‘nature,’”289 
Greimas complains that nevertheless a sentiment persists that 
correlates the “likeness” of an image, as a “motivate” icon, to a referent 
in the real world.  Such an imitation “presupposes a very thorough 
implicit analysis of ‘nature’ and a recognition of the fundamental 
articulations of the natural world” that the painter is said to copy.290  
Greimas doubts that any such reduction can maintain fidelity to the 
“richness of the natural world.”  Those marks on a canvas, he writes, 
“are perhaps identifiable as figures, but not as objects of the world.”291  
Greimas writes: 
The concept of imitation, which in the communication 
structure refers to the enunciator’s sending instance, 
corresponds to the concept of recognition, which refers to 
the receiver’s instance.  To “imitate” in the precarious 
conditions we have just described makes no sense unless 
the visual figures thus traced are offered to a spectator in 
order for him to recognize them as configurations of the 
natural world.  But this is not “doing painting.”292 
In this way, Greimas argues for an emphasis on “legibility of the 
natural world,” which generates the sense of imitation, rather than 
something manifest in the code of the image itself.  For, what “is 
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‘naturally’ given?” Greimas asks.293  A figure (which, Greimas clarifies, 
is “constituted by features coming from different senses”), cannot be 
legible as an object without being transformed into an object. 294  An 
object, “insofar as it is, for example, contrastable to ‘process,’ is 
interoceptive rather than exteroceptive, and is not ‘naturally’ inscribed 
in the primary image of the world,” Greimas adds parenthetically.295  
Greimas later come to describe the dichotomy between exteroceptive 
and interoceptive as the “set of semic categories which articulate the 
semantic universe,” that, further, constitutes “a paradigmatic 
classification that enables us to distinguish figurative from non-
figurative (or abstract) ones.”296 But, this remark traps the early 
Greimas in a tautology, one which essentially states that a figure is a 
figure until it is transformed into an object.  The point of it, though, is 
to suggest that legibility requires an act on the part of an actor—the 
object is the conceptual result of such an engagement.  Quickly, we 
notice in this relationship a problematic division between subject-
object, an inconsistency that is immediately repeated: 
It is this grid through which we read which causes the 
world to signify for us and it does so by allowing us to 
identify figures as objects, to classify them and link them 
together, to interpret movements as processes which are 
attributable or not attributable to subjects, and so on.  
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This grid is of a semantic nature, not visual, auditive, or 
olfactory.  It serves as a “code” for recognition which 
makes the world intelligible and manageable.  Now we can 
see that it is the projection of this reading grid—a sort of 
“signified” of the world—onto a painted canvas that allows 
us to recognize the spectacle it is supposed to 
represent.297 
As Perron explains the reading grid more plainly as the 
mechanism, “subject to cultural relativism, in which the figurative 
forms of visual figures are identified as ‘representing’ objects of the 
world transformed into object-signs through semiosis.”298  Objects, 
then, are “the result of reading constructions.”299  The idea of the 
reading grid eventually drops away from Greimassian semiotics, a 
result of an early formulation of the subject-object-act trio described in 
“Figurative Semiotics.”  I posit that the reading grid dilemma is 
resolved when Greimas develops a more complex theory of “actantial 
grammar,” in which an actant performs an act—this is a more 
satisfactory expression that dissolves the functional subject-object into 
an operational relationship, one that refocuses action as modality and 
subject as perpetrator (actant) of that modal verb. 
The fairly early model here involving reading grids (something 
that will eventually be subsumed under actantial analysis, I argue) 
causes a maltreatment of the role of writing, since writing is posited 
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always as an object—or, at least, as objectified—rather than as a 
process.300  I will continue to outline Greimas’s scheme for 
figurativization, a process crucial for interpreting a more satisfying 
semiotic theory of writing.   
Given the interim role of the reading grid, which more essentially 
posits iconicity in the reader rather than the signifier, Greimas affirms 
the non-iconic character of plastic representation.  Instead, iconicity is 
determined from a culturally-defined set of schemata, intuited at the 
moment of textual reading.  It is not, however, the only means of 
perception.  “Such an iconizing reading is, however, a semiosis—that 
is, an operation which, conjoining a signifier and a signified, produces 
signs.”301  Greimas deems the reading grid to be “of a semantic 
nature,” which, we must assume, possesses a paradigmatic 
dimension.  With the reading grid,302 a reader can group salient 
features together into “figurative formants,” which transforms those 
visual traces into “object-signs.”303  The crucial act of grouping “is a 
simultaneous grasping that transforms the bundle of heterogeneous 
features into a format, that is, into a unit of the signifier.”304  The “grid 
of the signified” is what allows for recognition, and it is at this moment 
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that the reader may correlate the representation as one of an object of 
the natural world.305 
Regardless of the means of analyzing the reader (whether as 
subject to the reading-grid as within this article, or as an actant), the 
important attribution here that remains constant is sequence.  In this 
system, grouping of features into figurative formants occurs at the 
level of the act of reading, and it does so on the basis of culturally 
inflected reading grids.  Greimas makes clear that the moment of 
semiosis is responsible for which particular features are amalgamated 
into signification.  Greimas writes: 
We can see that the formation of formants, at the time of 
semiosis, is no more than an articulation of the planar 
signifier, its segmentation into legible discrete units. This 
segmentation is done with a view to a certain kind of 
reading of the visual object, but as we saw in connection 
with the twofold function of the alphabet, it does not 
exclude other possible segmentations of the signifier. 
These discrete units, constituted out of bundles of 
features, are already well known to us.  They are the 
"forms" of Gestalt theory, "figures of the world" in the 
Bachelardian sense, "figures of the level of expression" 
according to Hjelmslev. This convergence of points of view 
originating in seemingly very disparate preoccupations 
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allows us to speak here of a figurative reading of visual 
objects.306 
The recognition of such figures defines reading, an activity, but 
what can we ascertain of a figurative reading in the case of ekphrasis?  
The previous section established that an original image is, in fact, 
unnecessary for the production of ekphrastic language.  In the 
presence of an original artwork, the reading grid which, a priori, 
ensures that various figures will be grouped together to yield a viable 
signifier, to which the process of semiosis will attach an appropriate 
signifier. In this account, Greimas’s semiotic process remains 
consistent with the aforementioned disjunction of ekphrastic writing 
with its “referent.”  I, however, went further to suggest that any 
ekphrastic writing antepositions a more restricted image in place of 
that original; this is especially so when an original does not exist, and, 
therefore, any ekphrasis already positions that replacement image.  
What does this mean within a Greimassian framework?  Moreover, can 
we consider ekphrastic reduction in images without a written product?  
These two questions can be subject to semiotic method.  Greimas 
writes: “This mode of reading that produces semiosis—a criterion 
which allows us to speak on the semiotic nature of the object under 
study—brings us to a semiotics that we can call figurative 
semiotics.”307  But, what is this “mode of reading” in the case of 
ekphrastic reduction?   
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Though by the time this paper was written, Greimas had well in 
place a modal grammar, the concept of modality reached its most 
developed form following the publication of “Figurative Semiotics.”  
Greimas later allows a “first stage” of understanding modality which 
divides modes of verbal forms into “utterances of doing and utterances 
of state.”308  “In other words,” Greimas writes, 
…the following can be conceived: (a) doing modalizing 
being (cf. performance, art), (b) being modalizing doing (cf. 
competence), (c) being modalizing being (cf. veridictory 
modalities), and (d) doing modalizing doing (cf. factitive 
modalities.  In this perspective, the modal predicate can 
be defined first of all by its sole tactic function, by its 
transitive aim, which can affect another utterance taken 
as object.309 
In the case of “reading an artwork,” for example, the artwork’s 
status as object is irrefutable.  The “mode of reading,” however, 
requires much closer scrutiny.  Since reading an artwork is not 
factitive, we must assume the instance of “doing modalizing being.”  
The “being,” though, might easily mislead, since it is yet unclear 
whether this mode is itself virtual, actual, or realized.  Greimas later 
clarifies: the “planar object” that produces a “meaning effects” therein 
affirms its membership within a semiotics system.310  But, though we 
                                       
308  Greimas and Courtés, 195. 
309  Greimas and Courtés, 195. 
310  Greimas, Collins, and Perron, 636-637. 
 171 
may have access to the its mode of manifestation, the system’s 
existence is unknowable.311  Greimas explains: 
Knowledge of particular planar objects alone can lead to 
knowledge of the system which underlies them.  This 
means that if the processes are grasped in their realized 
form, they presuppose the system as a virtual one, and 
thus as one that can be represented only through an ad 
hoc, constructed language.312 
Though we can only know an object through what Greimas 
elsewhere calls a metalanguage, he nevertheless holds that such a 
process of description does not preclude other “signifying articulations 
of planar objects,” and, in fact, refers only to figures which are 
assigned “with ‘natural’ interpretation.”313  
Because figurativity is generated through the process of reading, 
here given a priori structure through the reading grid, Greimas 
demonstrates that the “biased” and “partial” perspective implies that 
figurativization seems “to go beyond the limits of the planar vehicle or 
support, upon which its manifestation is based.”314  This is a critical 
aspect in the larger discussion of ekphrasis for two reasons.  Firstly, in 
this move, Greimas restricts any possibility of an autonomous artwork 
to phenomena of the natural world—in the process of legibility, an 
artwork cannot be comprehended unless filtered through the 
paradigmatic grid of reading.  Thus, the “meaning effects” of a work 
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are ineffably linked to their own construction as signifiers.  Secondly, 
because the features of the object in the natural world (which are 
bundled to construct the signifier) “also appear at the same time as 
features of the signified of natural languages,” Greimas argues on this 
basis that “verbal discourses carry within themselves their own 
figurative dimension.”315  There are two pervasive repercussions of 
such a correspondence. 
In the first place, we see the suppression of the visual to 
supplemental status—or more precisely, of the possibility of a visual 
writing.  This dangerous supplementation serves the purpose for 
Greimas of establishing the primacy of the narrative in his semiotics, 
but it does so at the price of semiosis happening at the level of the 
visual paradigm, rather than as a transposition to the rhetorical 
reading grid.  In the second place, and more revolutionary than 
Greimas elaborates, Greimas states that the “problems posed by the 
analysis of ‘visual texts’ are comparable to those posed by verbal texts, 
be they literary or not.”316  If this is true, it allows Greimas license to 
continue with his larger semiotic project, in which he perseveres in a 
“scientific” manner to reduce into its most fundamental parts both 
visual and figurative semes that, ultimately, will enforce Greimas’s 
larger narrative semiotics. 
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Discussion 
The remainder of “Figurative Semiotics” paves the way for 
Greimas to do just that: Greimas outlines the “initial steps” for the 
semiotician “to establish an area of investigation wherein to inquire 
into the how and why” of figure-objects.317  In this discussion, I will 
establish the import of Greimas’s method for an understanding of why 
ekphrasis holds such interest to historiography.  A recapitulation of 
the relevant Greimassian points will yield the following: semiosis 
occurs at the moment the paradigmatic is organized syntagmatically 
within the reader (or enunciator).  Within “visual semiotics,” the reader 
of an image produces a semiosis by means of a culturally informed, a 
priori reading grid, which allows that reader to posit a given bundle of 
features as figurative.  Figurativity, then, while appearing to refer to 
something of the natural world, is, in fact, a result of a predisposition 
in reading, rather than a natural link to the world.  The very logic that 
allows us to posit a figural semiotics, however, must reciprocally be 
applied to natural language, at which point we must also acknowledge 
a figural component within language—not at the level of its figural 
expression, but at the level of a figural content.318 
“To say that a planar object is a process, a text that is realizing 
one of the system’s virtualities,”319 is an admission of the semiotic 
method of analysis characterized by unscrupulous dissection in efforts 
to arrive at the smallest observable unit.  Such a directive leads 
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Greimas to the next step of attempting to isolate and identify a smaller 
segment within the plastic signifier, that is, “strictly plastic units 
which ultimately are carriers of significations unknown to us.”320  The 
drive in this endeavor is one towards operationalism: 
Now, given a visual text which we consider to be a 
segmentable signifier, we need but enunciate our final 
postulate, that of operativity.  This consists in saying that 
an object can be grasped only through its analysis.  Put 
simplistically, it can be grasped only through being 
decomposed into smaller units and through the 
reintegration of those units into the totalities that they 
constitute.321 
The first option in such a segmentation, for Greimas, lies in the 
“topological mechanism” of the image.  By this term, Greimas attempts 
a systematic means of reading the “reading” of an image.  I will outline 
the scheme he introduces, but first must emphasize that it is not the 
particular mechanism in Greimas that interests me, but rather the 
“area of operation” that he identifies, and area I will describe in a 
grammatological sense as “writing.” 
Of the “topological categories” in which visual figures might be 
cataloged, Greimas begins (quite conservatively) with the frame, with 
rectilinear, curvilinear, or compound forms.  He then moves swiftly 
into an opposition between eidetic (the qualities of an image 
independent of color) and chromatic categories.  I need not critique 
                                       
320  Greimas, Collins, and Perron, 637. 
321  Greimas, Collins, and Perron, 637.  (Italics original.) 
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these insufficient categories here.  Very nearly one hundred years 
earlier than the publication of this article, art historian Heinrich 
Wölfflin developed a more complex series of oppositions, the creation of 
which has subsequently been thoroughly deconstructed by newer art 
histories.322  Furthermore, by 1978, Jacques Derrida dismantled the 
surety of the frame as a painting’s fundamental matrix of legibility in 
La vérité en peinture.  (Formal categories being of especial interest to 
art historians, there is, in fact, a body of literature far too great to 
outline here, as German, Viennese, and American schools of formalism 
abound in such treatises.)   
Greimas alternatively calls these forms “topological,” as a 
general term, or “plastic categories,” referring to the “minimal 
substructures” that can be discerned from topological segmentation.323  
But, what holds relevance here is not the verification of Greimas’s 
weak formal categories, but rather that implicit “area of operation” 
therein, an area that he himself neglected to investigate owing to the 
aforementioned bias against grammatology.  Greimas writes: “These 
topological categories, projected upon a surface whose richness and 
polysemy would otherwise render it indecipherable, bring about its 
reduction to a reasonable number of pertinent elements necessary for 
its reading.”324  Those elements, Greimas goes on to demonstrate, are 
                                       
322 Most helpful on this topic is Marshall Brown, "The Classic Is the Baroque: On the 
Principle of Wolfflin's Art History," Critical Inquiry 9.2 (1982): 379-404; but see also 
Mark Jarzombek, "De-Scribing the Language of Looking: Wölfflin and the History of 
Aesthetic Experientialism," Assemblage.23 (1994): 29-69. 
323  Greimas, Collins, and Perron, 639. 
324  Greimas, Collins, and Perron, 639. 
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subject to the same kinds of discursive analysis used upon linguistic 
structures. 
Greimas grants a certain relativity to the reduction factor of 
those minimal units; instead, the semiotician “must be satisfied with 
the example offered by semantics.”325  This statement is instructive, 
since it implies Greimas’s most infamous contribution to semiotics, 
the exercise known as the semiotic square, and exercise utilized to 
consider the semantic, or paradigmatic, relationship of a given 
element.  Greimas explains the similarity to semantics, and his 
passage is equally pertinent as a description of the utility of his 
square: 
Semantics, faced with the impossibility of establishing a 
limited inventory of its semic categories that would still 
cover the whole of the cultural universe, has to be 
satisfied with taking into consideration only those 
categories that are relevant to the analysis of such and 
such a given microuniverse.  Thus, for example, the 
differences we see from one analysis to another in their 
inventories of chromatic categories can be explained in 
exactly the same way.326 
Though Greimas does not sketch out a semiotic square in this 
article, he does everything short of the exercise, including providing 
examples of oppositions appropriate for the square.327  (For example, 
                                       
325  Greimas, Collins, and Perron, 640. 
326  Greimas, Collins, and Perron, 640. 
327 Greimas’s most complete early work on the square is found in A. J. Greimas, 
"Narrative Grammar: Units and Levels," MLN 86.6, Comparative Literature (1971): 
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he notes the importance in Klee’s painting of pointed-rounded and 
earthly-heavenly oppositions, and in Boubat’s photography contoured-
flat and naked-clothed oppositions.)  With such a strong indication in 
“Figurative Semiotics” of the relevance of Greimas’s Rectangle in visual 
analysis, I will formulate just such a square here, with the express 
purpose of explaining not its correctness, but the scope of its “area of 
operation.” 
Let us consider two terms Greimas lays out: those between 
chromatic and eidetic categories.  To recapitulate, Greimas stipulates 
that these two plastic categories must be considered without overlap, 
i.e., the chromatic category must be considered to work solely from the 
provenance of color, and likewise, a black-and-white eidetic schema 
must be considered only as scale, and not as expressions of color.  
(Again, these categories contradict many contemporary 
understandings of light and human optic physiology, but let us set 
aside these foibles since the verification of this thought experiment is 
irrelevant to my argument.)  The initial plotting of such an opposition 
will yield the following figure: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
                                                                                                              
793-806.  Again, due to the simplicity of his early interface with the “reading grid,” I 
have preferred “Figurative Semiotics” over the other works, since for my purposes, 
the relationship between actantial subject and object is less crucial than the act 
itself of inscription. 
 Eidetic  Chromatic 
 
Not Chromatic  Not eidetic 
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Thus, we have both the initial opposition, eidetic-chromatic, and 
its negative expansion, not chromatic-not eidetic.  (The latter 
opposition, of course, includes a much greater sphere than does the 
former.)  If we take the square further to calculate all interstitial 
semantic values, we will arrive at the following figure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
Usually, this figure is offered without an additional 
encirclement, but for clarity, I have made the cartouche, the effect of 
the secondary terms, explicit.  While so many criticize the square on 
the basis of its functioning (e.g., why only four initial terms, why 
oppositions, etc.), it is not the insufficiency of binary opposition that 
concerns this study.  In fact, Greimas himself suggests that the square 
is not important; he even entertains the possibility of a semantic circle!  
What is essential, and ironically neglected by critics, is the process of 
inscription that accompanies his efforts to think through the 
unthinkable—to write semantics.328   
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Now, Greimas deserves substantial credit on the limits he sets 
on the square’s usefulness.  He cautions frequently that the square 
remains only one tool (one that does not exhaust the possibilities of 
semantic analysis) that, ultimately, is faced with an impossible task.  
But this is besides the task.  What remains the most instructive 
moment in his analysis is what he is doing.  Greimas believes, based 
on Boolean logic, that the binary serves as the most reduced number 
of variables into which one can make a logical proposition.  
Irrespective of the belief, in the moment of trying to delineate such 
binary relationships, he invariably exceeds those relationships.  While 
he attempts to apply the thinking virtually, he does so only through a 
metalanguage.  Greimas is fully aware that metalanguages are 
required to speak of the ineffable.  What remains under-theorized, 
however, is that through the process of a metalanguage—through the 
expansion and circumscription of original terms—Greimas is inscribing 
those terms. 
Inscription in this sense—far from the supplementary writing 
system which merely points to a natural or artificial language—
constitutes its own semiosis as writing.  The cartouche surrounding 
the original terms, terms that while referring to virtual signifiers 
nevertheless bears a figurativity, itself serves as inscription, as a 
visible mark.329  It is this inscribing mark, a mark that seeks to 
delineate the figurative, that we must call, writing. 
                                                                                                              
his consideration of writing per se does not sufficiently distinguish itself from the 
rhetorical.  It is on this ground that I have neglected it here. 
329 We might even compare this to the author’s signature, which, Derrida posits, is 
either inside the text, and therefore part of it, or outside the text, and therefore 
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In “The Violence of the Letter,” Derrida, in his characteristic 
flourished writing, critiques Lévi-Strauss for, among other things, 
arguing that the South American Nambikwara exhibit what must be 
the likeness of “the childhood of our race.”330  Derrida writes:  
If writing is no longer understood in the narrow sense of 
linear and phonetic notation, it should be possible to say 
that all societies capable of producing, that is to say of 
obliterating, their proper names, and of bringing 
classificatory difference into play, practice writing in 
general.331 
So, too, must we understand any process capable of enveloping 
differential structures—regardless of the fixity or verifiability of those 
relationships—as being of a writing in general.  Greimas’s 
metalanguage, in the semiotic square made manifest by the cartouche, 
would more accurately be read as a process of writing, rather than a 
rhetorical discourse.  This needs further relation to the figurative.  
Greimas writes: 
When it is decided to take on the task of classifying all 
discourses into two large classes—figurative and non-
figurative (or abstract) discourses—one soon notices that 
almost all texts called literary and historical belong to the 
class of figurative discourse.  It remains understood, 
                                                                                                              
irrelevant.  Any inscription, therefore, must instantiate the former and not the latter.  
See Jacques Derrida, Glas (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986) 262. 
330  Derrida, 108.  In this classic essay, Derrida argues that the moment the 
possibility of erasure enters a natural language, writing appears.  
331  Derrida, 109. 
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however, that such a distinction is somewhat “ideal,” that 
it seeks to classify forms (figurative and non-figurative) 
and not discourse-occurrences, which practically never 
present an “unalloyed” form.332 
This quotation firstly suggests the arbitrary division of all 
discourses into figurative and non-figurative.  Not two sentences later, 
however, Greimas disputes this division as being “somewhat ‘ideal’.”  
This incoherency brings question to Greimas’s frequent assertion that 
science, too, constitutes discourse without figurativity.  Recall 
Greimas’s aspiration to reform linguistics as a true science, and as 
such, a discourse without figurativity.  By his own admission, this 
must also be considered “somewhat ‘ideal’.”    Additional incongruity 
arises in the comparison of this passage to an earlier citation, in which 
Greimas consented that “verbal discourses carry within themselves 
their own figurative dimension,”333 and, therefore, even a scientific 
discourse must carry “figures of content” and not just “figures of 
expression.” 
Regardless of the desire for scientificity within the historical 
disciplines, we must consequently see all forms of historical writing as 
figurative, i.e., figurative in both content and expression.  Though 
Greimassian taxonomy might maintain particular terminology for this 
consequence, the idea of figurativity in historical writing is not new.  
What we must investigate, though, is that the inscription of this 
figurativity—irrespective on the content of those figures—is 
                                       
332  Greimas, Collins, and Perron, 635. 
333  Greimas, Collins, and Perron, 635. 
 182 
appropriately a grammatological occurrence.  The centrality of 
occurrence is not lost on Greimas.   
In the passage, Greimas writes that the difference between the 
figurative and non-figurative that is a false difference, since we are not 
in the habit of dealing with forms as such, but rather, of discourse-
occurrences.  Chronologically, this passage from his book, Semiotics 
and Language, sufficiently succeeds the full development of 
Greimassian actantial theory.  Nevertheless, this passage does not 
directly state actantial relationship; instead, the performativity of 
figuration as “discourse-occurrence” is only implied. 
The passage continues: 
In fact, what interests the semiotician is understanding 
what the figurativization of discourses and of texts—a 
sub-component of discoursive semantics—consists in, and 
what the procedures (sic), which are put into place by the 
enunciator to figurativize the utterance, are.  Thus, the 
construction of a model of discourse production—which 
we call the generative trajectory—proves to be useful if 
only because it permits the constitution of the general 
framework within which one can seek to inscribe, in an 
operational and tentative manner, subject to invalidations 
and reconstructions, the figurativization procedures of a 
discourse posed first as neutral and abstract.334 
                                       
334  Greimas and Courtés, 118.  (Emphasis original.) 
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Greimas writes that the “figurativization of discourses and texts” 
issues as “a sub-component of discoursive semantics.”  We must place 
this within the larger Greimassian program.  Semantics, forming the 
paradigmatic axis of discourse analysis, always requires syntax to 
produce “meaning effects.”  Paradigmatic analysis is still possible 
without syntagmatic consideration, since one may employ the semiotic 
square as a device with which to gauge a paradigm’s relation to other, 
unspecified paradigms.  Thus, a figure in this schema must be 
understood to be subject to analysis by the square.  Whether in the 
binary sets constructed by the square or with another means of 
analysis as in Caviness’s triangulation, any such analysis must be 
seen as inscription, and therefore, as writing. 
The aforementioned “figurativitzation,” Greimas writes, consists 
in and what those procedures put into play as enunciation.  The 
figure, then, is understood operationally.  While that figure is a 
necessary precondition of writing as inscription, I do not equate 
figurativization alone as writing, but its inscription therein.  This does 
not preclude figurativization’s consonance with Derridean “arche-
writing,” the latter which, though not yet fully emerged as writing, 
forms its necessary precursor. 
In fact, the generative trajectory, posited by Greimas as a 
framework, constitutes that in which the inscription is allowed to 
occur.  We might extrapolate a kind of arche-writing in any established 
or constituted framework, within which inscription proper—qua 
writing—may eventuate.  But within such a model, we find recursive 
frames, that is, in the initial constitution of any such model, which 
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serves as that framework, its very circumscription as model 
simultaneously constitutes it as a kind of arche-writing.  It is not, 
therefore, the grouping of any set of objects, but rather the delineation 
of those objects as a group, the parentheses or braces which 
constitute that set, that must be seen as a primary inscription. 
Whether implicit or explicit, the historian’s job parallels this 
process at the moment he or she brackets any figures of a historical 
event.  That bracketing, an operation, is a kind of enunciation that we 
must consider inscriptive.  Thus, the historiographer follows in suit: it 
is the framework, rather than the individual parameters, that situates 
a historiographic inquiry.  Further, such a framework must be 
received as part of an operative inscription.  That inscription, and the 
inspection thereof, is always already guaranteed in the etymological 
provenance set up by its designation as historiography.   
Of additional import for the historian of the visual, the practice 
of ekphrasis, in which an author selects and orders pertinent 
linguistic figures of figures, must also stand as an inscription.  The 
existence of an original is, as I established earlier, extrinsic in 
ekphrastic generation.  The selection of figures, and its requisite 
framing under the banner of ekphrasis, that is, as a purported 
linguistic record of a visual object, is precisely that framework which 
we have been discussing.  Such an inscription must, therefore, be 
open to historical and especially historiographical analysis. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION: VISUALIZING THE HISTORICAL DISCIPLINES 
 
This dissertation has taken as its initial problem the argument 
that critical historiography, a term first used by Berger and 
Jarzombek, is worthy of extensive development as a discourse.  
Furthermore, it has called for both intra- and inter-disciplinary 
research regarding the meaning, relevance, and application of critical 
historiography and its methods.  My primary aim in this conclusion, 
then, is to set forth here questions for further development.  Firstly, if 
we accept the etymological factors in critical historiography’s scope, 
how ought the historian accept the roles of judging and discernment 
as mandated by a ‘critical’ historiography?  Secondly, how does writing 
form the core of any historiographic project, and moreover, what is the 
visual basis of such a project?  Thirdly, if vision and writing do form 
such a core, how does the historian handle failures of historical 
vision?  Finally, if we cannot rely on writing to transcribe with fidelity a 
visual image, as Pächt as argued against ekphrasis, then how might 
we regard it visually as a grammatological issue, instead? 
I offer only a preliminary avenue for exploration into these 
questions, and that avenue builds upon a visual studies perspective.  
Beginning with the term, critical historiography, I argued in chapters 
one and two that any such critical study necessitates deep reflection 
on the written aspects of history.  After a careful look at 
historiography’s etymology, I narrowed the ontological bounds of 
historiography to grammatological questions, that is, epistemological 
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questions whose grounds lie in writing rather than in the metaphysics 
of presence.  Any other epistemological questions about history may 
hold great interest, but they are more appropriately taken up under 
other disciplinary banners.  Once the critical historiographer 
recognizes the domain of writing as the proper field for investigation, 
he or she may pursue a number of discursive trajectories. 
In chapter three, I took up one such avenue in historical writing: 
the problematic operation of charismatic authority.  If a historical 
narrative theorizes interactions which, we might say, occur on a 
sociological field, then visual access to that field—and the writing that 
inscribes it—is first and foremost a historical issue.  Bourdieu 
demonstrates, however, that access to the field, access to the means 
by which the field is controlled, and the means by which actors 
participate on that field are all the results of sociological transactions.  
In further examining the trope Bourdieu introduces, I argued that 
those transactions occur in a visuo-spatial zone, and as such, are 
always visually-mediated transactions.  By tracing the transactional 
basis of charisma through Weber and Bourdieu, I reoriented 
Bourdieu’s field to account for both synchronic and diachronic aspects 
of charismatic transactions.  Such a multifaceted account (which 
Greimas would term “biplanar”) disputes earlier models of history as a 
steady stream of progress, instead finding Foucauldian value in 
rupture.  The recent history by John E. Joseph, Nigel Love and Talbot 
J. Taylor, Landmarks in Linguistic Thought II, begins with a valuable 
statement on this very approach.  In it, they write: 
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The coauthors of this book do not view linguistic thought 
as a matter of progress towards the theories that have now 
attained the status of academic standards.  Instead, in 
contrast to such a “progressivist” perspective, we offer a 
‘continuist’ alternative, according to which 20th century 
thinking about language continued to debate and develop 
the same themes, questions, issues, concepts and 
arguments that have preoccupied Western thinking about 
language since its inception.335 
Joseph et al expand upon this reasonable strategy by remarking 
that, contrary to a progressivist account, their historiography focuses 
on atypical but exceedingly important details such as “policing the 
borders of linguistics as a field of inquiry.”336  They underscore the 
critical role that discursive struggles played in inculcating the field 
with various ideological imprints.  They cite Michel Foucault’s work 
from 1971, which insisted that disputes regarding disciplinary borders 
have always been inseparable from that discipline’s research itself.337  
The thoughtfulness of this premise cannot be understated.  
Bourdieu, while viscerally concerned with social tangles that formed 
networks of struggles between intellectual agents, unapologetically 
views formal configurations of those discursive borders outside the 
scope of his inquiry.  Therefore, though Bourdieu’s sociological 
                                       
335  John Earl Joseph, Nigel Love, and Talbot J. Taylor, Landmarks in Linguistic 
Thought II: The Western Tradition in the Twentieth Century (New York: Routledge, 
2001) vii. 
336  Joseph, Love, and Taylor, vii. 
337  Joseph, Love, and Taylor, viii. 
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mapping held direct relevance on gauging charisma’s influence on 
historical writing, to consider epistemological history and the history of 
ideas, Bourdieu’s work necessitated some additional adjustment to 
accommodate the requisite content aspects inherent the history of 
ideas. 
I have defended various contours of my own project, contours 
that skirt several crucial—but for my purposes, extraneous—inquiries 
that will emerge from my visual studies approach to critical 
historiography.  Firstly, I early on clarified that a historiographical 
project need not address the nature of historical knowledge, since that 
is not implicit within the “-graphic” declension.  Actually, to begin an 
epistemic question of this nature requires an archaeology of 
knowledge, and as such, I deferred to the Foucauldian justification  
that historiography need not question historical knowledge so much as 
it must unearth the a priori conditions thereof.  Since an archaeology 
must, I contended, simultaneously account for charismatic authority 
(a subtle sociological transaction that would be stripped of nuance if 
discussed solely within a Foucauldian discourse of power), again, I 
retained a Bourdienne vocabulary while reading Foucault’s 
archaeological method through the former’s lens.  (As these two figures 
were working concomitantly, their own epistemic connection as 
gainsayers of structuralism might prove to be a fruitful study.)  In 
investigating Foucault’s archaeological “rules of formation” of a 
discourse, then, I attended to Foucault’s term “surfaces of emergence,” 
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“authorities of delimitation,” and “systems of formation”338 by showing 
formal compatibilities with an enfolded, reticulated sociological field. 
After outlining the functioning of Bourdieu’s field, I developed 
the concept in an inherently visual and visualizing direction.  I showed 
that Bourdieu’s description of the field is so carefully bound to visual 
metaphor that further development of the sociology of charisma as a 
visualized phenomenon increases its effectiveness in plotting agents 
interacting on a manifolded field.  I concluded that section arguing 
that Bourdieu, by introducing an envisioned field as a site of 
charismatic battle, inadvertently stumbles onto a different kind of 
Symbolic problem—one that insists the struggle for charismatic 
authority is itself a battle for legitimate control over knowledge of the 
Symbolic fabric’s convoluted topography. 
Finally, I ended chapter three by demonstrating that in the case 
of François Dosse’s History of Structuralism, Dosse diachronically 
entered the very historical field he intended to historicize by bestowing 
charismatic grace upon the subjects of his study.  In so doing, he 
himself intruded into the structural field, taking part in the ideological 
battles there.  Though Dosse presents a seamless narrative, he does so 
by actively distorting views of the historical field—measures that must 
be considered interventions on the part of the charismatics whom he 
follows. 
Following Foucault, an alternative model would posit historical 
ruptures—and not the more charismatic continuities—as viable, 
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preferable modes for the writing of history.  I argued that an 
intellectual history needs to account for Foucault’s “rules of formation” 
of a given discourse.  To learn more of charisma’s synchronic and 
diachronic authority on historical subjects, I attempted to reconcile a 
Foucauldian approach to those rules of formation while maintaining 
the complexity of the Bourdienne field.  This allowed me to understand 
the shortcomings of Dosse’s mythic biography.  Though Dosse offered 
platitudes attesting to the importance of multiple “centers” of historical 
investigation,339 his seamless narrative erased any possibility of 
multiple centers.  Instead, Dosse replaced the Foucauldian possibility 
of multiple “surfaces of emergence” with a single, concerted 
fountainhead from which all of structural history spewed forth.  For 
Dosse, the ancestry of structuralism’s exclusively French family began 
decisively with Lévi-Strauss. 
In place of the appealing but charismatically complicit Grand 
Narrative style of Dosse’s work, I urged historians to consider instead 
the archaeological possibilities of “lateral continuities” and 
“longitudinal discontinuities.”  For instance, where might Dosse have 
located epistemic alliances between Parisian structuralisms and other 
concurrent intellectual streams?  Where, in the very familiar narrative 
presented by Dosse and others340 of a coherent French history of 
structuralism, might he instead have discovered ruptures that contest 
                                       
339 See my footnote 8, page 12. 
340 A similarly constructed, though more demure account occurs in Edith Kurzweil, 
The Age of Structuralism: From Lévi-Strauss to Foucault (New Brunswick, N.J., U.S.A: 
Transaction Publishers, 1996). 
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a meretricious continuity?  The epistemic operation of ekphrasis, I 
suggested, might offer just such a rupture.   
Following the operation of ekphrasis allowed me to reconsider 
Otto Pächt’s injunction against it, which he insisted, served only to 
mislead the reading public.  Looking more closely at the operation of 
ekphrasis certainly indicates that Pächt is right to fear any claim of a 
truthful transposition from visuality into language; the image posited 
by any ekphrastic writing always cannibalizes the real original (if there 
ever was one).  Only by positing a restricted copy fashioned in 
language can ekphrasis ever attempt a transposition, but that 
transposition never emerges as a translation between modalities.  
Greimas ultimately provides the most compelling proof of this. 
His “Plastic Semiotics,” I proposed, presents a corollary account 
of ekphrasis, though he does not use the term.  Arguing that visual 
phenomena resemble both natural and artificial discourses, Greimas 
assigns visual semiotics’s existence in “tridimensional space” which, 
ultimately, resembles languages in their ability to refer outside of 
themselves.  This confirms, for Greimas, that the image indeed 
possesses a semiotics.  Since the plastic arts are capable of semiosis, 
like other semiotic systems, they must be open to paradigmatic 
analysis to determine the workings of their semantic universe.  For 
Greimas, this invariably leads to the square, which plots oppositions 
between terms to expand those relations to unnoticed binary pairs. 
Greimas’s semiotic square has endured harsh, though 
appropriate, criticism given the seeming arbitrariness of its shape, 
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number of sides, etc.341  I argued that its critics have consistently 
overlooked its greatest contribution as a model of inscription.  The 
rectangle as a semantic abacus is problematic, since it relies on 
Greimas’s dated belief that a Boolean constitutes language’s most 
reductive semantic relationship.  What matters far more to my own 
study, though, is the performed mapping of the square.  As illustrated, 
the very act of plotting the square encircles its objects in a cartouche—
an inscriptive mark indicating the Derridean operation of arche-
writing.  It is this envelopment within discourse, a particular 
encirclement, that distinguishes the rhetorical narration of history 
from its writing.  As such, Greimas presents the unlikely opportunity 
from which the historical supplement may be received in its rich 
chirography, and that plotting (like the signature) insists not on the 
historical text’s independence from its auto/graph, but rather insists 
on its complete ratification as such. 
The study of the square thus allows us to reconsider the entirety 
of this project in terms of inscription, bringing my initial claim on the 
importance of writing to historiography back into play.  While 
Bourdieu’s discussion of potentiation and envelopment on the field 
resembled a description of performance, in fact, it was never such an 
act.  As I have enumerated in my discussion on ekphrasis, those 
descriptions of the field are themselves cartouche-inscribed in 
                                       
341 See Timothy Lenoir, “Was that Last Turn the Right Turn? The Semiotic Turn and 
A.J. Greimas,” in Mario Biagioli, The Science Studies Reader (New York: Routledge, 
1999) 590. 
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discourse.  And though diaphanous rather than polygonal, such 
description of written activities is always a historiographic interest.   
 In this light, the utility of Madeline Caviness’s process of 
triangulation finds fullest expression.  In the previous chapter, I 
plotted variables on the semiotic square to expand those terms, 
showing their invisible counterparts.  Greimas provided this exercise 
to explore unnoticed—but highly operational—paradigms within a 
given semiotic.  While the particular paradigmatic results were of little 
interest to me, holding more relevance to the linguist, what was 
illuminating for my study was its resultant cartouche, which itself 
constitutes writing and evidence of inscription.  That writing—which 
contains both visible and invisible paradigms—is of utmost importance 
to the historiographer, who must at all times trace and uncover 
written processes that define and constitute the historical object. 
Triangulation, however, offers an elegant model, or at least a 
complementary one, in its insistence on operativity.  Not a completed 
triangle, but always a process of drawing one, Caviness’s semiotic 
exercise instead suggests that historical writing is already written 
within and without margins.  Marginalia—especially studied in 
medieval manuscripts—like the Derridean cartouche, destabilizes each 
reading, competing for the means by which a text is rendered primary 
or marginal.  The drawing of a margin line is itself the very process of 
inscription, and it calls attention not only to the act of its drawing (the 
writing), but to its ensnared body, as well.  
Triangulation, too, has the added connotation of navigation, and 
providentially, of movement.  Like the moving object within a radar 
 194 
display (itself a kind of transitory cartouche), the historical object of 
triangulation is always under inscription (and, consequently, under 
erasure).  The historian, as does the radar officer, always considers the 
historical object azimuthally: its obtains a bearing through inscription, 
but remains indefinitely positioned.  The historian thus follows 
tracks—themselves evidence of inscription.  It is this added quality of 
tracking with which I will conclude this dissertation. 
Little distinction has been made thus far between 
historiographic tenses, but this is an area in great need of expansion 
in subsequent works on critical historiography.  That is, the semiotic 
square and the cartouche are themselves geometric figures without 
temporal coordinates—they lack the contingency afforded by time.  
This proves acceptable for Greimas, though, since being essentially 
paradigmatic elements, they are unfettered by temporal limitations 
until they are arranged within a syntax.  Only then do they acquire 
temporal positioning.  Inscription, however, and by extension, the 
process of triangulation, in suturing the paradigmatic object within the 
syntax of its own configuration, necessarily renders its objects into 
time.  This same induction into writing occurs on the field; as 
mentioned in chapter two, Bourdieu describes this process as a “self-
structuring structure.”342   
Triangulation, then, provides a historiographic analysis critically 
embedded within the refutation of its capture.  It attests at every 
moment to inscription—to the seizure of historical and written 
                                       
342 See page 9. 
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tracks—but cannot offer that object in stasis.  Such an approach—
precise in its written coordinates, but at the moment of inscription, 
anchored to its own expiration—could lay a new course for 
contemporary historiography that continues to embrace its textual 
basis while at last crediting writing as its operative source of meaning.   
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